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MILITARY POWER IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B.A. Political Science, 1979  
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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
1994

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Master's Thesis, 2 Aug 93-3 Jun 94

Military Power in Operations  
Other Than War

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In a post-cold war environment, U.S. military deployments to promote stability, foster democratic reform, and encourage peace in an increasingly volatile world have risen dramatically. This thesis proposes that during protracted intervention, the U.S. reaches a strategic point of diminishing returns where the costs of intervention begin to surpass the strategic gains to be made; and how a myriad of variables contribute to the decreasing effectiveness of the military over time. Further, failure to recognize this point can significantly affect goal attainment, and protracted intervention can negatively affect readiness. The study examines U.S. intervention and the dilemmas that inevitably arise during protracted U.S. involvement overseas; it identifies problems associated with intervention and reviews current strategic thinking by noted authors and area experts. The study then examines two recent interventions, Somalia and Panama, applying a research model to determine if the U.S. was successful in achieving its strategic goals. A feasibility, acceptability and suitability assessment determines if military forces was the appropriate instrument to use and if not, why. The conclusions drawn tend to support the hypothesis, but they make even more evident the need for further study.

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Strategy, Operations Other Than War, Low Intensity  
Conflict, Somalia, Panama, Operation RESTORE HOPE,  
Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, Operation JUST CAUSE, UNOSOM

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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE


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
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
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# ABSTRACT

MILITARY POWER IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, by Major Melissa A.  
Applegate MI, USA, 236 pages.

In a post-Cold war environment, U.S. military deployments to promote stability, foster democratic reform, and encourage peace in an increasingly volatile world have risen dramatically. Never have so many of these "operations other than war" been conducted in such a short period of time by conventional forces tasked at the same time to remain prepared for war. Further, despite the nation's best intentions and significant investments of time, effort, and resources, a positive outcome does not always result.

This thesis proposes that during protracted intervention, the U.S. reaches a strategic point of diminishing returns where the costs begin to surpass the strategic gains to be made; and how a myriad of variables contribute to the decreasing effectiveness of the military over time. Further, failure to recognize this point can significantly affect goal attainment, and protracted intervention can negatively affect readiness.

The study examines U.S. intervention and the dilemmas that inevitably arise during protracted U.S. involvement overseas; it identifies problems associated with intervention and reviews current strategic thinking by noted authors and area experts. The study then examines two recent interventions, Somalia and Panama, applying a research model to determine if the U.S. was successful in achieving its strategic goals. A feasibility, acceptability and suitability assessment determines if military force was the appropriate instrument to use and if not, why. The conclusions drawn tend to support the hypothesis, but they make even more evident the need for further study.

#### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My appreciation and gratitude go to my thesis committee, for their perceptive ideas and insight as I struggled to produce a cohesive study of a difficult subject. Special thanks go to Dr. John T. Fishel, my committee chairman, who was my mentor--and at times my tormentor; through his wisdom, guidance and especially patience, I was able to complete this project. Thanks are also due to Karin Brightwell, who, by organizing and formatting this thesis, saved me hundreds of frustrating hours--she was truly a Godsend. My gratitude is also extended to my closest moral supporter, Major Debra Perez, who lived through the same twelve months of academic agony and who kept me focused on the end state. Finally, I am indebted to Colonel (Ret) Michael G. Snell, whose contributions are too numerous to mention. His love and support and have made this entire endeavor worthwhile.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

|   | Page |
|---|------|
| APPROVAL PAGE .....   | ii   |
| ABSTRACT .....  | iii  |
| ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....  | iv   |
| CHAPTER 1 Introduction .....  | 1    |
| CHAPTER 2 Literature Review .....   | 36   |
| CHAPTER 3 Research Methodology and Case Study .....   | 71   |
| CHAPTER 4 Panama: OPERATION JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE<br>LIBERTY .....   | 110  |
| CHAPTER 5 Assessment of Feasibility, Acceptability,<br>and Suitability of Military Interventions<br>and Conclusions ..... | 184  |
| TABLES .....  | 224  |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY .....  | 230  |
| INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .....   | 230  |

# LIST OF TABLES

|          |  |     |
|----------|--|-----|
| TABLE 1. | MOST IMPORTANT VARIABLES BY LONG-TERM DIMENSIONS ...                 | 224 |
| 2.       | MOST IMPORTANT VARIABLES BY SHORT-TERM DIMENSIONS ..                 | 225 |
| 3.       | MOST IMPORTANT VARIABLES BY LONG-TERM DIMENSION--<br>SOMALIA .....   | 226 |
| 4.       | MOST IMPORTANT VARIABLES BY SHORT-TERM DIMENSIONS--<br>SOMALIA ..... | 227 |
| 5.       | MOST IMPORTANT VARIABLES BY LONG-TERM DIMENSIONS--<br>PANAMA .....   | 228 |
| 6.       | MOST IMPORTANT VARIABLES BY SHORT-TERM DIMENSIONS--<br>PANAMA .....  | 229 |

## CHAPTER 1

### Introduction

At the same time, because we are able to fight and win the nation's wars, because we are warriors, we are also uniquely able to do some of these other new missions that are coming along--peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, disaster relief, you name it, we can do it, and we can modify our doctrine, we can modify our strategy, we can modify our structure, our equipment, our training, our leadership techniques, everything else to do these other missions. But we never want to do it in such a way that we lose sight of the focus of why you have armed forces--to fight and to win the nation's wars.<sup>1</sup>

General Colin Powell  
1 September 1993

Since November 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell, symbolizing the end of the Cold War, more U.S. troops have been deployed in operations to support U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives than in the entire period from the end of our presence in Vietnam in 1975 until 1989<sup>2</sup>. In October 1993, there were 18,072 U.S. Army soldiers deployed in 61 countries.<sup>3</sup> The international environment is enormously different than just five years ago; there is an increasing commitment of U.S. forces to what the Army now terms "Operations Other Than War (OOTW)."<sup>4</sup>

In the last five years, the U.S. military has committed itself in combat with distinction and today stands capable of achieving clearly stated military objectives in support of strategic political goals, as demonstrated by Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. The U.S. Armed

Forces clearly represent a credible instrument of national power in conducting conventional military operations.

Capability and raw combat power, however, may not always constitute the most effective "ways" to strategic "ends." Assessing the suitability of using U.S. forces in intervention for operations other than war is a complex undertaking. In any given situation requiring a U.S. response, if the costs of military intervention exceed the benefits to be gained, then it would be reasonable to conclude that another solution must be found at some point in time. It may be that U.S. forces should not be employed at all.

On the other hand, perhaps only the method of employing military force needs to change, whether through mission focus, force structure and training, or by developing a more equitable balance with the other instruments of national power employed --diplomatic, economic and informational.

One must determine how to measure military success or failure and the costs associated with the outcome--preferably before involvement reaches what may be a strategic point of diminishing returns. If such a point exists, and can be identified, it may allow for a more effective--and in turn, successful--use of military forces by the U.S. in an intervention scenario.

This thesis examines these complex issues surrounding military intervention as an instrument of national power. It evaluates not only the military's capability to conduct intervention by studying two recent case studies, it also assesses the long term impact of intervention to determine if there is a point where the costs of intervention begin to



outweigh the benefits. Finally, it assesses the impact of intervention on the military force and on the ability to realize strategic goals and objectives.

This chapter is devoted to providing an historical background, an analysis of the current strategic environment and an initial discussion of the challenging dilemmas associated with military intervention in a post-Cold War setting. The conclusions drawn from this broad overview produce the proposed research hypothesis, along with supporting hypotheses, for this thesis. The chapter concludes by detailing the direction of the study to follow.

### **Background**

Support to the "progressive" goals of promoting the stability that can lead to democratic reform overseas dates back at least to the Spanish-American War, when it became the rationale for attaining freedom for Cuba from Spanish rule. During the Truman administration, programs were implemented to assist in the economic development of post-World War II Europe in an effort to further the goals of stability and democracy. By 1960 it appeared to President Kennedy that economic assistance alone would not necessarily be beneficial to the poorest of the Third World.<sup>5</sup> Kennedy was instrumental in raising U.S. concern for both social and political reform, as evidenced by his belief that, "(T)he fundamental task of our foreign aid program . . . is to help make a historical demonstration that in the twentieth century . . . economic growth and political democracy can go hand in hand." The resulting U.S. protracted

involvement in Vietnam ultimately was ultimately rejected by the American public.<sup>6</sup>

Jimmy Carter, in the 1970s, brought human rights to the forefront of the foreign policy agenda, tying aid to the Third World to agreements to institute reform. His over-whelming emphasis on this issue was seen as a new direction toward liberal internationalism, and the results were mixed.<sup>7</sup> Nonetheless, the United States continues to search for ways to contribute to the admirable, if lofty, goals of worldwide peace and democracy. In the words of Douglas J. MacDonald:

Most Americans, for better or worse, see their nation as a force for good in the world. Though this self-image was badly bruised during the Vietnam era, it was not destroyed because it is based on widely held principles that are the very essence of the American . . . . belief system (which) is grounded in the assumption that a world of democratic nations would be a much more just and peaceful one. To ask Americans to stop believing this is to ask them to stop thinking like Americans.<sup>8</sup>

Despite these progressive attempts at a "kinder, gentler" world in the decades following World War II, it is generally acknowledged that throughout the Cold War the primary emphasis of U.S. foreign policy, as well as national security and military strategy, was placed on the all-encompassing policy objective of containing the expansion of Communism and Soviet influence.

Since the end of the Cold War, the "new world order" has seen a resurgence of historical conflicts unrelated to superpower competition for world dominance. Countries that once were strategically important and supported militarily, economically and politically by one superpower or the other, are redefining their role--or having it redefined for them--in the world. Many continue to struggle with internal or regional

conflicts, some of which arose during the Cold War, some of which are more historical in nature.

#### Current Strategic Environment

The continuing upheaval within the former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe requires the United States to reconsider fundamental aspects of its foreign policy objectives and methodology. We can no longer watch the world and react to crises from the "safe" perspective of knowing the threat with which we became almost comfortable. The overhaul in the global pecking order also forces the other nations of the world to re-examine their position vis a vis foreign affairs. For decades, much of the world relied on the American nuclear deterrence umbrella; other countries depended on the Soviet Union; few escaped one sphere of influence or the other. The political and military strengths of these superpowers was magnified by the relative weaknesses of their rivals and allies. American political influence in the world, to a large extent, relied on the,

concern over the reality of Soviet power and the uncertainty of Soviet ambitions (to) induce the Europeans and Japanese to put their security in American hands (and) to play a historically passive role in world affairs.<sup>9</sup>

In effect, America became an "empire by invitation."<sup>10</sup>

The changing levels of influence on the part of various players as a result of the end of the Cold War likely will force the United States to adjust to new competition in a world where its old policies may be inapplicable. For example, the rise of interdependency and global corporations with their own "national interests" actually

increases U.S. reliance on other nations, at least in an economic sense, instead of the other way around.

This shifting of global influence also is apt to lead to the emergence of regional power centers, to include super or near superstates in various areas of the world, allied economically, politically and/or militarily. These regional powers may work to "diminish very markedly the power-balancing role required of the United States."<sup>11</sup> As regional security arrangements are made and as power balances among those regions, the United States can, and perhaps should, allow countries to assume responsibility for more of their own security. Some would argue that it makes no sense for the U.S. to continue to provide global security or guardianship in the same manner in the 1990s that it used in the 1950s.<sup>12</sup>

Nonetheless, despite the developments of the last five years, the use of military power in intervention by the United States is still a viable means to foreign policy ends. Newly ignited conflicts or those that date back centuries are emerging or re-emerging. As such, clearly it is in the interest of the United States to play a major role in continuing to ensure or promote regional stability and encourage democratic reforms.

Promoting stability as an end itself, or as a way to encourage moves toward democracy, is based on "national policy goals of universalizing the democratic form of government."<sup>13</sup> Stability, peace and democratic forms of government, as "great icons of national policy" are ambiguous in developing military strategy, but are consistently used in mission statements.

In each case of real international action by the United States, (these icons) form the critical basis for the validation of such action as serving genuine American interests. All parties share in common the one undisputed American political objective of peace as a necessary condition of economic progress. Each of these abstract policy values, the elimination of divisions among men, the principle of self-determination, and the universality of the democratic political order, serves that approved objective. When force is applied in any form . . . it is justified by these icons.<sup>14</sup>

While these terms--democracy, stability, peace and security--have different meanings and are not interchangeable or even necessarily connected in the overarching strategic sense of justifying intervention, they provide a basis of connectivity for U.S. forces as they set out to foster an environment conducive to U.S. interests.

As for the use of military intervention to accomplish these lofty goals, the end of the Cold War has freed--cynics would say conveniently--the U.S. military to participate in missions that expand beyond the realm of combat on a grander scale and in more diverse ways than ever before.

There is something of a paradox here in that one might conclude that the military's role logically would diminish with the abatement of the Soviet threat. This logic has, in fact, driven the U.S. force structure to be cut by approximately one-third in the past three years.

The increased involvement of U.S. forces around the world supports the premise that ". . . when big evils vanish, lesser ones are quickly promoted to take their place."<sup>15</sup> In both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, U.S. military actions were constrained by the fear of escalation into direct confrontation with the communist superpowers.<sup>16</sup> Now that those dangers no longer exist, or are significantly reduced, the potential for the use of military power in battling what are

considered smaller, more manageable conflicts appears to have increased. Based on the figures noted at the beginning of this chapter, this is undoubtedly the case.

### The U.S. Military and Intervention

The proven success of U.S. forces in Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM probably has contributed to the widely-held perception that U.S. forces are a versatile, capable and responsive organization that can adapt to national and international needs. With the demise of the Soviet Union, many argue U.S. efforts can now be refocused utilizing the military to respond to situations where in the past the U.S. might have hesitated or seen military force as inappropriate.

With the potential for global war fading, the United States political and military leadership recognizes that the expanded role for conventional forces in intervention will be, and has been for the past five years, more on the "peace operations" end of the continuum of military operations spectrum.<sup>17</sup>

In accepting the premise that the United States will provide the leadership needed to "promote global peace and security,"<sup>18</sup> the U.S. is accepting responsibilities of epic proportions. Interventions assigned to the U.S. military likely will become even more unique and unprecedented. One example of this new diversity is Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, where, in the words of John Fishel,

The issue is almost one of "liberation" versus "occupation." In northern Iraq, unlike Kuwait or Panama, or even southern Iraq, the situation was that of occupation and the need to provide humanitarian services to hundreds of thousands of refugees produced by the war. What was really different about northern Iraq, however, was that these refugees had to be protected from the legal government of their

own country while at the same time prevented from themselves exploiting the situation to further their rebellion (which had been the precipitant of their search for refuge in the first place). This made for a wholly intrusive occupation/humanitarian relief mission.<sup>19</sup>

The complexity of military intervention brings with it numerous challenges and dilemmas which affect the military force and may determine success or failure. These issues are raised below to highlight the considerations used in developing the proposed research hypothesis.

#### The Problems With Intervention

There are numerous potential problems surrounding the core issue of how U.S. forces should be employed in an interventionist role in a post-Cold War environment. These include:

1. Reconciling ambiguous political goals and objectives with finite military capability.
2. The contradiction of employing an instrument of war in a benevolent role, as in humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping.
3. The limited success rate military forces attain when employed on long-term operations other than war, or the negative perceptions of U.S. force capability that may develop over time when visible success is not in evidence.
4. The potential for a degraded state of combat readiness faced by units deployed on operations other than war.
5. Established military doctrine which calls on conventional combat forces to conduct operations other than war, precluding considerations of force restructuring for OOTW-specific missions.

6. America's demand for quick solutions versus the long-term nature of many OOTW missions, and the potential loss of American support over time.

7. The potential for the intervening force to exacerbate the problem by its actions or its presence.

Each of these dilemmas has an effect on the military itself, the target country, the status of the United States in the international community, and/or U.S. ability to realize national security objectives.

#### Politics and Military Capability

Current U.S. national security strategy proclaims commitment to promoting stability and encouraging democratic reform throughout the world. However, while publicly-stated strategic goals remain intact, levels of commitment may vary with what different administrations see as more pressing requirements.

Also, while there is a general understanding of the ideals, application of a stabilizing strategy in the real world is not so easily understood or implemented. It may be that it is, in the words of John Lewis Gaddis,

it is all too easy to regard stability as an end in itself, rather than as the means to larger ends it always is.<sup>20</sup>

It is this confusion in understanding exactly what promoting stability and encouraging democratic reform entails, and the enormous commitment of resources it requires, that inevitably leads to inconsistent policies over time. Americans look for quick solutions to problems, both domestic and foreign; it is difficult to maintain the same sense of urgency in the level of commitment to various Third World



countries over time when threats to U.S. national security are not readily apparent or when other hot-spots draw America's attention.

And yet the use of military intervention to respond to a crisis, stabilize the situation and assist in moving a target country toward democracy in one form or another, almost by definition, is not a short-term proposition. Fluctuations in the degree of U.S. commitment over time can lead to a corresponding inconsistency in the application of the four instruments of national power.<sup>21</sup> These instruments include diplomatic or political, economic, military and informational power. This in turn creates the challenge of developing a coherent military strategy which reconciles ambiguous political intent with military capability and integrates the other instruments into actions to produce success.

In a country where the military holds fast to its apolitical image and focuses the preponderance of its attentions on the purely "military" aspect of campaigns and operations, incorporating the requisite political, economic and social missions into an interventionist role can become extremely confusing. As an example, an after action review of the Army's first participation in an 'Operations Other Than War' Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) exercise noted, "the politicians couldn't tell me what they wanted me to do, but they all wanted to know how long it would take."<sup>22</sup>

The recent examples of Haiti, Bosnia and Iraq after DESERT STORM demonstrate this inconsistency factor. In Haiti, although then President Reagan supported the ouster of dictator "Baby Doc" Duvalier in 1986, and President Bush soundly condemned the military coup against

President Aristide in 1991, the policy for Haiti has ebbed and flowed in the ensuing two years since Aristide's departure. Economic and diplomatic instruments of power, enforced or offered with varying degrees of intensity, have not solved the ongoing crisis in that country. Even the most recent benign intent of intervening with military elements to support the UN-negotiated return of Aristide was aborted before it even began.<sup>23</sup> After the UN-negotiated settlement failed to re-install Aristide, the same ships carrying a benign military force were ordered to institute a blockade of the country. The potential for mixed signals and negative perceptions on the part of the Haitians may preclude the success of any intervention by the military for any purpose, at least in the short term.

In Bosnia, U.S. forces are deployed to support humanitarian relief efforts and have been instrumental in enforcing a no-fly zone. While the political rhetoric has been forthright in condemning the combatants on all sides, with varying levels of intensity over time, actual intentions remain unclear to the people of Bosnia and the world at large. The level of commitment to that area of has served time and again to raise and dash hopes. While the situation in this crisis is extremely complicated, with no clear "good guy," and equally vacillating policies by Europe, Bosnia clearly exhibits--to many elements in the Third World at least--that they cannot always count on the U.S. putting into practice what it preaches. The perception of an unclear commitment reverberates around the world to all who would look to the United States for leadership, negatively affecting the ability to influence actions; one author notes that,

(s)ymbols matter in a world of intense and rapid communication, ideas diffuse across borders, and double standards can be devastating.<sup>24</sup>

In Iraq, shortly after conflict termination in DESERT STORM, then President Bush's stated rhetoric encouraged Shiite rebels in the south and Kurdish rebels in the north to intensify their efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein. In this case, the inconsistency between rhetoric and actions on the ground proved devastating. The revolts were put down decisively by Saddam Hussein, hundreds of thousands of refugees resulted, and public pressure to "do something" translated into U.S. forces being committed--not to combat Saddam's forces, but for humanitarian relief. The inconsistency and confusion went further; John Fishel notes:

The military strategy saw regional stability in terms of an Iraq whose military capability had been so degraded that it could not threaten its neighbors but not a dismembered Iraq consisting of a Shiite state in the south, a Kurdish state in the north, and a Sunni Arab Mesopotamian state in the center, all at war with each other. While government policy rejected this nightmare, it never was clear from the President's rhetoric just what it was that he wanted . . . . The results, of course, were the revolts of the Shiites and the Kurds, (and) the collapse of the revolts under pressure from . . . . Saddam . . . . Lack of congruence within the U.S. Government made for confused policy and undesired (and in some cases, unanticipated) outcomes.<sup>25</sup>

These comments reflect the dangers of perceived inconsistency not only on the part of a target people, but also within the framework of the U.S. strategy itself.

### Warfighters or Peacekeepers?

The second dilemma involves the difficulty of how to employ what is essentially an instrument of war, with all its inherent implications, to conduct benign missions in support of promoting democracy, stability, humanitarian relief and nationbuilding, sometimes in a combat-oriented environment.<sup>26</sup> These types of missions have been part of military intervention in each of the deployments conducted by the U.S. military since the end of the Cold War. In each instance, the U.S. has relied on the "versatility" of units and leaders as an answer to sometimes diametrically opposed peace- and war-related requirements.<sup>27</sup>

The belief in the need to concentrate on maintaining a warfighting mentality is understandable; the emphasis on combat skills is stressed every day in every unit throughout the military. Since the U.S. Army is a military force, it tends to operate as one, look like one, and project itself as a powerful entity. While this is essential in a conventional combat setting, its effect during some interventions could prove detrimental over time. These potential negatives do not necessarily presage failure of and by themselves. What they do indicate is that certain attitudes exist and, under conventional combat conditions, may be perfectly applicable. In other intervention operations, however, there is a need to refocus the "steely-eyed killer" attitude and training mindset of units which will intervene in order to conclude such operations with a stamp of success.

### Time Is of the Essence

If the military is destined to fulfill this interventionist role in the world's crises in pursuit of national interests, it would appear proper to relook the conduct of those missions. While short term goals have generally met with success during intervention operations, the record for long term success--and promoting stability and encouraging democratic ideals are by definition long term goals--has been less rosy.<sup>28</sup>

Over time, the absence of a tangible victory may lead to perceptions of, if not failure, something less than success. Somalia serves as an example. While initially successful as a military operation, the overall political situation remains unresolved with no clear solution in sight. In fact, although the majority of the countryside has stabilized, and people are no longer starving--largely as a result of U.S. military efforts--the instances where faction leader Mohammed Farah Aidid's "troops" have inflicted serious casualties on UN as well as U.S. forces have led to the general perception on the part of the American public that the U.S. has not met with overwhelming success.

The inherent American distaste for protracted involvement precludes--again by definition--overall success in an intervention aimed at providing stability by U.S. forces.

Because our military assets are increasingly limited and our interests wide-ranging, because conflict resolution is complex and ultimate solutions difficult, we have reframed our responses to avoid the protracted involvement of Cold War counterinsurgency. This necessarily entails handing off long-term responsibility to appropriate international or host nation authorities as soon as possible, short of jeopardizing U.S. interests. In all cases, long-

term involvement may not be avoidable, but it will probably be a U.S. objective to minimize protracted commitments.<sup>29</sup>

This avoidance of long-term commitment makes two debatable assumptions: (1) it assumes "international or host nation authorities" are capable of continuing progress toward the overall objective; and (2) it assumes the U.S. can extract its forces and claim success or divorce itself from any ensuing failure of the operation.

#### The Costs to Readiness

Combat units, trained to a fine edge to perform combat missions, cannot help but have that edge degraded when tasked to perform missions that support promoting democracy and stability.

To illustrate, prior to Operation JUST CAUSE, Colonel Michael G. Snell, commander of the 193d Infantry Brigade (Light), acknowledged as much. He identified from the Mission Essential Task List (METL) that commanders use to train their units, only one battalion-level task which his units were likely to have to perform in the event they were committed to operations in Panama--defend. He also had the brigade develop its own tasks, conditions and standards for a non-standard METL task of security operations. Traditionally, an infantry battalion has nine battalion-level METL tasks. His units trained to standard on these two missions and their subordinate tasks to the exclusion of the others. ("Attack" was added after operational plans dictated an offensive scenario.)

This concentration allowed time to train unit soldiers, down to squad level, on political sensitivities, restraint, and non-traditional tasks they might be called on to accomplish in that environment. While

this resulted in their overwhelming success during Operation JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY, Colonel Snell admitted that, had his unit been called upon to deploy to another country to fight as a standard infantry brigade, he would not have been ready to do so without additional training time.<sup>30</sup>

While for Colonel Snell's brigade this training system worked well, he notes it was due to the advantage of being a deployed force, capable of focusing on a single operational plan and specific scenarios. In today's Army, with the preponderance of forces stationed in CONUS, oriented for worldwide deployment against a variety of operational plans, this concentration of training effort is not possible.

This lack of focus was evidenced by the performance of several units which deployed during Operation JUST CAUSE and remained in a total "warfighter" mode, alienating the local populace and hindering follow on efforts during Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY.<sup>31</sup>

In other arenas, this degradation in traditional combat skills results because there is not enough time, training areas or allowances by the target country or organization overseeing the mission to train as units. This assertion has been made in reference to battalions returning from the Sinai<sup>32</sup> and probably would hold true for other forces involved in peacekeeping operations--in Macedonia, for example. Rod Paschall notes that when military forces are deployed to conduct stability operations, including peacekeeping or peacemaking,

(Military) organizations are formed for purposes other than peacekeeping and those original purposes are not served while a nation's military units are deployed and engaged in peacekeeping tasks. That nation's capability to wage or deter mid- or high-intensity conflict, for instance, is diminished. Then, too,

peacekeeping is a mind-numbing, boring duty that degrades a combat unit's fighting edge.<sup>33</sup>

While this statement applies more to those elements involved with observer/monitor-type missions, overall it can be argued that the low-level nature of peace operations and the potential for long periods of inactivity support the statement's assertion that combat readiness is degraded to some degree over time.

#### The Fallacy of "Versatility"

It does not appear, however, that at this time the U.S. Army plans to change the emphasis of training or organization to address this shortcoming. The U.S. Army TRADOC commander, General Frederick M. Franks, believes combat units, with supplemental training, can perform the missions inherent in an intervention and across the continuum of military operations, as opposed to building uniquely qualified units for operations other than war.<sup>34</sup> He argues that the "knowledge, attitude, toughness and teamwork" forged when training for combat is essential in the conduct of intervention which involves operations other than war. Units oriented strictly for the conduct of security assistance-type missions could not as easily be assimilated into combat operations.<sup>35</sup>

If, however, protracted intervention involves operations other than war to achieve strategic goals of promoting stability and/or democratic reforms, and if these missions are the preponderant examples of where the military has failed to fully accomplish long-term goals, it follows that perhaps combat units--as currently organized and trained--may not be suitable for a long-term intervention-ist role.



It is interesting to note that many countries, including Denmark and the Netherlands, who participate in UN peacekeeping operations have

recognized the dichotomy of skills needed for peacekeeping as opposed to those needed for making war . . . . (T)hese countries now utilize units which have been specially trained, organized, and equipped, in place of regularly deployable units.<sup>36</sup>

Also, General Wayne Downing, Commander of US Special Operations Command, noted that British forces preparing for operations other than war, most notably duty in northern Ireland, require six weeks of specialized training prior to deployment.<sup>37</sup> He went on to describe the Canadian experience in peacekeeping operations resulted in the conclusion that its conventional combat forces required at least four months of training to regain their warfighting skills following a deployment on a peacekeeping operation.<sup>38</sup> We must consider the costs not only of refocusing units toward operations other than war, but also the costs of returning to a conventional combat focus afterwards.

#### Considerations of National Will

Public support to military intervention is a fundamental prerequisite to success, both politically and militarily, domestically and internationally. One need only recall the devastating impact of the lack of national will during the Vietnam conflict to appreciate the criticality of this factor. During protracted intervention, public support does not appear to be a vital consideration for these operations, unless they are newsworthy, although there have been moves afoot in Congress, in light of recent actions in Somalia, to change this.

To illustrate, in the recent cases of Operations PROMOTE LIBERTY in Panama and PROVIDE COMFORT in southern Turkey, there has been little action taken by Congress or the President to mobilize support or even opposition. Following initial news coverage, little has been said about the northern and southern no-fly zones in Iraq or the no-fly zone in Bosnia, except when there is an actual incident involving U.S. personnel. There does not appear to be coordinated effort to gain national support to these missions.

The desensitization of the American public brought on by numerous extended deployments of routine activity punctuated by periods of crisis can have a backfire affect. Somalia again serves as a case in point. Routine operations generally were ignored, people assumed the mission was largely over, until 18 U.S. soldiers were killed in one day. The resulting public outcry was, in part, an understandable response to the failure of the U.S. government to sustain the country's support to its policy.

#### Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem?

A final dilemma involved in military intervention is that, despite our best efforts, or because of them, the introduction of U.S. forces may exacerbate existing problems or create new ones. This may occur early on in the intervention, or it may only develop over time. This unintended effect may preclude the accomplishment of the military mission, and hamper political efforts to achieve strategic goals.

While I was assigned to J2 of the U.S. Military Support Group-Panama (USMSG-PM), Colonel Jack Pryor, deputy commander of the USMSG-PM,

tasked my office with developing a new way to look at Panama in a post-conflict environment. We identified some ways to approach the concept of assessing a post-conflict area, an area described later in an article by Lieutenant Colonel (now Colonel) Ed Thurman published in Military Review in April 1992. It depicts post-conflict activity and peacetime engagement as part of the "Continuum of Military Operations."<sup>39</sup>

We wanted to identify how to keep another low intensity conflict<sup>40</sup> situation from arising under the auspices of the JTF-Panama mission of defending the canal and protecting U.S. lives and property, as well as promoting democracy and stability.

Although this research was only rudimentary, we realized that in a low intensity conflict situation, or in an environment where the conditions are ripe for a low intensity situation to arise, if conditions and perceptions do not change, the chances for an insurgency or rebellion to arise increases incrementally over time. As dissent grows, so does government repression, which leads to more formal dissent and the continued increase in a chance for conflict.

In a situation where the U.S. military steps in to solve a crisis, promote stability and assist in reforms along democratic lines that are seen as fundamental to U.S. national interests, a point is reached when the U.S. presence may, in fact, be setting the stage for the initial dissent spoken of above. One area expert noted,

Perhaps one of the most salient impacts of U.S. military intervention on national military and strategic goals is the postulating of the fantasy that U.S. military intervention is effective in promoting democracy. (Although) activity equals (positive) perceptions, (together they) do not equal progress.<sup>41</sup>

It appears the more the United States military does, the less it is appreciated, although that may be an over-simplification to cover all the aspects that need to be considered. Nyuyen Cao Ky, the former Prime Minister of Vietnam probably stated it best when he said,

so many well-meaning Americans . . . were unable to grasp the fact that (they) had made an excursion into a culture as different from America's as an African Negro's is different from that of an Eskimo. No man could hope to span the differences in American and Vietnamese culture and heritage in the short time of his appointment in our land. How could I explain . . . that while an American would be lost without a future to conquer, a Vietnamese is lost without the refuge of the past.<sup>42</sup>

It is said the (then) Soviet military managed low intensity conflict better than the United States, in that they concentrated their efforts at the strategic level in Third World countries for the most part, and when providing assistance at the tactical level, strictly maintained a low profile.<sup>43</sup> While special forces, civil affairs and PSYOP forces of the U.S. military have proven successful over time at this type of assistance, low profile presence is an almost diametrically opposed phrase to the American military.

There often are extremely high expectations of the U.S. military by the indigenous population when forces arrive, as evidenced by the initially grateful Somalis. As the U.S. presence is prolonged, it frequently becomes clear that all goals cannot be attained. Dissent may grow and the U.S. presence becomes mired in perpetuity because "there is more now to fix," or because "we're looking at a potential security problem now." U.S. intervention may be exacerbating the factors that play into a rise in dissent. The elements of visibility of the U.S. military, misunderstood psychological, physical, social and

cultural differences, and superpower arrogance begins to discredit our original intent.

This attitude, coupled with the time, effort, energy and resources already spent on the intervention, can lead to an increase in the U.S. presence, or an upsurge in the responsibilities assumed. A well-meaning increased or extended U.S. deployment may in actuality lead to, or contribute to, the very cycle described above, hence negating--to some degree--the ability to reach original objectives and secure national security goals.

Over the long term, military intervention may, in fact, work against achieving stated goals by creating dependence and its ensuing resentment, by over-exposing the military as a humanitarian organization and desensitizing potential adversaries large or small, or by not targeting the elements within a country that have the power to actually bring about the stability and democratic reforms.

Initially an "intrusive humanitarian mission,"<sup>44</sup> the U.S.-led coalition in Somalia succeeded in providing the necessary security to move relief supplies. The specific strategic objectives which were stated at the onset of the intervention were attained and the mission turned back over to the United Nations (UNOSOM-II) organization to realize the long-term objective of reconstituting the government and infrastructure--in other words, of promoting stability and encouraging democratic development. However, it only took one Somalia clan faction to begin to chafe at the amount of control imposed to lead to highly publicized dissent. This dissent led to opposition and then to violence,

requiring an increased presence of U.S. and coalition forces and, in turn, increased imposition of control.

Reaction by the people in the United States was predominantly negative, and politically threatened potential interventions in other locations, specifically Haiti and Bosnia. The situation remains unresolved. The failure to recognize the point of strategic diminishing returns led to confusion within the administration, the national military command, the diplomatic community and finally, among commanders on the ground.

This example serves to illustrate how failing to recognize this culminating point can dramatically change our ability to achieve the original strategic intent. The effects of such failure potentially can jeopardize the intervention itself (as seen in Somalia) as well as the position of the United States in its role as a world leader. If Somali clan leader Mohammed Farah Aidid can cause such confusion and loss of direction in the U.S. intervention, it follows that, while real power is not diminished, the perception of a loss of power or influence certainly exists.

This perception, whether on the part of the target country, the United States, or the international community, can reduce the effectiveness of the United States military as an instrument of national power. In interventions, because the military is so intertwined with the other instruments of national power, the perceived loss of credibility or influence can negatively affect the ability of the other instruments to accomplish the strategic goals and objectives.

### Conclusions

Overall, while intervention is not a new mission for the U.S. military, active conventional forces traditionally have not played a large role in protracted interventions that include the strategic objectives of promoting democracy and stability since Vietnam, at least not with overwhelming success. Short-term operations, such as Operation JUST CAUSE in 1989 and DESERT STORM in 1990, were deemed successful from a tactical, and even operational, perspective, but it remains unclear whether the overarching strategic goals of promoting stability and encouraging democracy were accomplished.

Although the primary military missions remain deterrence and the ability to fight and win should deterrence fail,<sup>45</sup> there is an increasing emphasis on promoting stability and encouraging democracy as a way to deter regional conflicts, evidenced by the new FM 100-5<sup>46</sup> and numerous policy statements by the current administration.

There are, however, numerous problems associated with an increased focus on intervention for operations other than war. Inconsistency in policy and actions, along with the need to incorporate the softer aspects of foreign policy, present numerous challenges in formulating a coherent military strategy. Protracted military intervention, even with clear, concise, military objectives, inherently develops or carries initially, the requirement to integrate military capabilities, resources, and manpower to perform tasks normally associated with the other instruments of national power.

One must consider the cost of using a warfighting organization in a benevolent role. Combat forces are just that; commanders

concentrate most of those efforts toward instilling an offensive spirit in their soldiers. Despite best efforts and intentions, the combat-oriented image and operational methods of American forces can be perceived negatively and reduce the chances of success. Military intervention as an instrument of policy is a demonstration of intent and/or of force projection; it is difficult to present an intervening conventional military force in a low profile.

Success, both in reality and perceptually, affects, and is affected by, time. America wants quick solutions; target countries often have unrealistic expectations of the intervening force to solve problems immediately. A perception of failure domestically, short or long term, can reduce the level of commitment and stymie attempts to achieve strategic goals. A perception of ineffectiveness in the target country or internationally can reduce the overall strength of the military as a power projection instrument of national power.

There is a loss of combat readiness within units focused on benevolent missions of post-conflict operations, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping. While conventional forces may, in fact, be capable of performing these missions with little or no specialized training, transforming them back into warfighters likely will prove more difficult.

There does not seem to be any clear impetus to change the force structure to create units specifically designed to handle operations other than war. This despite the fact that it is this type of mission which inevitably will have the most lasting impact on a target country.



National will, or public support to military intervention, appears to be fleeting. While it is probably too much to say the public views military operations abroad with a "no news is good news" attitude, there does appear to be a willingness on the part of policymakers to commit forces to operations other than war without mobilizing the country. Further, Americans are quick to condemn involvement in complex situations where there is no clear sense of winning. This can adversely affect the level of commitment and result in inconsistent and confusing policies.

Finally, U.S. actions in a given country can prove counter-productive by providing a focal point for opposition. If this occurs, U.S. involvement can then begin to expand exponentially to solve new problems it may have created on its own. The required degree of imposed control over elements of the target country likely will be objected to by the target country, eventually leading to dissent, opposition and potential exacerbation of the situation which initially led to the intervention.

This then becomes the strategic point of diminishing returns. Some of the issues discussed above potentially feed into this point to one degree or another, others are a byproduct. A failure to recognize that point, and a failure to address the mission, objectives and operational considerations upon reaching that point, can have a far-reaching impact on the U.S. military, U.S. interests and international community perceptions.

### Proposed Hypothesis

So it seems, at this point, there needs to be more study of this potential "strategic point of diminishing returns"; how, exactly does the U.S.--if it does--work against its own objectives and set the stage for active dissent; or, at least, an inability to influence the situation in line with goals and objectives. There may be a pattern which can be determined; if it can be deciphered, perhaps this study can recommend ways the military can respond to it.

The proposed research hypothesis, then for this thesis is: Protracted military intervention by U.S. forces consistently reaches a strategic point of diminishing returns, causing the benefits of the intervention to decrease as the cost rises.

Supporting Hypotheses include:

a. A failure to recognize the limitations of the military as an instrument of national power in protracted intervention can preclude successful mission accomplishment, either short- or long-term.

b. The use of military forces in protracted intervention reduces the ability of those forces to maintain conventional warfighting readiness. Conversely, concentration by military forces on warfighting capability alone reduces their ability to successfully execute protracted military intervention.

c. Reaching this strategic point of diminishing returns can dramatically change the ability to achieve the original strategic intent through the emergence of an anti-U.S. movement, or the loss of public support for the operation in the U.S., and/or potentially damaging perceptions by the international community.

## Direction of the Study

Chapter 2 of this thesis addresses current and historical literature used to prepare this study. Specifically, the literature provides detailed studies of security assistance, military civic action, and historical discussions of U.S. military interventions. There exists an abundance of texts, articles and monographs describing or hypothesizing about the effects of the end of the Cold War on U.S. military strategy and on national strategy in general. This study will make use of these documents to illustrate why U.S. strategy has changed to this new emphasis and to prove that it is, indeed, the direction which we expect to travel over the course of the foreseeable future.

In discussing the impact, or consequences of using U.S. military power as an instrument of national power in intervention, this study will concentrate on two primary sources of information, published research and interviews. Published accounts will assist in assessing the impact of involving U.S. forces in these operations on readiness. Also, several interviews with individuals who have had experience in intervention operations and have seen first hand the impact on military units will be utilized.

Chapter 3 addresses the first specific example of recent military intervention--Somalia from December 1992 to the present. Chapter 4 analyzes the case of Panama from the elections in May 1989 through January 1991.

These case studies will be evaluated through the application of the model developed at the Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD) at USSOUTHCOM. This model consists of seven dimensions, or

variables, which assess an insurgency's potential for success or failure.

The 43 insurgencies (each applied to the six models) varied with the dimensions of the SWORD model 90 percent of the time as contrasted with the next best performer . . . where they varied with its dimensions 73 percent of the time. As a result of these comparisons, we are convinced of the general efficacy of the SWORD model.<sup>47</sup>

The Sword Model provides a mechanism to assess an insurgency, but the variables used can also be applied to the specific cases to be studied even though they are not classic insurgencies. Preliminary research using the SWORD model tended to indicate that the model could be successfully applied to twenty-three other cases of non-insurgency investigated but not used in the research publication.

Somalia is a difficult case because it began not as a combat intervention, but rather as an "intrusive humanitarian effort."<sup>48</sup> However, upon the departure of the main U.S. force, and the subsequent hand-off of the operation to UN forces, the situation deteriorated into what essentially became a low intensity conflict which required the return of U.S. forces. Application of the SWORD model to this scenario will be modified to the extent that there is no established government which can be used to gauge responses, actions or results. The SWORD model covers action-related variables associated with the host nation government in the short-term dimension, which becomes difficult, understanding the lack of a central, organized government in Somalia. The model's variables will be modified to reflect the UN organization on the ground, UNOSOM, as the de facto government of Somalia, despite Mohammed Farah Aidid's attempts to circumvent its efforts. Again, the

impact of this case study of military intervention will assess the impact on the military, on Somalia, and try to determine if U.S. involvement in this humanitarian relief mission, and subsequent low intensity conflict, can be considered a success.

Panama, on the other hand, provides a clear example of conventional military intervention, with an inherent follow on mission (to Operation JUST CAUSE) of "promoting liberty"<sup>48</sup> for the forces that remained in country after redeployment of XVIII Airborne Corps elements. This study will address the impact of intervention operations on the Panama, and, through the use of the SWORD model, determine how successful the intervention has been to date and what its prospects are for the future.

Chapter 5 applies the feasibility, acceptability and suitability test to the three case studies. Each of these variables will be applied to determine: (1) if the military was the appropriate instrument of national power to be used; (2) if the cost of using military forces was acceptable; and (3) if military forces were suitable to achieve the strategic objectives. The study concludes with a summation and assessment of the findings.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>Colin Powell, "Bottom Up Review," Office of the Assistant Secretary Of Defense (Public Affairs), 1 September 1993: 4.

<sup>2</sup>General Frederick M. Franks, Lecture "Military Forces Update," Lecture Delivered at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 29 October 1993.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid. This number does not include those forces permanently stationed overseas; i.e., in Germany, South Korea, or Panama.

<sup>4</sup>U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1993), chapter 13.

<sup>5</sup>David Louis Cingranelli, Ethics, American Foreign Policy, and the Third World (New York: St Martin's Press, 1993), 218-19.

<sup>6</sup>Regional Conflict Working Group, Commitment to Freedom: Security Assistance as a U.S. Policy Instrument in the Third World (Washington, D.C., 1988), 7.

<sup>7</sup>Cingranelli, Ethics, American Foreign Policy, and the Third World, 218-219.

<sup>8</sup>Douglas J. MacDonald, Adventures in Chaos, American Intervention for Reform in the Third World (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992), 20.

<sup>9</sup>Ronald Steel, "The End and the Beginning," in The End of the Cold War, Its Meaning and Implications, ed. Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 111.

<sup>10</sup>Geir Lundestad, "New Role for Europe, Decline of the United States," in The End of the Cold War, Its Meaning and Implications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 203.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid; 101.

<sup>12</sup>Colin S. Gray, War, Peace and Victory, 354.

<sup>13</sup>Richard L. Sutter, "The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action," in John W. DePauw and George A. Luz, Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990) 140.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>John Mueller, "Afterthoughts on World War III, in The End of the Cold War, Its Meaning and Implications." (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 50.

<sup>16</sup>Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing, 1982) 127.

<sup>17</sup>Lieutenant Colonel Edward E. Thurman, "Shaping an Army for Peace, Crisis and War: The Continuum of Military Operations," Military Review, 72 (April 1992): 28.

<sup>18</sup>National Security Strategy, p. 3.

<sup>19</sup>John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm, 56.

<sup>20</sup>John Lewis Gaddis, "The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future," in The End of the Cold War, Its Meaning and Implications, ed. Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 38.

<sup>21</sup>U.S. Army Battle Command Training Program, Executive Summary, ARRC Seminar, 19-23 July 1993, (Kansas: Fort Leavenworth, 1993), encl 1.

<sup>22</sup>David Louis Cingranelli, Ethics, American Foreign Policy, and the Third World, 202-203.

<sup>23</sup>Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," Foreign Policy 87 (Summer 1992): 43.

<sup>24</sup>John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm (Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, 1992) 61-62.

<sup>25</sup>Major General Anthony Zinni, USMC, Lecture "Somalia," Lecture Delivered at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 30 November 1993.

<sup>26</sup>FM 100-5, chapter 13.

<sup>27</sup>Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1978), 86-108.

<sup>28</sup>Colonel Horace L. Hunter, Jr., (USA, Ret), "Ethnic Conflict and Operations Other Than War," Military Review, 73:11 (November, 1993), 20.

<sup>29</sup>Colonel (Ret) Michael G. Snell, interview with author, 12 November 1993.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid. Author also was present at a conversation with then Brigadier General Joe Kinzer, deputy commander of JTF-Panama, who had just returned from the town of Chepo, east of Panama City in early 1990. He had approached a local woman who drew the hourglass symbol of the 7th Infantry Division on a sheet of paper and asked Kinzer if he was one of "them." Only when he assured her he was not did she agree to talk to him. It was clear the 7th Infantry Division, whom the local population saw as door-kicking combat invaders, were not appreciated or welcome in that area of Panama.

<sup>31</sup>Robert Frusha, interview by author, Monterey, CA 15 October 1993.

<sup>32</sup>Paschall, LIC 2010, 137.

<sup>33</sup>General Frederick M. Franks, TPADOC Commander, Military Forces Update, Lecture Delivered at U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 29 October 1993. Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>A. W. Baker, "Peacekeeping: A New Role for U.S. Forces," (Individual Essay, U.S. Army War College, 1983) 8.

<sup>35</sup>General Wayne Downing, "Special Operations in Operations Other Than War," Lecture Delivered to Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 26 January 1994.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Lieutenant Colonel Thurman, Edward E., Military Review, 27-35.

<sup>38</sup>The use of the term "low intensity conflict" is a precursor to the adoption of the newer phrase "operations other than war." The term LIC is used in this instance to reflect the terminology that was effective in our theater of operations in 1990.

<sup>39</sup>Lieutenant Colonel Humphries, quoted in comments to draft.

<sup>40</sup>Nguyen Cao Ky, "How We Lost the Vietnam War" (New York: Stein and Day, 1976) in John W. De Pauw, "Winning the Peace," in Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action, ed. John W. De Pauw and George A. Luz (Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 1990), 143



<sup>41</sup>Regional Conflict Working Group, Commitment to Freedom: Security Assistance as a U.S. Policy Instrument in the Third World (Washington, D.C., 1988), 11.

<sup>42</sup>John T. Fishel, "Intrusive humanitarian mission was a term coined for Operation Provide Comfort. The actual mission statement called for forces to provide security for IGO/NGO humanitarian operations, discussion with author, 2 November 1993.

<sup>43</sup>National Military Strategy of the United States, U.S. Department of Defense, January 1992. p.6.

<sup>44</sup>FM 100-5 OPERATIONS, Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1993, chapter 13.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

<sup>46</sup>John T. Fishel, see note 50.

<sup>47</sup>The designated operational name for support to Panama following Operation Just Cause was "Operation Promote Liberty."

## CHAPTER 2

### Literature Review

This chapter deals with a review of currently applicable literature relating to the topic of the thesis, and can be broken down into several areas. The literature reviewed for this thesis overall provides one with the inescapable conclusion that there are as many opinions about the use of military forces in protracted intervention as there are authors. The problem is attacked from every viewpoint and direction on the policy spectrum from the strategic to the tactical level and begins with the issue of how the end of the Cold War has affected world events and in turn, the development of a new national security strategy.

Policy-related literature reviewed for this study concentrates on three areas. First, there are those authors who concentrate on the various paradoxes and dilemmas inherent in strategic policy formulation that in turn, make implementation of U.S. military strategy difficult at best. The second group of references include explanations of the current strategy in use--the compilation of various principles, characteristics, priorities and prerequisites, which, if applied to the letter, will eventuate success. Then, of course, comes the succession of those authors who will find exceptions to those same agendas and use them to demonstrate their ineffectiveness. Or, they demonstrate the futility of policy agendas by noting (with some smug satisfaction) how

often the U.S. becomes involved in intervention by selective application of those prerequisites.

The literature that specifically addresses the impact of using the military as an intervention force, both on mission accomplishment and on the military itself, generally diverges down three paths--those who argue for intervention with conventional forces, those who believe such intervention only exacerbates situations and cannot succeed in most cases, and those who fall somewhere in between--which recognizes the unique capabilities of the U.S. military as well as its limitations.

One group constitutes the view that, without reservation, because we are exceptionally good at conventional operations, that any and all missions are possible. They see that today's U.S. military is, without question, the most advanced and capable force in the world, with the best-educated leadership and the highest quality soldiers. If we improve this conventional force, if we increase and improve the lethality and accuracy of weapon systems, there is no mission too difficult, or so the conventional wisdom of much of this literature would lead one to believe. These writers see the continued export of democracy as critical to the national interests of the United States.

Further, this theory goes, operations other than war can be accomplished, at least in part, by modifying or fine tuning the military force mission to mission. They tend to gloss over the excruciatingly painful process of applying a warfighting organization to operations other than war and believe that, with few adjustments, we will be as successful at these operations as we are at conventional combat.

Then there are those who lean toward the opposite end of the spectrum and see military intervention as a recipe for disaster in almost every instance. They believe that the U.S. government foreign policy makers who employ the military do not fully understand the futility of intervening in today's complicated ethnic and civil strife, especially if the threats to U.S. national interests are not readily evident. They argue that the military itself is counterproductive to conflict resolution in many parts of the world because of the perceived inability of the U.S. military to understand cultural, social, economic and political realities of the situation into which they are thrust and because of the inherent image they present and the statement they make by their presence. The result is that the military can do little more than exacerbate an already complicated, irresolute situation without a massive long term commitment that the American public is unlikely to accept.

Finally, there are those who fall somewhere between, those who recognize the unique capability of the U.S. armed forces, but who also recognize the inherent difficulty in conducting successful intervention in the post-Cold War era. They have addressed the potential dangers of this new world order, and see a role for the U.S. to play, including the military forces. They are quick to point out, the fact that the U.S. military has, if nothing else, an unparalleled logistical and transportation capability. Coupled with the combat capable elements and specialized capability of our special forces, the military can, and should, be used as a viable instrument of national power.

However, they are also able to see, to some degree, the limitations of the military as an interventionist force and caution against decisions that will lead to mistakes of the past--a lack of commitment, a lack of resources to do the job, unclear objectives, a lack of an end-state or exit strategy.

Each of these areas, from strategic policy literature through each of the different major schools of thought on the use of the military as an intervening force will be examined to some degree in order to connect the central themes of this thesis to existing literature. The review also provides a frame of reference from which the reader can further explore the various issues this thesis raises. Moreover, this literature review will illustrate the compounding dilemmas that U.S. policy makers and military leaders continue to face as we attempt to identify coherent strategies that successfully achieve national interest objectives within the capabilities of the United States military.

#### End of The Cold War

The primary source of information used in the initial discussions was Michael J. Hogan's *The End of the Cold War, Its Meaning and Implications*,<sup>1</sup> which provides excellent essays by various recognized authors on the impact of the demise of the Soviet Union. Much of the material that volume addresses was discussed in Chapter 1 and will not be restated here; suffice it to say the book provides a good general overview of the enormous rippling effect this historic event has created in upsetting the 50-year old status quo. It also provides insight into

not only the dilemmas faced by policymakers in a new world where the old strategy no longer makes sense, but also into the numerous ethnic, civil and regional conflicts, held in check during the Cold War, which have now surfaced or resurfaced and which demand attention.

Other publications have also addressed the implications of the end of the Cold War and its affect on U.S. foreign policy and security strategy. Specifically, Colin S. Gray addresses the issue of the new "international distribution of power"<sup>2</sup> in his *War, Peace and Victory, Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century*. He argues convincingly that the emergence of "super or near-super states" will diminish the influence of the United States, not to its detriment, necessarily, but rather to free it from outdated security agreements which are no longer applicable in the post-Cold War era.<sup>3</sup>

Richard Connaughton, in *Military Intervention in the 1990s, A New Logic of War*,<sup>4</sup> presents a look at the impact of the end of the Cold War on the ability of the U.S. to influence the Third World. He states,

because today's smaller states enjoy greater collective power they will not be so easily fobbed off . . . . The Third World countries account for more than 70 percent of the world's population and over 58 per cent of its land area. Their differing conditions and circumstances are reflected in the regional organizations from which they derive their collective security.<sup>5</sup>

His book continues to present arguments against military intervention in a post-Cold War era, which will be discussed below. Here, however, he makes the case that with the demise of the Soviet Union, as the Third World becomes less dependent on the United States for security, increases in population, and forms regional alliances, it enhances the degree of influence it wields along with a corresponding decrease in

U.S. influence. This allows for the conclusion that where, in the past, U.S. policymakers may have assumed that the Third World would allow the U.S. to operate freely "in their best interests," this may no longer be the case, and will be less so in the future.<sup>6</sup>

Another reference that deals with the end of the Cold War and its impact on foreign policy, strategy and military intervention that is worthy of note is Joshua Muravchik's *Exporting Democracy*.<sup>7</sup> Muravchik argues that the defeat of Communism was more a reflection of the promise of democratic ideals, buoyed by America's economic and military strength, than an overt failure of a totalitarian system. He supports the view that the United States needs to continue to promote democracy, as opposed to adopting a policy of isolation.

Another excellent reference to the post-Cold War policy environment is *U.S. Security in an Uncertain Era*,<sup>8</sup> a collection of essays drawn from the *Washington Quarterly*, a publication of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. This volume deals with the redistribution of power in a post-Soviet world, how U.S. interests are evolving in various regions, and the challenges posed by international economic and demographic changes.

#### Strategic Policy--Paradox and Dilemma

The list of dilemmas facing the United States as it sets out to formulate a coherent national security strategy, with its corresponding national military strategy, are seemingly endless. Edward N. Luttwak's discussion begins with the paradox of how we "ensure the peace by preparing for war."<sup>9</sup> He believes "the entire realm of strategy is

pervaded by a paradoxical logic of its own"<sup>10</sup> and this would tend to be borne out in the research material used in this thesis. While it makes understanding of the subject extremely difficult, this non-linear logic cannot be ignored because of the level of permeation which exists at all levels of implementation and because it helps explain why we so often find ourselves unable to realize national objectives or why events do not always play out the way they were intended.

Colin Gray begins with the dilemma the United States faces by noting that with all its extraordinary strength, it nevertheless experiences

persisting difficulties reconciling the standards of decency that . . . society requires of public officials with the more brutal necessities of international life.<sup>11</sup>

This dilemma is one that continues to confound Americans in general and policymakers in particular; it is the profound "goodness," or if you will, naivete of Americans unwilling or unable to grasp the harsh realities that exist in the world. With America's relative youth, it is difficult to understand centuries-old ethnic or nationalistic conflict; because the U.S. is a developed country, it is impossible to see that more primitive nation states would not appreciate the "civilizing" effect that intervention by the United States could impose.

Richard Sutter, in an essay The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action,<sup>12</sup> also describes this dilemma in great detail. He provides an excellent discussion of U.S. ambitions to create a world at peace through "managed conflict,"<sup>13</sup> a world that follows the American tradition of democratic ideals along the lines established by James



Madison in The Federalist Papers. In relating this dilemma within the context of military civic action (MCA), he notes,

The national policy goals served by . . . MCA . . . also include the objective of universalizing the democratic form of government. This is based on the long-standing American belief that only tyrants and despots perceive war and conquest as positive goods. A democratic world, would, therefore, be a world at peace. MCA and the strategy of revolutionary action are employed to convert monarchies, oligarchies, dictatorships, and other kinds of regimes into popular governments which mimic Western governmental styles.<sup>14</sup>

He goes on to demonstrate that the United States, with all its good intentions, uses the abstract values of "elimination of divisions among men, the principle of self-determination, and the universality of democratic political order"<sup>15</sup> to justify military intervention. The dilemma arises in that as a people, Americans are loathe to intervene in the sovereignty of another nation, while at the same time, they feel compelled to help in the name of peace, which they consider to be "a necessary condition of economic progress."<sup>16</sup> For example, as in the case of Vietnam, (or Panama or Somalia, for that matter) the U.S. continued to try to justify its actions based on those very ideals which may or may not be applicable in the nation into which they feel duty-bound to intervene to promote peace and democracy.

Douglas MacDonald, in *Adventures in Chaos, American Intervention for Reform in the Third World*,<sup>17</sup> also illustrates this dilemma by arguing that there is a basic contradiction in the belief, on the one hand, that it is imperative to respect the sovereignty of nations, and on the other hand, the compulsion to get involved. He argues:

The proper role for the United States in the international arena is to act as an example to the rest of the world and to protect its

interests, but not to attempt actively to change it. A contrasting belief . . . is based on an evangelical, missionary impulse that promotes the idea of reform on a mass scale in order to bring reality into congruence with the broad generalities of American ideals and values. This "progressive" view (believes) government should not only take vigorous action to correct present wrongs in society, but should act to avoid future problems as well through a moderate devolution of economic, social and/or political power . . . .<sup>18</sup>

More easily put, "Americans earnestly want to help other people, but they also want to leave them alone."<sup>19</sup> The dilemma presents itself when these contrasting positions enter into the realm of policy formulation and/or crisis response; too often, both are tried to some degree, or a commitment is made to solving only part of the problem. As Charles Krauthammer put it in an essay on Somalia,

the paradox returns. There is no such thing as just feeding the hungry, if what's keeping them from eating is not crop failure but vandalism and thuggery. One has first to destroy the vandals and the thugs. In a country racked by civil war, what starts with feeding ends with killing. There is no immaculate intervention.<sup>20</sup>

This paradox can lead to varying degrees of commitment that are just as likely to lead to unintended results and the inevitable backlash of disbelief and perceptions of failure. This backlash leads to the frustration of unfulfilled objectives and it is back to the drawing board for the policymakers.

Sutter continues to build on this dilemma by presenting discussing the difficulties that arise once the United States has made the decision to intervene; that is, basically, that in order to stabilize a country, or to promote democratic ideals, you inherently cause destabilization, at least initially. This can, in the long run, work against national strategic objectives and potentially set the stage for short- or long-term failure. This is what he calls the "burn a village in order to save it"<sup>21</sup> dilemma, because essentially intervention

MCA, but it would logically apply to any intervening force to varying degrees) is forced to "adopt some version of cultural imperialism precisely because (the U.S. has) no other cultural referent than our own."<sup>23</sup>

This is an important aspect in discussing the impact of intervention on the ability to accomplish long term objectives and will be discussed more fully below. However, in terms strictly of a policy dilemma, Sutter very capably lays out that with every intervention the U.S. is trying to impose a change to the status quo, changes that in some cases, are diametrically opposed to strategic objectives, although that may not be realized initially. That failure to recognize what intervention can potentially lead to, i.e., an entire change in the political, economic, or cultural makeup of a target country, with its corresponding nascent opposition, can in turn lead to dramatic, even catastrophic failure to accomplish our goals, depending on the degree of intervention and the degree of change attempted.

Another dilemma that faces the policy making process detailed in Connaughton is the concept of the "slippery slope"<sup>24</sup> which is refers to intervention that gets out of control. In the instance of intervention, Ullman's slippery slope entails three stages of intervention, which build on each other or "snowball" out of control, leading to what currently is referred to as "quagmires" or "mission creep."<sup>25</sup>

The first stage of is characterized principally by the provision of material and financial assistance. . . . The second stage of intervention . . . by the limited participation of the supporting Power in military operations . . . . But in order for the intervening Power to get effective control, it is necessary to

proceed to the third stage. Then the intervening forces become the dominant element in the war effort of the supported side."<sup>26</sup>

It can be seen from this statement that there are multiple dilemmas involved in this argument. Intervention at one level may not realize stated objectives, leading to further involvement until a point is reached where the intervening forces are the primary determinants behind ongoing events in a target country. While this may work for a short period, it can lead, if protracted, to disillusionment on the part of the American public, prohibitive costs in manpower, resources, time, effort and energy--possibly without corresponding positive results--as well as the potential that increasing the degree of intervention will become the opposition rallying point for disparate groups in a target country who otherwise would remain disparate and weaker. Also, intervention itself can cause its own escalation of hostilities or can lead eventually to escalation--a UN Civil Affairs Coordinator in Bosnia postulates that the introduction of U.S. forces into that conflict would immediately provoke massive retaliation against UN forces by the Serbs.<sup>27</sup> To some degree this escalation and refocusing of the target has occurred in Somalia, and it could potentially occur with involvement in Haiti, where many people are believed to be more loathe to outside intervention than the oppression of a military regime.

Connaughton concludes that the

escape from the "slippery slope" requires astute decision-making and firm leadership in order to effect disengagement before full-blown military intervention is joined.<sup>28</sup>

It is to decision-makers and leadership the literature review will turn next, to illustrate formulation of current post-Cold War national security and military strategy. This is not to say this is the end of

the dilemma issue, however; as one explores the literature that addresses impact on military operations and the ability to accomplish objectives less overarching paradoxes exist. Their cumulative effects contribute to the dilemmas posed in the above paragraphs.

### Current Strategic Policy

There are numerous documents which describe national security strategy and corresponding national military strategy. In addition to the products published through the Joint Strategic Planning System, including the national security and military strategies, are out-of-cycle reports. One such product is the Defense Department's Bottom Up Review.<sup>29</sup> The validity or utility of this review has been argued at various levels within government since its publishing date in September of 1993. The debate is understandable since the document readily acknowledges the challenges inherent in trying to piece together a coherent strategy and organization around the concepts of uncertainty and the unknown. Then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin notes, "We must determine the characteristics of this new era, develop a new strategy, and restructure our armed forces and defense programs accordingly."<sup>30</sup> The review presents the potential dangers the U.S. believes it still faces, in four broad categories:

1. Dangers posed by nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction;
2. Regional dangers;
3. Dangers to democracy and reform; and
4. Economic dangers

The document is crucial to determining the role the military will play as an instrument of foreign policy with the statement, "Our armed forces are central to combatting the first two dangers, and can play a significant role in meeting the second two."<sup>31</sup> It is these second two, dangers to democracy and reform and economic dangers that call into question whether or not the military is suited to intervention missions outside the realm of the first two, more combat-related missions. There is a stated emphasis, under the provisions of this document, on post-war stability operations, peace enforcement and intervention operations, in which one could expect, as part of a coalition, to be able to conduct missions not normally associated with the Army's External Evaluation Program (EXTEV) manual. These will be more fully discussed below. The important contribution this document makes, along with its supporting analysis, is while the primary mission to fight and win the nation's wars remains constant, operations other than war will play a larger role for conventional forces than at any time since the Vietnam War.

David Louis Cingranelli, in his book, *Ethics, American Foreign Policy, and the Third World*,<sup>32</sup> explains that current trends in foreign policy will lead to the probable adoption of one of three possible models to deal with the Third World in the next century. The first is the isolationist model, which predicts the United States will lose interest in the Third World and drastically cut involvement and assistance.<sup>33</sup> The current administration's recent review of all foreign aid programs could support this idea, along with the disillusionment which has followed recent events in Somalia and Haiti.

The second model described by Cingranelli is regressive -one that projects the United States will take even greater steps to bring its influence to bear on the Third World without the constraints on its conventional forces that existed during the Cold War.<sup>34</sup>

Thirdly is the progressive model which postulates Third World countries, no longer viewed as prizes in a Cold War contest, can now be looked upon as areas to simply concentrate on promoting democracy through good works, humanitarian and civic action assistance, in order to further U.S. national interests and increase global stability.<sup>35</sup> This model would appear to be the one being pursued by the current administration, if one considers the idealistic and well-intentioned rhetoric that surrounds most of today's foreign policy statements. But, research yields far too few concrete measuring sticks to determine the success or failure of such an approach over time. One could argue easily success or failure in both the application of military forces as well as other instruments of power to the noble goals of stability and democracy and it remains to be seen whether, in the long term, this approach is fully adopted or modified to incorporate aspects of the other models.

Samuel Huntington, in an article for Joint Forces Quarterly,<sup>36</sup> provides clarification on military roles and missions of the future based on today's strategy by separating strictly military missions from those that fall under the purview of operations other than war. Military missions will include maintaining superiority, regional security, and foreign internal defense operations.<sup>37</sup> "Non-military" missions he refers to as potential operations to be considered among the

norm of the future include domestic crisis response, disaster and humanitarian relief, peacekeeping and operations as diverse as providing role models for America's youth and contributions to education and health.<sup>38</sup>

Huntington's arguments how to accomplish all of these diverse missions under current organization and operating parameters will be discussed below. What is demonstrated by his essay is again, that warfighting, while primary, is going to have its share of the pie bitten into more and more in an era of downsizing and reduced threat of conventional global war.

Secretary Aspin, in remarks to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in September 1993, further illustrates our military strategy of the future, with its emphasis on a two-conflict strategy. He believes that, as the U.S. is currently projected to be configured, the military establishment is capable of preparing to handle two major regional conflicts, while at the same time

support(ing) other coalition operations . . . peace-keeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian assistance. Our forces will be lean, highly flexible, highly mobile and able to deploy quickly in a crisis.<sup>39</sup>

This concept is at the heart of the debate over what are, or should be, the focus of the United States military in a post-Cold War environment because of the fundamental impact on force structure, on doctrine, on training, and on the ability to achieve strategic goals.

#### Impact On Military Operations and Goal Attainment

The literature addressing military intervention specifically in today's environment is as diverse as the discussions that abound on



foreign policy in general. One can generally liken the three schools of thought to Cingranelli's models, although the subject is almost too broad to be classified quite so succinctly. Accepting that military intervention is a viable instrument of national power, the problems arise--and hence the divergent view among experts--in trying to decide when, where, in what strength and to what ends to employ that instrument. Issues include the effectiveness of intervention, the cost of doing business is when forces are diverted from primary warfighting preparations, and what effects intervention have on how the United States is perceived within the international community.

The literature, as noted, generally falls into three categories: the traditional approach (what Cingranelli might refer to as regressive); the controlled approach (Cingranelli's isolationist model); and the moderate approach (Cingranelli's progressives).<sup>40</sup> Each of these will be looked at separately.

#### Traditional Approach

The traditional approach is one that has an overriding faith in the military's unique capabilities and professes a belief that its vast resources and internationally-recognized strength render it eminently suitable to respond to crises. With the demise of the Soviet Union, and the surge or resurgence of regional conflicts, natural disasters, and human suffering, the military can turn at least some of its attention to operations other than war as a matter of course, rather than assuming these missions as part of a deployment for combat only.

This emphasis on diversity can be seen first by noting the new chapter on "Operations Other Than War" as put forth in FM 100-5, Operations, the Army's primary doctrinal manual.<sup>41</sup> But official sanction of this concept is more widespread, and probably was the harbinger for the changes to the FM in the first place.

Secretary Aspin's Bottom Up Review clearly establishes that the current administration acknowledges that military forces, while primarily established to fight and win the nation's wars, can contribute to other missions requiring less firepower. These missions fall under the purview of operations other than war, including peace operations and humanitarian relief. In the words of the Bottom Up Review:

These capabilities can be provided largely by the same collection of general purpose forces needed for the MRCs (major regional conflicts), so long as those forces had the appropriate training needed for peacekeeping or peace enforcement.<sup>42</sup>

This document also recognizes, however (and some would say thankfully) that U.S. forces could not handle both a major operation other than war at the same time it was involved in a major regional conflict--an either/or proposition. Since there has been only one major regional conflict since the end of the Cold War, it follows that deployments of the kind referred to above are certainly an acceptable use, in the eyes of the administration.

Samuel Huntington, again in Joint Forces Quarterly, adheres to this line of reasoning by arguing that since armed forces have been used in other than combat roles since inception, there is no reason to believe they should not be used in such a manner today. As noted earlier, he acknowledges (but does not necessarily support) the use of

the military in non-combat missions, but he goes further in his argument by noting Senator Sam Nunn's position that U.S. forces can now

reinvigorate the . . . spectrum of capabilities to address such needs as deteriorating infrastructure, the lack of role models for tens of thousands, if not millions, of young people, limited training and education opportunities for the disadvantaged, and serious health and nutrition problems facing many of our citizens, particularly our children.<sup>43</sup>

While the accuracy of Huntington's historical perspective on what constitutes traditional roles for the military is not challenged, one might question the historical organizational structure and operating methods of the military of the past.

With today's requirement on Army combat forces to conduct EXTEVs, to train and perform in the national training centers through the Battle Command Training Programs (BCTPs), all of which primarily center around combat missions and combat Mission Essential Task List (METL) requirements, it is difficult to understand how we will retool or refocus our limited training time to do both, or all of the proposed missions that require vastly different skills, at least in the opinion of some.

Probably the best explanation of this traditional approach is provided in an article by Lieutenant Colonel John Abizaid and Lieutenant Colonels John R. Wood, in their article, Preparing for Peacekeeping: Military Training and the Peacekeeping Environment.<sup>44</sup> Abizaid and Wood have highlighted what they see as the challenges facing our forces who are tasked to prepare not only for war, but for operations other than war that are inherent in combat deployments. They concentrate primarily

on peacekeeping, but the issues they raise are applicable across much of the intervention spectrum. They argue,

The peacekeeping environment requires careful attention to restrain, civil action, force protection and multinational military and civilian coordination . . . . (G)iven adequate doctrine, realistic training and time to prepare, regular units can be better prepared for the challenges of the peacekeeping (sic).<sup>45</sup>

Further, they believe,

it is an environment, just like mountain, jungle, or desert that leaders must understand and for which they must adjust training.<sup>46</sup>

This statement admits that units designated to perform missions not inherent in the METL can be compared to those for which the Army has long recognized the need for special training and for which it has designated specific division-size elements--to wit, the 10th Mountain Division or the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The Jungle Warfare Center in Panama allows numerous battalion-size units of light, airborne and air assault divisions to train for that environment. However, with the exception of the infusion of some new scenarios into the national training centers at the JRTC and in Germany (specifically in response to potential contingencies to Bosnia, not as a matter of course), there has been little momentum to emphasize training, to reorganize, or refocus efforts in support of what across the board are considered increasingly likely missions of today and tomorrow.

Abizaid and Wood acknowledge,

In cases of civil war as in Somalia and Bosnia, there are few borders to police, front lines to respect, or demilitarized zones to inspect. In peacekeeping situations, soldiers man positions that are well-known, marked, and obvious to all. They patrol main lines of communication and frequently venture into dangerous urban terrain harboring unseen enemies. soldiers face the prospect of confronting

armed belligerents who only respond to the threat or actual use of force.<sup>47</sup>

Again, from a conventional point of view, a quick glance at any current company- or battalion-level EXTEV manual will make it relatively clear very quickly that the unique requirements of this environment are not adequately addressed and would require, as stated earlier in the case of Panama where all but two METL tasks were virtually ignored, a lot of time at the cost of being able to perform other conventional tasks.

Since it is not unusual for local authority to be destroyed, peacekeepers often find themselves forced to participate in the policing of the area. Searches, detaining criminals, and seizing weapons often become key elements in the military forces' strategy for controlling its areas and protecting itself.<sup>48</sup>

This "policing" requirement, passed to conventional units, can succeed, but the learning curve may be steep. For example, U.S. military police are specifically trained for this type of operation; their training program takes time to be effective and constitutes its own unique METL. If an infantry battalion or brigade is provided only limited time prior to deployment to train on these missions, it can only be expected that there will be mistakes made and warfighter attitudes will take time to readjust. If the leadership is also of the "warfighter mentality" as opposed to fully committed to this concept of restraint, which to some degree was witnessed in Panama in the 7th Light Infantry Division (noted in Chapter One), by the time the unit has learned how to fully employ this restraint and act according to the rules set forth for the specific operation, they may already have done irreparable damage to the attitude of the local combatants and/or the populace. This damage can increase exponentially if the local

combatants or indigenous population is not predisposed to the deployment of U.S. forces into their country in the first place.

The changes (in training) necessary can be taught as refinements to operations, expansion of basic skills, and enhancement of fundamental procedures in a relatively short period before deployment to a peacekeeping mission.<sup>49</sup>

This statement is true if there is sufficient warning prior to deployment; but in fact, training every day is designed to develop a warfighter attitude and to instill combat fighting skills in soldiers; to, in effect, create "steely-eyed killers." Arguing that this type of training needs only to be "refined" or "enhanced" appears diametrically opposed to many OOTW-specific tasks and is bound to create some degree of confusion in the minds of soldiers on the ground tasked with what can be termed "soft power"<sup>50</sup> missions. No one would argue that today's soldiers are inflexible and cannot adapt over time to almost any situation with which they are faced.

During protracted intervention, if soldiers who are not fully aware politically and culturally and capable of interacting with an indigenous population or local leaders are deployed, there is a potential their actions will be counterproductive to the overall operational and strategic goals set down at the outset of the operation. In the case of Somalia, and to a lesser extent, in Panama after Operation JUST CAUSE, it would probably amaze many from the United States how one small instance of rudeness, or perceived disrespect, or show of force can spread like wildfire through the indigenous population and set our course back to square one or severely derail efforts at progress. In the worst scenario, which to some degree has been seen in

Somalia, the U.S. military actually becomes the new focal point for "enemy" action.

Finally, Abizaid and Wood stress,

Leaders must allocate time and resources to prepare soldiers for the unique demands of peacekeeping . . . an ad hoc training program designed to teach rapidly deploying soldiers may fall short. Hastily assembled and trained units do not disguise the lack of adequate preparation. Success in peacekeeping is the result of training and timing. (emphasis added) . . . we should also prescribe a minimum essential predeployment and preparation and training period that allows units to adequately prepare for the complex missions ahead.<sup>51</sup>

These statements bring home the fundamental dilemma with the traditional approach. Today's doctrine, training, and operations are geared toward rapid deployment for combat, the "18 hours and wheels up" goal. It is all well and good for Abizaid and Wood to insist on the one hand that U.S. forces can do the mission--there is no doubt they can adjust over time--but to have a force able to deploy rapidly with all, or even many of the skills this article refers to is an almost virtual impossibility without some significant peacetime training refocus. Under today's current training program for combat units, this refocus does not exist except on the periphery of training planning.

#### **The Controlled Approach**

This argument, which if read correctly, would discourage even the most optimistic military leader from believing U.S. forces should be used for intervention. This view posits that intervention likely will not succeed in almost any instance, and that the resulting backlash in foreign and domestic disdain is not worth the price paid.

Frank Crigler, in his essay, *The Peace Enforcement Dilemma*,<sup>52</sup> sums up the confusion of today's crisis-oriented world into which we contemplate military intervention by saying,

scrupulous respect for national sovereignty and the consent of parties in conflict has grown harder to rationalize. Neat distinctions between international and internal conflicts have become blurred, while the collapse of authoritarian control in many states has unleashed violent ethnic rivalries and pressures for self-determination.<sup>53</sup>

He points to the first of several localized dilemmas that are faced by soldiers on the ground--can peace be enforced from the barrel of a gun on (here he refers to Somalia),

a reluctant and notoriously proud people . . . and the social fabric of their nation be rewoven at the direction of outsiders(?)<sup>54</sup>

Crigler goes on to discuss the problems inherent with using conventional military forces in an essentially law enforcement role. He notes as time progresses, or the intervention becomes protracted, military forces unwittingly become party to a conflict, which in turn hampers relief efforts and attempts to restore order and stability--a relatively cogent argument to nonintervention.<sup>55</sup>

Richard Connaughton also addresses this argument by noting,

most military interventions undertaken in this century should never have been embarked upon, for they were doomed to failure. The reason for this has tended to be due to misplaced faith in national capabilities as well as a misappreciation of the size of the problem.<sup>56</sup>

Connaughton further believes that intervention cannot help but "take with it the seeds of its own destruction," that it is a self-defeating proposal even if legitimized by an international authority like the United Nations.<sup>57</sup> It would appear from this writing that the



answer would be to assume an isolationist policy and accept that the United States has either no responsibility to the world or no ability to affect events, neither of which is an officially-sanctioned policy.

Despite his acknowledgment that U.S. forces have traditionally been used in what he terms "non-combat roles," Huntington appears to lean more toward this controlled approach when discussing the use of military force for intervention purposes. With reference to Somalia, for example, in his Joint Forces Quarterly article,

One or more parties in that conflict may perceive any outside involvement as a hostile act. Thus, by deploying American troops, from the viewpoint of the local combatants, we become the enemy. Inevitably while we are there for humanitarian purposes, our presence has political and military consequences. The United States has a clear humanitarian interest in preventing genocide and starvation, and Americans will support intervention to deal with such tragedies within limits . . . . But the United States has no interest in which clan dominates Somalia, or where boundary lines are drawn in the Balkans. Americans will not support intervention which appears to be directed towards political goals. It is morally unjustifiable that members of the Armed Forces should be killed to prevent Somalis from killing each other.<sup>58</sup>

Put another way by a senior government official,

Mr. and Mrs. Couch Potato want us to stop civil wars and save the hungry. They see the military as the best way to do that, but when people get killed they won't stand for it.<sup>59</sup>

This illustrates another localized dilemma in using military intervention for operations other than war. We want action, but action at minimal cost. The controlled approach sees little but futility, despite its acknowledgment that the desire to help, to spread democracy and goodness exists--it simply does not see military force as the answer.

Huntington also illustrates another localized dilemma; what he sees as the potential futility of attempting to use a military force for

humanitarian purposes. "A military force is fundamentally antihumanitarian: its purpose is to kill people in the most efficient way possible."<sup>60</sup> The conflicting signals presented through this dilemma may not be able to be solved without some fundamental change to a portion of the military force. As Rush Limbaugh says, the military "kills people and breaks things."<sup>61</sup> While this is obviously an overstatement, to some degree, the people of a target country may find it hard to understand military intervention in a humanitarian or peacekeeping role--especially when it is accompanied by gunships, tanks and roving armed patrols.

Part of the controlled approach argument rests on the realization that there is only so much one can do with scarce resources. While there are various documents that address this issue, U.S. News and World Report published an excellent article which clearly establishes the costs of doing intervention business. The article claims that the Army and Air Force are doubtful they can wage two regional wars at the same time they have over 22,000 soldiers deployed on various operations other than war missions. In the words of the article,

even small commitments, such as the Army force in Somalia, can paralyze an entire 16,500-person division. The 10th Mountain Division, for instance, has just one of its two 2,500-person brigades in Somalia--but it also has sent a good portion of its command, intelligence and aviation troops. That means the rest of the division . . . is essentially unavailable to fight elsewhere. And the Army (also) has smaller elements of three other divisions tied down in Somalia.<sup>62</sup>

The article goes on to say that perhaps two Armies might emerge from this, if the decision-makers recognize that operations other than war will take a seat at the main table of defense--one ready to fight, the other less so.<sup>63</sup> Perhaps the argument can best be laid to rest if

the military leadership was simply willing to accept that the expertise, training and attitude required for missions outside the realm of conventional combat dictate deliberately planned and allocated resources specifically for those missions.

In the end, though, of looking at this controlled approach, probably the most definitive article is an essay by Thomas A. Grant, in *Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats, New World*.<sup>64</sup> Grant argues that it is the "political and bureaucratic nature of the beast" that precludes U.S. military forces from executing operations other than war with the same degree of skill and acumen as seen in mid- or high-intensity conflicts.<sup>65</sup> He reasons that because military leaders have dedicated a vast amount of our resources, manpower and time to preparing for conventional, even nuclear war, operations other than war have been relegated to the lower end of the priority spectrum as a result of the consequences of losing to a Somalia would be much less severe than those if we were to face a nuclear-armed North Korea.<sup>66</sup> He lays out, in great detail, the attributes of low intensity conflict that make it unpalatable to the American people as well as to military professionals, who view operations other than war as appendages to our primary purpose.

Specifically, he includes secrecy, political ambiguity, duration, perceived stakes, the use of soft power, the problems inherent in integrating other instruments of national power (institutional arrangements), doctrinal resistance, and imbalances in will, organization and interest.<sup>67</sup>

While these issues, described in detail in Appendix A, present the best explanation for why the U.S. military is not good at operations

other than war, his arguments do not negate that these operations are part of every conflict, every mission, and hence need to be seen in light of not what cannot be done, but what must be done to provide us with the capability to succeed. What this article does say is that it is up to the doctrine, training and policy makers to move the military in a direction that expands our ability until or unless the decision is made that U.S. forces are no longer suitable for operations other than war.<sup>68</sup>

#### The Moderate Approach

Finally, the literature provides some references that fall between the traditional and controlled positions, and while there is not an extensive amount of material, it probably is the most compelling in terms of understanding not only the capabilities of the military in intervention, but also its limitations. It recognizes that the military cannot solve every problem, nor should it, but it also sees a role for the military to play in the post-Cold War environment in pursuit of what Cingranelli refers to as progressive foreign policy objectives-- democracy, stability, and peace.

Connaughton probably expresses the argument best by reasoning (after he presents his views on the futility of intervention) that there is hope for success in future operations. He says,

The USA's global power projection capability will become limited as the anticipated peace dividends are taken. In foreign affairs, the USA may choose not to become involved, perhaps just offering political support to collective security operations. Alternatively, where intervention really cannot be avoided, future policy will emphasize employment of naval and air forces. The aim will be to deploy land forces only in extremis. (emphasis in original) . . . What seems certain today is that multilateralism will prove to be a

useful, more rational foreign policy mechanism . . . than unilateralism.<sup>69</sup>

He goes on to assert that the role of the UN will increase in importance, but that it should not see intervention as the solution to every crisis. Rather that it should be used as a last resort, and when it is used, it must be used in such a way that the proper level of force is employed to ensure success. He concludes by emphasizing restraint through the argument,

It is not good enough to determine whether an intervention is justified. The interventions undertaken this century will have been considered justified by those responsible . . . yet most have failed because they could not succeed and should not have been attempted . . . Many future conflicts will simply be tolerated in "difficult" regions due to the sheer inability of other forces to form effective coalition operations.<sup>70</sup>

Colonel Horace L. Hunter (Ret), in an article for Military Review, also recognizes the contribution military forces can make while not ignoring the limitations. He cautions,

Because our military assets are increasingly limited and our interests wide-ranging, because conflict resolution is complex and ultimate solutions difficult, we have reframed our responses to avoid the protracted involvement of Cold War counterinsurgency. This necessarily entails handing off long-term responsibility to appropriate international or host nation authorities as soon as possible, short of jeopardizing U.S. interests. In all cases, long-term involvement may not be avoidable, but it will probably be a U.S. objective to minimize protracted commitments.<sup>71</sup>

Finally, General John Galvin, in an essay Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era, acknowledges "(t)he lower end of the scale of military response cannot be given "lower end" consideration and resourcing."<sup>72</sup> He also realizes that operations other than war is "part of the mainstream of security affairs" and that our ability to conduct these operations will depend largely on resourcing and training. This is

probably the most important aspect of the moderate argument--to convince the military leadership and decision makers that success is going to be largely determined by a willingness to accept another major mission, with the commensurate training, resources, and with the same dedication given to the primary mission since inception.

Galvin also supports the concept that in these operations, the efforts of specialized experts may be more pivotal than the combat forces, an absolute contradiction to the way we have always done business. Galvin believes the key to future success lies in determining "(h)ow can the United States support resolution of low-intensity conflict," rather than "how can the United States resolve low-intensity conflict?"<sup>73</sup>

### **Conclusions**

The literature, as can be seen, is diverse and inconclusive. The conclusions that can be drawn are that the end of the Cold War dictates the requirement for a new vision, of policy, of strategy, and of use of the military in pursuit of national strategic objectives. It is also clear from the literature that current policy is still being restructured and developed, and that many dilemmas remain to be resolved if a coherent strategy is to be adopted, if indeed there is a single strategy for the United States.

As to the use of military instrument of national power as an intervening force, the literature provides several schools of thought that cross the spectrum. Whether the military is the answer to all the troubles of the world, at least in those areas the U.S. deems it

necessary to take action, or whether forces are maintained solely in preparation for war, or if the military should be seen as a contributing element of response of last resort remains a highly debatable subject.

## Endnotes

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<sup>2</sup>Colin S. Gray, *War Peace and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 101.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>Richard Connaughton, *Military Intervention in the 1990s, A New Logic of War* (New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1992).

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 27.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>Joshua Muravchik, *Exporting Democracy, Fulfilling America's Destiny* (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1992).

<sup>8</sup>Brad Roberts, ed., *U.S. Security in an Uncertain Era* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993).

<sup>9</sup>Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy, The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, 3-4.

<sup>11</sup>Gray, *War, Peace and Victory*, 99.

<sup>11</sup>Richard L. Sutter, "The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action," in *Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action*, ed. John W. De Pauw and George A. Luz, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1990).

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, 139.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, 140.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup>Douglas J. Macdonald, *Adventures in Chaos, American Intervention for Reform in the Third World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).



<sup>17</sup>Ibid., 25-26.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Charles Krauthammer, "The Immaculate Intervention," Time, 142:4, 78.

<sup>20</sup>Sutter, "Strategic Implications," 136.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Connaughton, Military Intervention in the 1990s, A New Logic of War, (New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1992), 4.

<sup>24</sup>Connaughton, Military Intervention, 4.

<sup>25</sup>Article, "When There's No Peace to Keep," Newsweek, 122: 8 (23 August 1993), 20.

<sup>26</sup>Connaughton, Military Intervention, 62.

<sup>27</sup>Office of the Secretary of Defense, Bottom Up Review: Force Structure Excerpts (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1 September 1993).

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., 1.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., 1-2.

<sup>30</sup>David Louis Cingranelli, Ethics, American Foreign Policy, and the Third World (New York: St Martin's Press, 1993).

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., 231.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>Samuel Huntington, "New Contingencies, Old Roles," Joint Forces Quarterly, 2 (Autumn 1993).

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., 41.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Les Aspin: Remarks Before the International Institute for Strategic Studies (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 12 September 1993), 1-3.

<sup>38</sup>Cingranelli, Ethics, American Foreign Policy and the Third World, 231.

<sup>39</sup>U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1993), chapter 13.

<sup>40</sup>Force Structure Excerpts, 13.

<sup>41</sup>Huntington, New Contingencies, Old Roles, 39.

<sup>42</sup>Lieutenant Colonel John P. Abizaid and LTC John R. Wood, "Preparing for Peacekeeping: Military Training and the Peacekeeping Environment," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 10 May 1993).

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., 7.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., 8.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., 9.

<sup>48</sup>Thomas A. Grant, "Government, Politics, and Low-Intensity Conflict, in Old Threats in a New World, by Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992), reprinted in C520 Text, Operations Other Than War (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army, 3 January 1994), 19.

<sup>48</sup>Abizaid and Wood, "Peacekeeping," 9, 23.

<sup>48</sup>Frank Crigler, "The Peace Enforcement Dilemma, in Joint Forces Quarterly, 2 (Autumn 1993).

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., 65.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., 67.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., 70.

<sup>52</sup>Connaughton, Military Intervention, 29.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid.

<sup>54</sup>Huntington, "New Contingencies, Old Roles," 42.

<sup>55</sup>Newsweek Perspectives, quote attributed to an unnamed senior government official, Newsweek, 122: 26 (27 December 1993), 13.

<sup>56</sup>Huntington, "New Contingencies, Old Roles," 43.

<sup>57</sup>Rush Limbaugh, The Way Things Ought to Be (New York: Pocket Books, 1992), 200.

<sup>58</sup>"A Hollow U.S. Army?," U.S. News and World Report, 115: 19 (15 November 1993), 50.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid.

<sup>60</sup>Grant, "Government, Politics and Low-Intensity Conflict."

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., 15.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., 18-20.

<sup>64</sup>For other readings on this controlled approach, John W. DePauw and George A. Luz's Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action (MCA) (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1990) provides a host of arguments throughout its collection of essays on the problems inherent in military intervention. Although this reference deals primarily with MCA, many of the dilemmas associated with this form of "intervention" can be seen in debates against the use of military forces for operations other than war. This document also provides keen insight on the impact of intervention on the target country, an issue not addressed in this study, but integral to the overall success or failure of military intervention as an instrument of national power.

<sup>65</sup>Connaughton, Military Intervention, 45.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., 61.

<sup>67</sup>Colonel Horace L. Hunter, Jr., U.S. Army Retired, "Ethnic Conflict and Operations Other Than War," Military Review, 73: 11 (November 1993), 20.

<sup>68</sup>John R. Galvin, "Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era," in Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan, Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992), reprinted in CGSC Text 520, Operations Other Than War (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army, 3 January 1994), 12-13.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid.

<sup>71</sup>Colonel Horace L. Hunter, Jr., U.S. Army Retired, "Ethnic Conflict and Operations Other Than War," Military Review, 73: 11 (November 1993), 20.

<sup>72</sup>John R. Galvin, "Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era," in Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan, Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992), reprinted in CGSC Text 520, Operations Other Than War (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army, 3 January 1994), 12-13.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid.

## CHAPTER 3

### Research Methodology and Case Study

This chapter addresses the research methodology for the thesis and presents an analysis of Somalia, the first of two case studies. This discussion will use the SWORD Model as discussed in Chapter One to determine the outcome and perhaps understand how actions in Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM II contributed to the success or failure of the overall mission. Chapter Four conducts the same analysis for the intervention in Panama in 1989.

To determine the impact on the military and on the ability to achieve national strategic objectives through the use of the military instrument of national power, chapter five conducts a feasibility, acceptability and suitability (FAS)<sup>1</sup> assessment of each of the case studies.

Together, the application of these two methodologies may assist in drawing conclusions about the use of military forces in intervention. The assessments also may clarify the impact of involvement in each situation in a way that will lead to an acceptance of limitations, and an emphasis on strengths as the military contemplates continued involvement in operations other than war.

### The Sword Model

The SWORD Model consists of seven dimensions which can be applied to intervention situations to determine or assess the outcome of those events:

The theoretical construct suggests that seven dimensions, each composed of multiple variables, determine the success or failure of an insurgency. The seven dimensions form two clusters . . . . The first cluster (four dimensions) seems to affect long term outcomes while the second cluster (three dimensions) appears to have short term impact. . . . The theory links the seven dimensions in a concept of dynamic interaction.<sup>2</sup>

The four dimensions affecting long term outcomes include:

1. Military Actions of the Intervening Power, assessed through the number of troops involved, the type of actions taken, and the use of unconventional warfare.

2. Support Actions of the Intervening Power, assessed through the consistency of support, as well as the perceived length and strength of commitment.

3. Host Government Legitimacy, determined through the degree of domestic support a government garners, the ability of the government to provide services, and an assessment of whether political violence is considered common.

4. Degree of Support to Insurgency, applies to the destabilizing forces in a country; in Somalia, it refers to the clan factions and in Panama to the disaffected members of the PDF, Noriega's former political allies, and the Mafia-like infrastructure that continued to operate after the invasion. The dimension is measured by determining if support was available to the destabilizing forces, when

it was available, and whether or not it was possible to separate these elements from their sources of support.

The three dimensions associated with short-term impact include:

1. Actions Versus Subversion, measured by the ability of the Host Government to control the population, the successful execution of psychological operations to sway the population and gain support, and the ability to employ intelligence collection to counter the destabilizing forces.

2. Host Government Military Actions, rated in terms of how professional and well-trained the indigenous regular and paramilitary forces are, how willing they are to accept officer casualties, and how aggressive they institute patrolling against the destabilizing forces.

3. Unity of Effort, involves the perceptions of the Intervening Power's interests, the clarity of terms for any settlement of the situation, and the polarity between the Intervening Power and the Host Government.

There are four major players involved in the seven dimensions: the Host Government, the Intervening Power(s), the Insurgents, and the External Power(s) supporting the insurgents.<sup>3</sup>

These dimensions can be measured based on the actual events that occurred or environments that existed during the intervention operation. Each dimension, for purposes of this study, will be applied to the case studies and evaluated either as positive, negative or neutral on the outcome of the situation.

While the model allows for a more scientific quantification of the variables and dimensions, applying these measures will suffice for the purposes of this thesis.

The situations in each of the case studies are not specifically insurgency-counterinsurgency related. Adaptations to the model to the existing criteria, along with the absence of conclusive or complete data, leads to some degree of subjectivity in the evaluations. This study will use the research material already reviewed, as well as material that specifically addresses each situation to the degree possible in evaluating the seven dimensions. These seven dimensions, along with their corresponding variables, are graphically summarized in Table 1 and Table 2.

#### Definitions

Intervention. The introduction of third country forces (in this study focusing on U.S. forces), unilaterally or as part of a coalition, into a country or region to conduct operations in support of national policy objectives. These operations, for the purposes of this study, can include combat, but primarily are concerned with non-combat missions, including peace operations, humanitarian relief missions, and nation assistance.

Peace Operations. As defined by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali in his Agenda for Peace<sup>4</sup>:

1. Preventive Diplomacy: involves preventive deployment, or the interposition of a military force between combatants



prior to the outbreak of hostilities. It could occur with the consent of both, or only one, of the potential belligerents.

2. Peacemaking: generally means using mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or diplomatic initiatives to peacefully resolve a conflict.

3. Peace Enforcement: using military force to complete a cessation of hostilities or to terminate acts of aggression by a member state.

4. Peacekeeping: traditionally involves using military personnel as monitors/observers under restricted rules of engagement once a cease-fire has been negotiated. (The rules of the game are universally known; agreement of all parties to the mission and mandate, maintenance of absolute neutrality and the use of force only in self-defense.)

5. Peace-building: rebuilding institutions and infrastructure within a country to create conditions conducive to peace. (Peace-building deals primarily with post-conflict operations.)

Protective engagement. Using military measures, essentially defensive, to provide safe haven or a secure environment for humanitarian operations. (Such actions tend to fall between chapters VI and VII of the U.N. charter.)

Operations Other Than War. Military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces. Often of long duration, operations other than war may

precede and/or follow war or occur simultaneously with war in the same theater. They may be conducted in conjunction with wartime operations to complement the achievement of strategic objectives. They are designed to promote regional stability, maintain or achieve democratic end states, retain U.S. influence and access abroad, provide humane assistance to distressed areas, and/or protect U.S. interests.<sup>5</sup>

#### **Assumption**

That, in all instances of U.S. military intervention, there will be requirements, to varying degrees, to conduct operations other than war.

#### **Somalia: Operation RESTORE HOPE and UNOSOM II**

#### **Background**

The civil disorder which tore Somalia apart for two years following the ouster of dictator Mohammed Siad Barre in 1991 was, in essence, a classic ethnic conflict through which several clan and sub-clans vied for power.<sup>6</sup> That conflict led to a United Nations-led relief effort beginning in January 1991.

The failure of the UN-led effort to stabilize the situation in order to stave off mass starvation in Somalia led to the deployment of the first U.S. troops to Kenya in August 1992, to prepare for a food airlift.<sup>7</sup> In November, the United Nations approved a recommendation developed by JCS Chairman Colin Powell to provide assistance. This approval was based on two considerations: 1) the scale of the humanitarian disaster; and 2) the realization that the U.S. was the only "world power with the resources and will to do something about it."<sup>8</sup> The crisis was severe; by the end of 1992, an estimated 300,000-500,000

Somalis had died of starvation. Approximately 800,000 more had fled the fighting to refugee camps in Ethiopia and Kenya.<sup>9</sup>

According to Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, there were three stages of U.S. involvement in Somalia:

1. August 1992 to December 1992: U.S. provided food, but discovered the situation prevented distribution. Operation Provide Relief was initiated during this stage, essentially the airlift of food to the heart of the country. More than 30,000 metric tons of food and supplies were delivered to Somalia, of which 70 percent was provided by the United States.

2. December 1992 to May 1993: UNITAF, or Operation Restore Hope, stage, which focused on security as well as food. The U.S. led a military effort to provide sufficient security to deal with the famine, and the UN adopted Security Council Resolution 794, which eventually led to the deployment of over 26,000 U.S. troops, and 13,000 from other nations. Sufficient order was restored to allow relief supplies to reach the people. By spring, much of the countryside had been stabilized and the people were no longer starving.

3. May 1993 to present: UNOSOM II focused on creating conditions whereby the Somali people could rebuild their country. The UN broadened their efforts under a new UNSC Resolution (814), calling for the UN to begin to rebuild the government, reestablish the essential elements of a national economy and develop an adequate justice system and police to maintain order. U.S. troop presence during this period was reduced to just over 4,000.<sup>10</sup>

U.S. forces initially were deployed on a "finite mission: to end clan fighting and protect humanitarian operations in the famine belt of southern Somalia . . . ."11 Although the UN Secretary General called on the U.S. to assist in disarming the Somali fighters, this mission was precluded because "it was neither realistically achievable nor a prerequisite for the core mission of providing a secure environment for relief operations."12 The disparity between U.S. and UN goals would prove a complicating factor in the ensuing months as the U.S. tried to extricate its forces from increasing involvement in Boutros-Ghali's larger plan to rebuild Somalia.

This is not to say the U.S. did not aggressively pursue the mission--albeit with some degree of naivete. The U.S. military became "involved in every aspect of the restoration of order from limited combat operations to political negotiations and reconstruction of the national infrastructure."13

After the establishment of UNOSOM II in May 1993, relations between the United Nations and the rival clans deteriorated, and rebels targeted U.S. forces and other national contingents for attack. In June of 1993, with approximately 1,400 U.S. troops still on the ground and a U.S. Marine quick reaction force stationed off the coast, clan members attacked the Pakistani peacekeeping contingent, killing 24.14 The United Nations blamed the attack on General Mohammed Farah Aidid and called for his arrest, along with those responsible for the assault on the Pakistanis.

The United States responded with a new deployment of U.S. Army Rangers, along with two additional AC-130 gunships.15 Tensions

escalated further into the fall, as we conducted offensive operations aimed at capturing Aidid. The situation reached a culmination of sorts with an attack on U.S. forces that left 18 American soldiers killed, and 200 Somalis dead. With the American public incensed, President Clinton authorized an increase in U.S. forces in Somalia and established an end date for the mission of 31 March 1994.<sup>16</sup> Additional armor and infantry elements were deployed to provide security for the U.S. contingent.

By January 1994, the security situation in Mogadishu was still precarious, despite the relative calm of the countryside. The clans of Ali Mahdi and Aidid reached a peace agreement, but there were no guarantees that it would be honored by either faction leader. News reports alluded to increasing arms buildups, an indication that fighting could erupt upon the pullout of U.S. troops in March.<sup>17</sup> Prospects for a long-term solution, despite the massive U.S. effort over the course of 19 months, appear dim.

#### Actors

**HOST GOVERNMENT:** None exists in Somalia. The United Nations, which entered Somalia after the civil war, is as close to a governing body that provides requisite basic services as possible. Two major rival clan leaders, Mohammed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi both have claims on the presidency and have significant numbers of followers; hence, they each have an element of legitimacy.

**INTERVENING POWERS:** The United Nations also serves this role, as the initial and current intervening force. The United States, which led a coalition to provide relief under UN auspices, led the

humanitarian operation from December 1992 to May 1993. In effect, the U.S.-led coalition as well as the UN serve as the intervening powers.

**CLAN/FACTIONAL ORGANIZATION:** While the disaster that occurred in Somalia is the result of a civil war, and not an insurgency, continued clan rivalry precludes a settlement that will allow the country to stabilize. Primary players in this continued civil strife include Mohammed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi, along with their followers.

**EXTERNAL POWERS SUPPORTING THE FACTIONS:** Rival clans were able to escape to Ethiopia; however, Ethiopia did not sanction these actions. Much of the weaponry the clans used during the conflict and today are arms stockpiles provided by the then Soviet Union during the Ogaden War of the late 70s.

#### **Application of The Model Long Term Dimensions**

##### **Military Actions of the Intervening Power**

According to the SWORD model, the impact of military actions of the intervening power are applicable over the long term. Ideally, military forces should be introduced in small numbers to assist the Host Government defeat an insurgency. Military force "should not be applied ad hoc in response to either political or military failure, or in an attempt to "try something that might work." If military force (is required) it should be done overwhelmingly at the outset. . . .<sup>18</sup> The model further states, "the more intense and voluminous the military actions, . . . the more likely the incumbent government was to lose to

the insurgents. . . . The more they did--militarily--the worse things get."<sup>19</sup>

#### Analysis of the Dimension

Initially, the number of UN "peacekeepers" (read military force) was low. There were no real attempts to maintain a low profile, but their small number and lack of firepower precluded them from having a significant impact on the security situation. There were no government troops or police forces to train to deal with the factional fighting that was destabilizing the country.

Once the UN authorized the deployment of the U.S.-led coalition, the numbers of troops on the ground increased dramatically, with the intended effects. The Somalis perceived the U.S. humanitarian efforts as a benevolent gesture, and initially they welcomed the Americans. The U.S.-led coalition succeeded in stabilizing the country,

applying overwhelming force . . . to intimidate lawless gangs and rival clans, force their cooperation, and ensure the rapid seizure of all key terrain,<sup>20</sup>

sending the clear signal that the security situation had changed. U.S. forces were able to create an environment which allowed the non-governmental organizations to continue their work. They did not project a threatening stance to the rival clans and were generally seen by Somalis as neutral.

As time progressed, the U.S./U.N. presence took on a much higher negative profile. The United Nations increasingly took actions antagonistic to Aidid, to the point where they were seen as violating their neutrality. This "side-taking" led to a loss of whatever toehold

on legitimacy they possessed and the imposition of stringent military security measures to control the population, which Aidid and his followers understood to be oppression.

The support U.S. military forces provided in the search for Aidid eroded their neutral, benevolent position. Hence, they, too, became a target for clan factions. The mission had become one almost of foreign internal defense in support of the UN acting as the governing body of the country. Far from being perceived as a benevolent humanitarian organization, the U.S. military took on the appearance of exactly what it is: a highly visible, combat military force with an overwhelming amount of firepower. Cobra gunships, tanks, APCs and heavily armed troops patrolled Mogadishu. As one report put it,

There are not many targets in Somalia for the F/A-18 . . . to bomb and strafe, though U.S. officials threatened to take out Aidid's arms caches in the countryside if he made more trouble in Mogadishu.<sup>21</sup>

Adding to negative perceptions was the fact that numerous Somali civilians were killed in isolated incidents throughout the fall and into the winter of 1993-94.

The negative response by some Somali clan members should have been expected, but was not, at least in the eyes of the American people. That our best intentions "(led) down a path of entanglement and unintended consequences" should not be surprising.<sup>22</sup> In his argument that military civic action, applicable to this scenario, does little to produce long-term goodwill, Sutter points out:

It tends to release forces and produce outcomes which the theoretician who applies it does not understand or even recognize because these forces and outcomes do not fit the prejudices of his ideology. The smiling native who cooperates when soldiers show up



with the intention of disturbing the countryside gives his assent for a rather different motive--fear. Fear, however, is invariably converted over time into a search for a redeemed self-esteem. In a revolutionary situation, where tribal and communal loyalties are broken, national-ism is the likely means of expression for this kind of reaction. As in the case of a bad dog, the hand first bitten by this new nationalism will inevitably be the one which feeds it.<sup>23</sup>

Another factor that complicated the military actions of the Intervening Powers was the move toward nation-building tasks, including long-term stabilization, creation of an infrastructure and justice system, and nationwide elections. While some of these missions are inherent in a humanitarian operation, the scope of the operation grew exponentially despite the gradual withdrawal of troops and the chronic lack of effectively coordinated efforts by the UN and civilian agencies. These ambiguous new objectives created new challenges for the U.N. and U.S. forces in country, particularly along the lines of command, control and delineating exactly how these operations were to be executed.

As a result, during the UNOSOM II phase, "tactical and operational decisions were increasingly being made on the ground."<sup>24</sup> In fact,

No orders were ever issued authorizing a change in mission for the U.S. Quick Reaction Force, which had been established as an emergency standby that would act only as a last resort to aid UN troops. . . . (The U.S. military) started performing everyday tasks. UN military commanders, uncomfortable assigning missions to less reliable forces under its command, increasingly relied on the Quick Reaction Force to provide road security, to escort convoys and to conduct weapons sweeps, even though the Americans lacked the armor other troops had.<sup>25</sup>

The strategic restructuring of the U.S. role in UNOSOM II, along with a lack of coherent planning for expanded challenges, by design or by accident, resulted in limited success at best and dramatic failure at worst. Continued U.S. presence, even in small numbers (1,400

in May 1993), fostered expectations. Those forces were not, however, equipped, manned or resourced to rebuild the entire infrastructure of Somalia, despite the faith, confidence and pressure of the Secretary General of the UN. In the end, we succeeded primarily in lowering perceptions of confidence in, and potentially the credibility of, the United States military.

The use of U.S./Allied unconventional operations against the threat contributed significantly to the negative perceptions both at home and abroad and the ensuing failures to realize the strategic objective of capturing Aidid. U.S. special forces operations to hunt down the clan leader (for a period of time a publicly stated objective), the bungled raid on one of Aidid's suspected headquarters (whether the operation was a feint or not is immaterial) and related human intelligence gathering operations cannot be considered as contributing to the overall success of the mission.

Overall, this dimension is rated negative. The impotence of the initial UN force proved unsuccessful in accomplishing stability and easing tensions. The massive introduction of U.S. forces into country effectively resolved the immediate crisis, but exacerbated the situation during the later phase of the operation. The failure to maintain neutrality, the targeting of U.S./UN forces by Aidid's clan, and the limitations in resolving the base cause of the crisis, resulted in a loss of credibility that would cement the U.S. military on the path to failure in the eyes of America.

### Support Actions of the Intervening Power

Under this dimension, the consistency of support is the most important aspect in determining success. The model stresses that contributions to political and economic progress is much more important than military action. According to the model,

The aggregate data shows clearly that when military, economic, or political aid was withdrawn by the United States or another primary coalition partner at any time during a conflict, or when any of these types of support were provided inconsistently, the possibilities for success were greatly reduced. . . . Failure of the Intervening Power to reinforce the Host Government's efforts to attain or enhance its legitimacy probably dooms the counterinsurgency to failure.<sup>26</sup>

### Analysis of the Dimension

In Somalia, the United Nations initially maintained a semblance of neutrality and was committed to alleviating the widespread suffering of the Somali people. Over 80 relief agencies established operations in an effort to provide services; their willingness to remain in country despite austere conditions and threats to their safety demonstrate a strong commitment. Nonetheless, the UN's continued inability to deal effectively with stability revealed the weakness of the UN's military support to Somalia from the start.

The U.S.-led coalition arrived in country totally committed to ending the crisis and to save thousands of starving Somalis. The American public, haunted by news accounts and pictures flashed across magazine covers and TV screens almost nightly led to an outpouring of support to the plight of the Somali people.

Despite the initial 'hit the beach' show of force by the U.S.-led coalition in December 1992, American forces arrived with the

objective of performing essentially a humanitarian mission. They were able to complete that mission successfully, although they were unable to rectify the situation that had caused the crisis in the first place--nor had they been mandated to do so, at least in the eyes of the U.S. government. The initial success solidified U.S. commitment, or motivation to continue support; it remained high as long as the news was good.

When the U.S. pulled most of its troops out of Somalia in May 1993, the issue : ame relegated to non-news. It was only the increase in violence directed against the UN forces--among them, U.S. forces--that brought the situation back into the limelight. As the situation worsened, and violence increased, the motivation of the Intervening Powers came into question and the strength of commitment declined.

In October, when 18 American soldiers were killed, the American public overall withdrew its support for the operation, and an end date to our commitment was announced. Other nations supporting the UN effort, including Germany and Italy, also announced their intention to withdraw. Meanwhile, the UN requested assistance from other countries, but response was slow. Pakistan offered to continue support, but overall the perceived strength of the commitment waned, and the end of U.S. support was imminent.<sup>27</sup> The loss of U.S. support further hampered the efforts of the other 32 countries involved because these nations "lacked the muscle of the Americans and relied almost wholly on U.S. logistics support."<sup>28</sup>

On the diplomatic front, it was only the reintroduction of U.S. Ambassador Robert Oakley that kept relations between the two major

clans from dissolving completely. Oakley was able to convince Aidid and Ali Mahdi to continue negotiations, albeit minimally. At this writing, both factions can be expected to continue their struggle for power in country upon the departure of U.S. forces.

Overall, Actions by the Intervening Power that included feeding the population, efforts at negotiation, a willingness to respect the rights of the people and a strict adherence to rules of engagement are all positive.

Unfortunately, the inconsistency demonstrated by the Intervening Powers during the UNOSOM II phase confused the situation. The increasingly threatening stance by U.N./U.S. forces and the initial hunt for Aidid began a downward spiral of ambiguous policy. The subsequent flip-flop illustrated when the search for Aidid was called off and he was elevated to the status of a legitimate leader (by transporting him via U.S. Air Force aircraft to negotiations in Ethiopia) was equally confusing and raised questions on the consistency of support. When coupled with the failure of negotiations to make any real progress, and the publicly stated withdrawal of support from the United States, this dimension is rated negative in terms of long term impact.

#### United Nations (Host Government) Legitimacy

The host government, according to the model, is considered legitimate,

when it has a significant degree of domestic support . . . ; when its people do not perceive its actions to be corrupt; when it delivers necessary governmental services with reasonable efficacy and

impartiality; and when political change can be effected without a resort to violence.<sup>29</sup>

The model sees this dimension as probably the most important from an internal perspective in a war against subversion. In the case of Somalia, where no organized government exists, the only recognized authority that can be considered for the purposes of this study is the United Nations.

The primary variables considered under this dimension include the support to the government from the public, the degree of corruption perceived to exist within the Host Government, the government's ability to provide services to the country, and whether or not political violence is considered to be common.

#### Analysis of the Dimension

In considering the degree of Host Country (read UN) support against the threat (read the fighting clan factions), the UN certainly has made a Herculean effort to bring relief to Somalia.

The United Nations, along with its numerous relief organizations, was able to pacify the majority of the countryside, continue to provide humanitarian assistance and services to the people of Somalia. They encouraged the people of the interior to restart farms, schools and clinics, all positive factors. Still, their inability to create a stable environment in the power center of the country--at least in southern Mogadishu, their weakness in aggressively pursuing a negotiated settlement and the inadequate efforts to install a legitimate internal government or establish an effective security force voided many of their positive actions.

Early on, the U.N.'s major claim to legitimacy was its position of neutrality and its publicly perceived sincere intention to resolve the crisis. They began to erode their right to legitimacy when, following the attack on the Pakistani contingent in June, the Secretary General called for the arrest of Aidid, clearly taking sides against one of the primary rival clan leaders. UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali, a former Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, had extensive dealings with then-dictator Mohammed Siad Barre, and was therefore suspect among the rival clans from the start, especially within General Aidid's group.<sup>30</sup> In October, 1993, Boutros Ghali balked at restarting regional negotiations if they were conditioned on Aidid's participation. In fact, the UN failed to attend negotiations with Ethiopian President Meles, exacerbating an already unstable situation.<sup>31</sup>

The U.S.-led coalition, on the other hand, was able to pacify many of the clan factions, maintaining neutrality to a large degree, and in the eyes of the local population, the U.S. effort--and by extension, the UN--was legitimate. Unfortunately, the U.S. was not able to contribute to the legitimacy of the United Nations other than while they were the lead agent in the operation.

The chances for the Host Government to be successful are substantially reduced if violence is considered endemic in the country. While the vast majority of the countryside was pacified to ease the immediate crisis, chronic violence in the capital precluded the U.N. from establishing the stability required to start the country on the road to real recovery.

As a result, while the U.N. could claim services were provided, their actions were, to a large degree, a "finger in the dike" solution to the problem. An internal solution which would effectively end the need for a U.N. presence was no closer to reality in December 1993 than it was in August 1992. The people were no longer dying of starvation (although the term "famine" is once again being used by relief workers interviewed by the media), but the country was far from self-sufficient.

Overall, the UN provided services within the constraints of the security situation, but was unable to negotiate a lasting settlement which would allow for the creation of an internal governing mechanism. They initially maintained a level of neutrality that led to if not support, at least passive tolerance; much of this tacit support was lost when the UN violated their neutral position in the country. The eventual actions against Aidid by the U.N. and the U.S., the inability to provide a secure environment and set the stage to establish a legitimate Somali government, rate this dimension negative in the long-term sense.

#### Degree of Support to Clan Factions (Insurgents)

The model determined if sanctuaries, either external or internal, were available to the clan factions early on, they were more likely to succeed. A major goal of the Host Government or Intervening Powers should be to isolate the clans from their sources of support.<sup>32</sup> Also, this dimension can be interpreted, in this case, as the "flip side" of government legitimacy, in that support to the clan factions affects their legitimacy as potential rulers of the country.<sup>33</sup> The



three variables considered for this study under this dimension include the availability of sanctuary to the clan factions, when during the intervention sanctuary was available and how successful the Host Government was in isolating the rebel factions.

#### Analysis of the Dimension

Sanctuary was available to the rebel clans due to the primitive nature of the interior of the country, the lack of adequate forces to monitor the operations of the clans, and the ease with which clan members were able to assimilate into the civilian populace. Not only were the clan factions capable of finding refuge in the interior of Somalia, they were able to exfiltrate to refugee areas in Ethiopia.<sup>34</sup> While overt support may have been minimal from any outside element, the ability of the clans to cache weapons in safe locations allowed them to continue operations.

The vast interior provided numerous safehavens from which to escape from the security operations conducted by the United Nations forces as well as from the U.S. military. Additionally, even in the capital of Mogadishu, clan members could evaporate in the maze of the markets and remain hidden among supporters or neutrals alike.

Despite agreements by the various clans to turn in "technicals"--vehicles mounted with weapons used to provide security and to conduct operations--as well as other heavy weapons, the plethora of arms and ammunition available in country made these gestures relatively moot in the long term. Also, while clans were forced to curtail operations during the period from December 1992 to May 1993 while the

U.S.-led coalition was providing security in country, once the United Nations assumed control the clans were once again relatively free to operate.

At no time were the sanctuaries of the clans ever seriously threatened other than in isolated incidents, primarily because disarming the clans was never assumed as part of the U.S.-led coalition.

Interestingly, instead of the widespread deadly fighting between clans and sub-clans, the violence post-May 1993 was characterized by fighting between the clans and the United Nations forces. Our presence became

the focal point upon which clan factions (could) concentrate against as opposed to trying to figure the best way to fix the country.<sup>35</sup>

This may be seen, in a backhanded way, as policy gone askew. When the U.N., with the U.S. as its enforcer, tried to abrogate Aidid's legitimacy, it actually worked to his benefit. By targeting Aidid as a criminal, a "thug," the Coalition in effect solidified his support. Mohammad Sahnoun, a former U.N. envoy to Somalia, notes,

In Somali culture, the worst thing you can do is humiliate them, to do something to them you are not doing to another clan. . . . It's the kind of psychology the U.N. does not understand.<sup>36</sup>

While it may be difficult to understand how our actions could serve to indirectly enhance the legitimacy of the clans, who had made no real effort to rebuild or stabilize the country on their own (hence, in U.S. eyes do not have a preordained right to legitimacy), one should clearly understand the impact of the introduction of UN forces, regardless of how benign the intent.

For that intent, while unstated, involves the destabilization, destruction and the recreation of the cultural order of another people according to a coherent and detailed vision of the desire new political, social, economic, religious and cultural order which is the ultimate object of such action . . . .<sup>37</sup>

This intent is evidenced by Boutros-Ghali's vision of large effort to rebuild the infrastructure, install a freely elected government and establish an effective police force. It is understandable that what the UN (and the U.S.) saw as well-meaning intentions could be viewed by the proud Somalis with some trepidation.

The lack of understanding of how its actions might be perceived led to actions by the U.N. which were increasingly hostile to Aidid's faction. Meanwhile, the legitimacy of the U.N. could not help but be reduced in the eyes of the other rival faction leader, Ali Mahdi. He was attempting to negotiate through less violent means, and had abided to a large degree with the agreements to turn in weapons. By doing so, not only was he left vulnerable to an eventual takeover bid by Aidid, his own legitimacy was attacked indirectly through the publicity focused on, and the resultant elevated status of Aidid.

All three of the variables considered within the parameters of this dimension received a negative rating, leading to the conclusion that this dimension overall should be seen as negatively affecting the outcome.

#### Short Term Variables

##### Actions Against Subversion

The most important aspect of this dimension is that " . . . intelligence and psychological operations, and population controls must

be designed to quickly locate, isolate and destroy the insurgency."<sup>38</sup> The model emphasizes the need to aim operations not only at the enemy, but also to affect perceptions of friendly and neutral populations if the counterinsurgency is to prevail.<sup>39</sup>

#### Analysis of the Dimension

Efforts to influence the population and locate and attack the insurgency met with mixed success. While humanitarian relief operations were established early, the inability to stabilize the country hampered the effects of those operations. Both sides used psychological operations to further their cause and influence the indigenous population. Intelligence operations proved fruitful once established in country, but were hindered by a lack of understanding of Somali clan culture.

There is evidence that at least relief efforts in some form were present throughout the two years of fighting that led to the crisis. Non-government organizations (NGOs) were in theater long before the UN and U.S.-led coalition deployed, and they had their own goals for providing relief to the population.<sup>40</sup>

The NGOs were not, however, in a position to negotiate a settlement, encourage stability, or provide security. The arrival of UN forces, and later, the U.S.-led coalition, resulted in the establishment of a Humanitarian Operations Center to coordinate overall relief efforts. This in turn led to an increased amount of influence over local populations, but did little to influence the warring factions. It is reasonable to conclude, from the amount of continued violence in

Somalia, that despite successful efforts to control elements of the civilian populace, until the Host Government or Intervening Powers get the warring factions under control and to the negotiating table, the situation will either stagnate or continue to deteriorate.

Psychological operations were initiated upon arrival of U.S. Special Forces elements in December 1992. The goal of the PSYOP operation was to

project a neutral image of the force as an uncommitted, non-aligned third party between hostile factions, while promoting the goodwill and intent of the coalition and relief agencies.<sup>41</sup>

These goals were largely realized through the use of printed media and loudspeaker teams with interpreters, supplemented by leaflets and radio.

As positive as the effects of the PSYOP effort was, the clans also were successful in influencing the situation through the media. General Aidid's radio station began to broadcast increasingly negative reports about the U.S./UN presence in the country, attempting to inflame the population against the relief effort through appeals to clan loyalties. His actions, while they had an isolated effect on the population, had an even greater impact on the U.S./UN leadership, reinforcing their belief that he needed to be "removed from the equation" for the effort to be successful.<sup>42</sup> Further,

(Aidid) began to deliberately target U.S. troops, thinking he (could) energize public opinion in the United States against keeping Americans in Somalia as happened in both Vietnam and Lebanon.<sup>43</sup>

The impact of Aidid's actions led to the increase in operations against him, the perception that sides had been taken and neutrality

violated, and eventually to the violence of October. These elements worked against the U.S. PSYOP effort to promote our benevolent aims.

This dimension is rated neutral overall; the positive impact of our PSYOP and intelligence operations are cancelled out by the equally effective operations by Aidid and the inability to effectively employ intelligence assets to determine intent. The indigenous population in the countryside likely was more influenced by U.N. operations, but the people in the capital, the American people, and the U.S. government were powerfully affected by Aidid's actions.

#### United Nations (Host Country) Military Actions

In the case of Somalia, this is a difficult dimension to measure. For the purposes of this study, the forces serving under the United Nations will serve as the Host Country military force. The model suggests that the stronger, more disciplined and professional the military, the more likely it will be to achieve political as well as military objectives. There must also be a willingness to take casualties, both in general and among officers.<sup>44</sup>

#### Analysis of the Dimension

Generally, the level of proficiency of UN forces was considered inadequate prior to the deployment of the U.S.-led coalition. The initial UN authorization of four 750-man contingents was not effective in halting the looting, extortion and running battles between 15 various clans and sub-clan elements.<sup>45</sup> Relief supplies continued to be diverted from distribution centers and the people continued to suffer. While the proficiency of the military contingents that deployed with the U.S.-led

coalition varied, once the U.S. military arrived in strength, the perception that a professional, capable, and neutral force was in charge was widely held. The actions of the U.S. led coalition succeeded in stabilizing the situation in order to get relief supplies to the people.

General Hoar, the CENTCOM Commander, believed that a highly visible U.S. presence was counterproductive in the long run.

Raising the profile of the Armed Forces in Somalia would undermine the perception of U.N. military forces as truly international and capable of meeting the task at hand.<sup>46</sup>

Nonetheless, the loss of that presence had the opposite effect. Once the majority of U.S. withdrew, and UNOSOM II took charge, the situation again deteriorated and the military forces on the ground no longer were credited with the same level of effectiveness.

While there is no evidence to support that the United Nations force was not willing to accept casualties, i.e., understood the criticality of their commitment, there were differing opinions among the participants. During the period of U.S. command, casualties were minimal, and considered acceptable. However, upon the assumption of UN control and the standup of UNOSOM II, the situation changed drastically.

The loss of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers, the increasing violence against American and other UN forces, created a firestorm of protest in the U.S.<sup>47</sup> America was not willing to allow its soldiers to be killed in support of humanitarian efforts in Somalia, a country not considered to be of vital interest to the United States. This objection to casualties was, in large part, responsible for the announcement of a complete troop pullout by the United States and other contingents.

Based on the negative ratings of the most important variables associated with Host Country Military Actions, the dimension is rated negative.

#### Unity of Effort

This dimension involves cooperation and perceived common aims on the part of the Host Government and the Intervening Powers. It calls for the Intervening power to effectively employ public diplomacy to promote the goals of the Host Country. Essentially,

This principle ensures that all efforts are focused on the ultimate common goal--survival. . . . Should the organization not exist to effect the 'calculations and coordination', unity of command is lacking. Not only is authority fragmented, but objectives are unarticulated or become the subject of great controversy. There is no unity of effort to resolve the myriad problems endemic to the insurgency--thus failure.<sup>48</sup>

#### Analysis of the Dimension

The multi-lateral effort to bring relief to the Somalis initially was, in general, a cohesive, unified operation. The United Nations and the U.S. agreed on enough common aims of the endeavor to provide relief in Somalia. Even as the operation was winding down for the U.S., policymakers continued to sanction U.S. support to U.N. efforts. As the expanded scope of the UNOSOM II mission became clear, however, and violence against UN forces increased, that cohesion began to fall apart. The in-place command and control structure of UNOSOM II was a facade to establish legitimacy; the U.S. was effectively in charge in all but name. Nonetheless, this did not compel coalition members to respond to U.S. orders, a situation that would eventually result in catastrophe. Finally, the inter-national media had an enormous impact



on the international decision to intervene and, some would say, on the decision to withdraw; regardless, suppression of the media was never a factor in this case study.

The United States went in with the aim of stabilizing the situation and protecting relief shipments. The U.S. and multinational troops opened roads, got food moving again and carried out some disarmament operations. Disarmament, other than that which could be negotiated through political channels, was not a primary objective. Progress at negotiations, from the tactical to strategic level, was encouraging enough to lead everyone to believe the situation might actually be resolved.

In March 1993, the U.S. supported a UN resolution that specified United Nations nationbuilding efforts. In May, the U.S. House of Representatives even endorsed the nation-building effort and favored the use of U.S. troops to support it, for years, if necessary. This would suggest that the U.S. and the UN, acting not only as intervening power but also as Host Government, had a common understanding and that the multilateral effort presented a united front.<sup>49</sup>

During the early transition period of UNOSOM II, the United Nations began to change the mission of deployed forces from one of crisis intervention to one of nation-building and stability operations in the long term. This led to widely publicized debates among Coalition members, concerned with divergent national agendas. The objections on the part of participatory governments led to evidence of either a lack of commitment or an inconsistency of commitment, either real or perceived.<sup>50</sup>

The UN Secretary General was not immune to this political debate, saying at one point, "All of my experience tells me not to trust the U.S. You are too unpredictable and change your minds too often!"<sup>51</sup> The conflicting changes understandably produced confusion when no one transmitted clear messages to the U.S. and UN commanders on the ground in Somalia.<sup>52</sup>

In retrospect, the relative calm that existed in the country in May 1993 was not a true indicator of a stable situation. After the attacks on the Pakistanis and later, Americans, policymakers clamored to blame the United Nations for continued U.S. participation in what had originally been expected to be a mission of extremely short duration (then President Bush expected troops would be withdrawn by March 1993.) The divisions between the various policies and players became intractable after the October attack on Americans, and in the end, everyone lost.

On the ground, coalition partners for the most part continued to work relatively well together for common tactical objectives, and were largely successful in terms of continuing to prevent starvation.<sup>53</sup> As is often the case, though, one can win the tactical battle, but still lose the war. Successes at the tactical level were overshadowed by the difficulty in forming a coherent plan at the operational or strategic level and a failure to negotiate a settlement that would lead to a long-term solution.

UNOSOM II was portrayed as a structure under UN command and control, with support provided by the coalition partners. This portrayal was essential to establish the credibility of the UN in

operations that were increasingly seen as a viable for this international body. Unfortunately, the United States was in charge in all but name only. This led to a myriad of problems, not the least of which was determining the proper use of quick reaction forces, a dilemma that would preclude other coalition forces from relieving U.S. forces involved in the 3 October raid (which was conducted largely independently from UNOSOM II Command.)

The command and control system epitomizes a lack of unity of effort, because of the built-in authority to override or ignore orders from UN command deemed inappropriate by U.S. military commanders. Although Turkish General Bir was the UN commander on the ground, and ostensibly in charge of all forces and operations, this was not, in reality the case. The Special Representative of the Secretary General, Admiral (Ret) Jonathan Howe had an unofficial link to the NCA. Major General Thomas Montgomery (U.S.) wore two hats, as deputy under General Bir and as commander, U.S. forces. He also had an informal command channel to Admiral Howe, and was responsible to the CENTCOM CINC as well.

The end result of this convoluted chain of command was that the U.S. commander had the authority to veto a UN-directed unilateral operation. In effect, the U.S. QRF did not have to respond to UN requests if U.S. commanders were opposed to the operation. Conversely, the UN forces did not have to respond to U.S. unilateral operations. Hence, on 3 October, there was no mechanism in place to ensure that U.S. forces were reinforced by other UN forces when the situation got out of hand.

In effect, the emperor was not wearing any clothes--the UN was not a credible military command. The masquerade of UN leadership would only perpetuate the myth of UN credibility, with potential ramifications for future operations elsewhere in the world. Put best by John Bolton, a former State Department official,

We (meaning the U.S.) are the central multi-lateralists. The idea that there's some collective international will out there is just some fairyland stuff.<sup>54</sup>

The lack of unity of effort eventually affected operations not only at the combined level, but also on a U.S. tactical and operational level. Over time, U.S. commanders began to experience mission creep, or, in more professional parlance, an "evolving end state,"<sup>55</sup> which

broadened the scope of the operation to include many missions and tasks that were never initially conceived as part of the operation.<sup>56</sup>

The Army Forces After Action Report encourages leaders to anticipate this phenomenon and incorporate it into their vision, staff planning and execution.<sup>57</sup> This appears to be nothing more than excuse making for unclear policy, a lack of unity of effort and a failure to recognize the limitations of this instrument of national power. Mission creep more likely was a symptom of a lack of unity of effort at the national level; U.S. military commanders, even overzealous ones, are not in the habit of allowing their missions to expand beyond established parameters (i.e., specified and implied tasks.) More likely, in Somalia they were victims to changing policy and political decisions of expediency.

Finally, there are some who would argue it was the international press that induced the United States into getting involved

in--and later, into getting out of--Somalia. While this may or may not be true, reporting from Somalia once U.S. and coalition military forces intervened was free and uncensored, along the lines of established agreements between the Defense Department and reporters. International journalists were generally allowed access commensurate with the security situation. Whether or not the media drove policy is outside the scope of this study, except to say that there is sufficient evidence to indicate it at least played a role in forcing the administration into possibly premature action. In terms of the model, the openness of reporting is seen as positive.

Overall, the dimension of unity of effort is rated negative. Although initial combined efforts were cohesive, they remained that way for only a short period; divisive efforts were evident at some point across the spectrum of the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The impact of a lack of unity of effort is evident, with the result being the death of Americans and the withdrawal of U.S. support.

#### Conclusions

Of the seven dimensions applied to the case of Somalia, six resulted in a negative rating; one (Actions Against Subversion) resulted in a neutral rating. Table 3 and 4 graphically summarize the findings of this study. While there were some positive aspects of the operation, and initial objectives were attained, over time the failures at the strategic and operational levels yields dim prospects for future success. The U.S. military, capable of specific missions to achieve

specific objectives, and adequately armed to combat violence, does not necessarily mean that success is ensured.

Also, the successes attained by the U.S.-led coalition must be seen in the light of the overall strategic situation in that achieving initial objectives does not end the continuum of military operations. In a complex situation such as that found in the case of Somalia, solutions will be years in the making. The United States must understand the strategic ramifications of its involvement, and realize the use of the military in intervention can itself aggravate the situation. Decision-makers must clearly appreciate what the military can and cannot do and develop military missions to conform to those capabilities.

As the situation in Somalia grew more complex, with an increasing infusion of political and cultural issues to deal with, it appears limitations of military capability grew more evident. The U.S. was less likely to rectify the crisis because its military instrument of power is geared toward a conventional military approach to crisis response. This could be why U.S. policymakers did not fully understand the how the ramifications of, for example, the conventional attempt to capture Aidid exacerbated the situation. The U.S. military response in this instance was unsuccessful, both in reality and perceptually, and eventually had to be abandoned with no concrete military concept of operation to take its place.

Further, the evidence would indicate that the military force of the United States may not be the instrument of choice in a post-Cold War environment like Somalia, where "factions are not riven by ideology, religion or ethnic group--just by loyalty to clan . . . (and) able to

face down the political and military might of the world's civilized nations."<sup>58</sup>

Other instruments of power may have to suffice in certain situations where vital American interests are not at stake; at the very least, they must be brought into balance with the military instrument in intervention in places like Somalia.

The U.S. involvement in Somalia demonstrates the complex intertwining aspects of the political, economic, and social considerations inherent in operations other than war. Ambassador Robert Oakley addresses the need for balance by noting,

The political, military and humanitarian elements of many peacekeeping operations cannot be logically disjoined. Peacekeeping operations are essentially political operations carried out by military means. Political preparations and continuing dialogue can reduce casualties and increase the chances of military success. The converse is also true. The leverage of political effort to broker peace agreements is bolstered by sufficient military strength . . . . Humanitarian and economic thrusts complement and reinforce political-military thrusts if used in concert, or they can complicate them if not used properly.<sup>59</sup>

Finally, consistency of support is paramount. As Thomas Grant points out, "Our opponents are patient; our political system is not."<sup>60</sup> If the U.S. enters into an intervention only to withdraw when the situation does not conform to expectations, the rate of success in dealing with these types of crises likely will not increase. Only if leaders understand that not every problem can be solved in the short term can they preclude another Somalia from occurring.

#### Endnotes

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<sup>32</sup>Manwaring and Fishel, "Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Toward a New Analytic Approach," 309.

<sup>33</sup>John T. Fishel, discussion with author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1 February 1994.

<sup>34</sup>Jeffrey Taylor, Major, USA, interview with author, 15 January 1994, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 15 January 1994. MAJOR Taylor, an African Foreign Area Officer, was the primary Africa analyst on Somalia for Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) at the Pentagon from September 1991 to July 1993, and was instrumental in providing assessments of the situation in Somalia to the DCSINT and Chief of Staff of the Army.

<sup>35</sup>Oakley, "An Envoy's Perspective," 52.

<sup>36</sup>"What Went Wrong in Somalia," U.S. News and World Report, 35.

<sup>37</sup>John W. DePauw and George A. Luz, Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action, 141.

<sup>38</sup>Manwaring and Fishel, "Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Toward a New Analytical Approach," 286.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup>Hoar, "A CINC's Perspective," 57.

<sup>41</sup>U.S. Army Forces, Somalia, "ARFOR After Action Report For Operation RESTORE HOPE," (Fort Drum, NY: 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry, 2 June 1993), 86.

<sup>42</sup>Editorial, Washington Times, 27 August 1993, 1f.

<sup>43</sup>Oakley, "An Envoy's Perspective," 53-54.

<sup>44</sup>Manwaring and Fishel, "Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Toward a New Analytic Approach," 287.

<sup>45</sup>CALL, "Operation Restore Hope," 2.

<sup>46</sup>Hoar, "A CINC's Perspective," 63.

<sup>47</sup>"The Trouble With Good Intentions," Time, 37-38.

<sup>48</sup>Manwaring and Fishel, "Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Toward a New Analytic Approach," 288.

<sup>49</sup>"Anatomy of a Disaster," 45-46.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid. For example, then Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger complained the UN Secretary General had "moved the goalposts," while the UN blamed the U.S. for waffling over the disarmament issue and whether to stay in or get out.

<sup>51</sup>"Anatomy of a Disaster," Time, 45.

<sup>52</sup>U.S. News and World Report, "What Went Wrong in Somalia," 37. "No orders were ever issued authorizing a change in mission . . . . " Also, ". . . when U.S. diplomats belatedly recognized the policy had gone wrong, no one bothered to tell U.S. and United Nations commanders in Mogadishu that their mission had been changed." 31.

<sup>53</sup>U.S. Army Forces Somalia, "ARFOR After Action Report For Operation RESTORE HOPE," 20, 73-74, 77-79.

<sup>54</sup>Article, Newsweek 122:8 (23 August 1993): 19.

<sup>55</sup>"Make Plan, Then Make Peace," Army Times 29 (14 February 1994): 26.

<sup>56</sup>U.S. Army Forces, Somalia, "ARFOR After Action Report For Operation RESTORE HOPE," 49.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

<sup>58</sup>"Bloodbath: What Went Wrong," Newsweek, 38.

<sup>59</sup>Oakley, "An Envoy's Perspective," 52.

<sup>60</sup>Grant, "Government, Politics, and Low-Intensity Conflict," 20.

## CHAPTER 4

### PANAMA: OPERATION JUST CAUSE AND PROMOTE LIBERTY

#### Introduction

This case study assesses the situation in Panama from the May 1989 elections until the deactivation of the U.S. Military Support Group-Panama in January 1991. While U.S. actions prior to the invasion have a direct impact on post-conflict operations in relation to the model, only one overall assessment of each dimension will be made--to determine if U.S. intervention in Panama was successful, or if, despite surface appearances, the objectives of stability and democracy were unrealistic. Tables 5 and 6 summarize the ratings of the seven dimensions in relation to this case study.

#### Background

After General Manuel Noriega effectively nullified the May 1989 elections, during which the world had watched as the coalition of Guillermo Endara, Arias Calderon and Guillermo "Billy" Ford were beaten in the streets of Panama City, the prospects for a peaceful resolution to the crisis began to recede. The United States, increasingly embarrassed by Noriega and unable to reach an agreement to oust the dictator, embarked down the road that eventually led to invasion.

Despite prolonged negotiations, both unilateral and through the Organization of American States (OAS) from the period May 1989 forward, and despite a failed coup attempt in October, Noriega was able to delay

the inevitable until December. The coup attempt, which probably failed as a result of a lack of support from the United States as well as the ineptitude of the coup leaders, precipitated renewed active planning for the offensive Operation Plan Blue Spoon (executed as JUST CAUSE).

In mid-December, Noriega virtually declared a state of war with the United States, and, convinced the U.S. would never invade, had himself appointed maximum leader, with special powers to combat what he saw as constant harassment by U.S. military forces. Noriega claimed Panama would have "new wartime laws," claiming the U.S. had "surrounded and besieged" the country.<sup>1</sup>

The day after this declaration was made, a U.S. Marine lieutenant was killed by PDF soldiers at a roadblock in downtown Panama City, and a Navy Lieutenant beaten and his wife harassed. These incidents, on top of over a year of increasing harassment and patterns of intimidation leveled at the American military and repression of the Panamanian people, prompted President Bush to approve the use of force to accomplish four goals:

1. Safeguard the lives of Americans in Panama.
2. Restore democracy to Panama.
3. Protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty.
4. Apprehend Manuel Noriega and bring him to the United States to stand trial for drug trafficking.

The invasion commenced early on 20 December. Combat operations, which effectively ended after the 22 December attack on the DNTT, officially ceased 31 January 1990. Once Noriega was in the United States on 3 January, President Bush announced that all four objectives

had been attained. President Endara's coalition had been sworn into office prior to the execution of the operation.

American soldiers were greeted in the streets of the capital and throughout the country as liberators; the people were joyous that Noriega was finally in custody, and, despite the widespread looting, the incineration of the El Chorrillo neighborhood, and conflicting casualty figures, the invasion was generally approved of by the people of both Panama and the United States.<sup>2</sup>

The redeployment of the vast majority of the XVIII Airborne Corps on 12 January 1990 did not end military requirements. One report describes the condition of the capital after the invasion this way,

Panama City was in shambles after the U.S. invasion on 20 December. Widespread looting had stripped the shelves of merchandise in most of the businesses in the shopping districts. Rioters, often led by armed members of former dictator Manuel Noriega's Dignity Battalions vandalized countless buildings. In sum, Panama suffered over \$1 billion in losses.<sup>3</sup>

The remaining forces in country drew the mission of promoting stability with an eye towards democracy; forces were also allocated residual security missions and the onerous task of standing up the new police force. Nonetheless, overall force levels were down to pre-war levels by mid-February, with the residual force tailored to include numerous military police, special operations forces and support elements. To support these additional units, cuts to other forces were made.<sup>4</sup>

Many of these forces were task organized in January into the U.S. Military Support Group-Panama (USMSG-PM). USMSG-PM was responsible for standing up and coordinating training for the new Panamanian Public

Force (PPF),<sup>5</sup> and was instrumental in providing military support to nation assistance efforts.

#### Actors

##### Intervening Power

The United States in this case is the intervening power before, during and after the invasion. The U.S. has been a firmly established presence in Panama since 1903. Despite a relatively peaceful relationship on both political and military levels since the beginning of the century, and despite the long-term presence of U.S. military forces, the United States is still considered the intervening power.

Before the conflict, the troop strength increased from traditional levels, the operations tempo accelerated as the forces in country exercised U.S. rights under the Carter-Torrijos Treaties, and the level of diplomatic and economic pressure on the country escalated.

After the operation, the U.S. remains as the intervening power due to the extensive visible involvement of both U.S. military and civilian forces in stability operations and nation building efforts.

##### Host Government

This determination is somewhat complex. Since the time of Torrijos, the military, for all intents and purposes, has been the Host Government, despite the presence of a civilian president--he was never more than a figurehead; the military ran the country. It was only Noriega's abuse of power and his involvement in narcotrafficking, evidenced by two federal indictments in the United States, that became

overwhelmingly unacceptable to the United States government, not the concept that a military government was in place. One study noted,

As long as Panama was relatively quiet and cooperative, the United States could overlook the imperfections of military government and the facade of democracy.<sup>6</sup>

During and after the invasion, the host government becomes that of the coalition of Endara, Arias and Ford--elected in May 1989 and sworn in the night of the invasion in a ceremony arranged for by U.S. officials, on a U.S. military base.

#### Destabilizing Forces

The SWORD Model uses this term to define the enemy that the Host Government and the Intervening Power are trying to destroy. In the case of Panama, the situation again is complex when applied to the model. Over the course of time, the destabilizing forces changed, as did our actions toward them. The invasion successfully rid the country of the destabilizing forces which were focused on at the time, namely Noriega and the organization of the PDF and Dignity Battalions responsible for much of the looting and rioting.

In the post-conflict environment, the destabilizing forces take on a more traditional stance; the enemy then became groups of disaffected former members of the PDF, Noriega's former political allies, and the vast Mafia-like organized corruption that continued to plague the country.

#### Support to Destabilizing Forces

This element includes, in pre-JUST CAUSE Panama, outside support provided to Noriega in direct contravention to U.S. interests.



They include, but are not limited to, countries like Cuba and Nicaragua, who provided intelligence and military equipment and training support to Noriega's PDF.

After the war, support to the destabilizing forces can be found mainly in the form of rhetorical support to Noriega by his supporters who fled the country but continued to try and influence post-JUST CAUSE events from abroad. There is no evidence of any state-sponsored support to any of the low-level insurgent movements that existed--or claimed they existed--in the aftermath of the war. Within the country itself, destabilizing forces were small in number, occasionally vocal, and found support among the criminal and disaffected elements who were unable to realize the same profits (whether politically or economically) as under Noriega.

#### **Application of the Model Military Actions of the Intervening Power**

##### **Pre-JUST CAUSE Analysis**

After the elections in May of 1989, U.S. military forces began to plan in earnest for operations geared to depose Noriega and counter the threat of the PDF.

The arrival of July/August 1989 saw a dramatic increase in the use of military forces as a show of force in Panama, primarily in the capital and throughout the area in the general vicinity of the Panama Canal.<sup>7</sup> Exercises termed "Sand Fleas" and "Purple Storms" were conducted by in-country forces to demonstrate U.S. rights to move freely anywhere in the Republic of Panama. Although perceived by the Noriega

Regime as antagonistic, the U.S. maintained the "moral high ground" by using this justification to conduct these exercises, which involved everything from two to three vehicles driving the Amador Causeway to battalion-size operations throughout the areas of access. According to Major General William Hartzog, USSOUTHCOM J3 and later Commander, JTF-Panama,

we had a series of activities going on in Panama that were designed to visibly display the ability and will of the United States military to (1) protect its people there; (2) to live up to both responsibilities and exercise the rights of the treaty. Most of that had to do with freedom of movement which in retrospect had been eroded over the years by either actions or the lack of actions, that is, those things that were guaranteed by the treaty we either chose consciously to not do by what appeared to be good and cogent reasons to various CINCs, or we chose to avoid and not do so we wouldn't anger the Noriega regime.<sup>8</sup>

In an ineffective attempt to get the attention of policy makers in Washington, General Woerner, then commander of USSOUTHCOM, early in the summer of 1989, warned that an American could be killed by the increased level of posturing. He tried to convince Washington that "military posturing was bound to provoke the kind of situation we were trying to avoid."<sup>9</sup>

These military actions inevitably drew the wrath of Noriega and the PDF, upping the ante between the U.S. and Panama, and contributed significantly to increasing tensions. These actions, in retrospect, had little effect in convincing Noriega that his best course of action was to leave power. Instead he tried to turn the increase in U.S. military activity to his advantage, playing the nationalist card and portraying the United States as an imperial power bent on domination in Panama.

Noriega's success in trying to build anti-U.S. sentiment with the public as a result of U.S. military activity, however, was negligible. What he was able to accomplish, through a continuous campaign of harassment of U.S. personnel, was to increase the frustration level of the U.S. military forces in country. Every time his forces created an incident, the U.S. responded in kind. The environment became one of tit for tat, or "mano a mano" between the U.S. military and Noriega's PDF.

The U.S. reacted to each incident of harassment with its own small-scale retaliation--the PDF would stop one of our soldiers, we would detain two traffic policemen. The intent was to show our resolve; the result was an increase in tensions to the point where inevitably it blew up (with the killing of a Marine lieutenant), providing the casus belli precipitator necessary for the military operation to remove Noriega.<sup>10</sup>

Visibility and intimidation were the objectives, and succeeded only in increasing tensions. The focus for the American military became one of combat. Buckley points out that General Thurman (who became SOUTHCOM commander on 1 October) ordered all officers into combat fatigues, to include protective masks (although this was later toned down after the news hit the papers). He told his staff they were "literally at war"--with Noriega, America's enemies in Central America, and with drugs.<sup>11</sup>

The one chance during the period from May to December when U.S. military forces might have provided the impetus and support that would assist internal forces overthrow Noriega--i.e., the 3 October coup

attempt--was missed. The increased show of force by U.S. forces in the summer were "designed to trigger a coup," and probably did increase the confidence of Major Giroldi and the other coup leaders.

Nonetheless, whether through miscommunications and analytic failure of the situation, a lack of clear policy, the changes in command at the senior levels of SOUTHCOM and the CJCS (General Thurman and General Powell were both new to their positions) or indecisiveness over whether to support any PDF element, the U.S. missed the opportunity to use military forces of the Intervening Power to our advantage without necessitating a full-scale military intervention.<sup>12</sup> Marcella and Woerner argue,

The failure to respond was politically costly to the administration. Congressional voices from both parties and the media assailed Bush's timidity. The failure also allowed Noriega another opportunity to purge any professional elements left in the PDF. In short, it was probably the last chance for a Panamanian solution--however imperfect that may have been. The failure to respond effectively on 3 October also meant that the United States would act decisively next time and insert itself once again in a major way in Panamanian domestic politics.

#### Operation JUST CAUSE Analysis

Once the decision to execute OPLAN 90-2 was made, the invasion itself was conducted successfully. The plan was operationally sound, with clear initial objectives and overwhelming combat power committed against the forces of the PDF in a coup de main. In very short order, the United States was able to completely defeat the PDF, capture and extradite Noriega, and install the elected coalition to power. Noriega was gone, the Canal was safe (although it was never threatened), Americans were safe, and the democratic process was ensured. Actions of

the Intervening Power during this period are positive. Although a significant number of forces was used, the operations were conducted with an eye toward minimal collateral damage and limited civilian casualties. In the streets of the capital, American soldiers were the heroes of the day. As noted in Koster and Sanchez,

Panamanians welcomed (American) soldiers as liberators. And that was how those soldiers felt and acted. What jaunty confidence they showed, patrolling in twos and threes through a foreign city! A dangerous city too, for till week's end it was also patrolled by armed "Dingbats"--the soldiers' slang for Dignity Battalion-eers. How courteous and good-humored they were despite helmets and battle dress and body armor and weapons and boots and gear in Panama's heat! Clearly, they feared no evil. It was partly because they knew their business and could, if occasion warranted, be as evil as, or more than, anyone else in their region.<sup>13</sup>

If there is a negative aspect to the military actions during invasion itself, it was that the extent of destruction caused by looting during the invasion was not fully anticipated. This is not to say the possibility was ignored completely. John Fishel, one of the civil affairs officers involved in the planning noted,

if the plan were to be implemented in the wake of combat operations, the planners deduced that there would be a complete breakdown in law and order as the PDF police abandoned their posts. This would clearly have resulted in serious disorders, including significant looting, which would make it incumbent on U.S. forces to establish and restore law and order until such time as a new police force could be established.<sup>14</sup>

While senior planners initially incorporated the possibility of looting into their planning process, the follow-on chain of command, led by General Thurman who, along with the XVIII Airborne Corps was admittedly more concerned with combat operations, spent less time on the possibility.<sup>15</sup> One could argue here that a second-order effect of maintaining battle focus to keep the combat edge sharp is senior

officers with a narrower than optimum experience base and therefore, a restricted vision.

The speed with which combat operations concluded further hampered cohesive planning for the potential breakdown in law and order. In the words of one senior staff officer,

All of a sudden we found ourselves in a position where military operations were over. It shocked us because then we had control of everything and yet we weren't prepared yet to execute any type of law and order function or anything else. There was just a breakdown. What are we supposed to do next? We were never told what to do next, so we just sat there like dummies on the street corner and watched them loot the place.<sup>16</sup>

U.S. commanders did not anticipate the massive numbers of refugees that would flow from the burned out Chorillo district and flood the predominantly American housing areas. This caused American forces, which might have been available for commitment in the areas where looting went on, to be diverted to provide security in the PCC (Panama Canal Commission) housing areas.<sup>17</sup>

At any rate, the end result was that Panamanians took to the streets and the Panamanians themselves proved incapable of defending their businesses; the devastating effects would significantly hamper recovery efforts.

#### Post-JUST CAUSE Analysis

The military has historically done a very good job of planning and executing military operations but there comes a time when military operations cease and some type of a civil affairs law and order type mission starts, the transition from a military operation to a civil affairs police action starts and historically we have never done a very good job planning for those type operations.<sup>18</sup>

The problems incurred by military forces increased dramatically by the rapid cessation of hostilities, a lack of clearly understood

direction and the convoluted myriad of civil-affairs organizations--none of which was adequately manned. The planning that was done had not received enough emphasis or manpower to keep pace with the warfighting plans that were refined during the pre-JUST CAUSE phase. The answer was to combine the civil affairs organizations and establish the U.S. Military Support Group-Panama (USMSG-PM), the agency that would have the lead for post-conflict reconstruction and stability operations.

The SWORD model indicates that success is more likely when intervening forces maintain a lower profile, and are involved in training activities of indigenous forces. In Panama, it was difficult to conceal the presence of overwhelming U.S. forces, who remained a very visible presence on the streets of the capital and in the interior well into the summer. In spite of the speed with which combat operations were concluded,

Combat forces were allowed to be combat forces way too long. We were having combat jumps up in the middle and end of January when the fighting was over, using assets that could have been used for nation building, using people who could have been used to secure and support nation building.<sup>19</sup>

Following the termination of combat operations at the end of January 1990, the U.S. military remained charged with stabilizing the country. The USMSG-PM, subordinate to, and supported by, JTF-PM, was responsible for several facets of getting the country back on its feet. These responsibilities included providing guidance and security assistance to the government leadership, supporting the JTF-PM mission of protecting American citizens and property, and standing up the new police force, formed from the remnants of the old PDF.

The responsibilities assigned to USMSG-PM grew to epic proportions over the year following Operation JUST CAUSE. Success rates varied, but overall, efforts were hamstrung by circumstances beyond their control and the scope of requirements practically ensured that, given the resources available, not all missions would be accomplished.

By mid-1990, the U.S. military was still patrolling the streets of the capital with an ineffectual new Public Force--in fact, we still had American guards on duty at the houses of the governing coalition. American guards on PCC housing areas lasted until March 1991.<sup>20</sup> U.S. presence in the interior was alternately tolerated or scorned by Public Force elements, but continued due to the public's fear and mistrust of the former PDF members who were now acting as the country's police force.

U.S. military influence at the highest levels of the Panamanian government was evidenced by the constant interface between U.S. military leaders and the governing coalition, and a corresponding low profile by the U.S. Ambassador.

the U.S. presence throughout Panama is so conspicuous that American Colonels who would be obscure figures at home have become household names in Panama. Top Panamanian officials confer with their U.S. advisors daily, sometimes several times a day.<sup>21</sup>

U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton thought the level of involvement by Colonels James Steele and Jack Pryor, Commander and Deputy Commander, USMSG-PM, was too close, too much. Richard Schultz notes that "perhaps the most serious (drawback) was the perception created by having the military of the United States in the forefront of nation-building and democratization in a Latin American country."<sup>22</sup>



This presence and influence, along with the perceptions of U.S. military power in the country after JUST CAUSE, was maintained visibly at this level long after it would have benefitted the government to have the military lower its profile. As an officer assigned to the USMSG-PM, I would argue it was clear the leadership of the organization relished the exposure and influence they wielded; they saw the contribution they were making outweigh the potential negative effects of that exposure. Additionally, it probably was exciting, to judge from hearing them recount their experiences at the center of demonstrations, trying to quell the masses; or running over roof tops through the slums of Panama City during a police raid.

The problem with this type of involvement is addressed by Michael Polt, former Political Counselor at the U.S. Embassy, offered this view,

So many things we did in the aftermath of JUST CAUSE, in my opinion, convinced the Panamanians of one thing: . . . if you want something done quickly and right and preferably not on your tab, but on somebody else's, all you got to do is turn toward an American uniform and you will get it done. . . . I don't care whether the Panamanians are convinced that we have a competent military or not. What is important for the Panamanians to realize is that civilian government can work. It does not have to be brutally corrupt. It does not have to be totally inefficient or completely incompetent. It can work. And the way to demonstrate that fact is civilian government at work. . . . I think the Panamanians should have been set up long before JUST CAUSE to face the possibility and the need to deal with their own problems in their own way. However long it took, however long it was, however tragic it could be for many of them individually or their society collectively, but to do it themselves. . . . (It) was one thing to take Noriega out for them, the other was to try to recreate their country for them. That was in the short term an official to them, even satisfying to us, but in the long term not positive for Panama. With the right setup and allowing it to sink into the Panamanian mindset this was not going to be one of those gringo bailout situations. If they had a greater hand in restoring their country to themselves it would have a more lasting effect and gone a long way toward preparing them for 1999.<sup>23</sup>

Still, U.S. leaders fostered the high visibility aspects of military involvement--this was due, in part, to a belief on the part of the command that it was essential to the security mission to continue show of force operations through the country and it was essential to show U.S. support for the new government.<sup>24</sup>

In the interior, visits to remote areas by U.S. military forces to "promote stability and democracy" led to great expectations on the part of the indigenous population, much of which was never realized. The arrival of a U.S. Army Blackhawk full of U.S. military personnel who glad-handed the local leadership, listened to grievances, and promised help (aloud or tacitly) looked great in the press, but resource constraints precluded the U.S. military from even beginning to make a dent in improving the quality of life for the vast majority of Panamanians.

This situation never was fully rectified during the first year after the invasion. In fact, as late as May 1991, Colonel Steele, then JTF-PM Deputy Commander for Support

still joined President Endara and Ambassador Hinton for breakfast on a weekly basis, and his radio was still tied in with the President of Panama's net. However strange this may appear, President Endara, Ambassador Hinton, the CINC, the Commander of JTF-Panama and Steele himself all seemed to be comfortable with the arrangement. The implication that the relationship of the U.S. military with the Panamanian government remains closer and more autonomous than may be desirable is inescapable.<sup>25</sup>

Overall, despite the best intentions of U.S. military personnel, and from all reports and personal experience, and I can attest to the complete dedication of U.S. forces to do our part to get the country on its own two feet, we were operating from a paradoxical

situation. Namely, as time went on, continued U.S. presence diminished the effectiveness of the Panamanian elements of government; that, in turn, required continued presence to ensure security.

In many cases, U.S. hands were tied by the economic and political instruments of power operating in the country, and when coupled with the almost impossible mission of trying to turn what essentially was a police force with a military mindset into a cohesive group of public servants, the U.S. military was bound to if not fail, certainly not meet with success.

There is one other element which precluded success in military intervention at this stage which cannot be ignored; that is, between 1983 and 1987, the United States spent \$21.8 million training and equipping the PDF. Over 1,000 PDF members were trained through the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET). These actions had a strong impact on such a small force as the PDF; additionally, it "fostered the illusion of "influence" by the U.S. military.<sup>26</sup>

In a post-conflict environment, U.S. forces were responsible again to invest time, effort, energy, manpower and resources to train a benevolent police force. In many cases, certainly with the initial leadership of the Public Force in 1990, THESE WERE THE SAME PEOPLE! One advisor stated the problem eloquently,

What the Panamanian people are seeing is a disgraced military person who is supposed to become a policeman, being trained by a soldier who previously trained him to become a military man but who now wants him to be a policeman.<sup>27</sup>

In this situation, that resentment built up over time is not surprising. That the American soldiers felt compelled to institute their operating procedures as they stood up the new Public Force is not surprising either. One article notes,

The Panamanians, having just been routed by the Americans, now found them working in their police stations. Most of the Americans spoke no Spanish and knew little about Panamanian law. Nevertheless, they had charged right ahead, completely changing the way things were done.<sup>28</sup>

The environment was confusing at best. Nonetheless, there was some progress reported by April, although it was isolated and erratic. The problems were offset to some degree by the success of the RC (Reserve Component) Cop Program, which authorized reserve military forces, who were policemen when not on active duty, to train and assist the Public Force as it stood up. It alleviated some of the resentment fostered by the presence of the active military "victors," but allowed the U.S. to maintain a position of influence. By the end of 1990, however, even these efforts were not enough to establish a credible police force in the minds of Panamanians.

In the end, as U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton said in April of 1990, but which was just as applicable at the end of the first year, .

The Panamanians (had) real reason to worry. I don't think you'll find very many people who think you can take somebody who's been in an institution like the PDF and convert him . . . you've got to turn thought processes in a new direction. This is working extraordinarily well in some cases--and hardly at all in others.<sup>29</sup>

#### Application to the Dimension

Military Actions of the Intervening Power in the post-conflict phase were plagued by numerous problems in planning and execution,

before, during and after the invasion. A lack of clear policy, miscommunications and a failure to take advantage of opportunities that arose precluded the United States from averting war. While the conduct of combat operations was executed successfully, the rapid cessation of hostilities placed U.S. forces in a position unprepared to take on immediate law and order missions. In a post-conflict environment, the high visibility of, and heavy dependence on, U.S. forces, coupled with the difficulty of creating a police force from the former PDF precluded a successful transition of control to the Panamanians.

Overall, military actions of the intervening power in post-JUST CAUSE Panama is rated negative. While the military was able to make some progress in the missions of promoting stability and encouraging democracy, the expectations of the people exceeded the capability of the troops that remained in country; political constraints (discussed below) hindered effective application of military efforts at reconstruction and restoration. As time went on, the inability of the military to achieve the great expectations of the people and the continued reliance of the government on the U.S. military for security and governing assistance, prevented a successful outcome of the intervention during the year following the conflict.

#### Support Actions of the Intervening Power

##### Pre-JUST CAUSE Analysis

As late as September 1989, the administration still had no clear, consistent policy on Panama. Bush took a hard line, however, and

on 1 September, when Francisco Rodriguez (Comptroller of the Panamanian Treasury) was installed as the civilian president, declared,

Panama is . . . of this date without any legitimate government. The United States will not recognize any government installed by General Noriega.<sup>30</sup>

He went on to reassure the people of Panama that the United States was fully behind their efforts to fight for self-determination and democracy.

During the period May--December 1989, the Bush administration approached the problem of Noriega on several fronts, none of which were successful and which eventually led to the introduction of massive military force to oust Noriega. In other words,

The United States became committed to a course of democratizing Panama, posited on the removal of Noriega, through the uneven application of diplomatic blandishments, indictments and sanctions. While these failed to produce results, the pressure intensified (after the May elections) with the use of the military instrument in the exercises of that summer.<sup>31</sup>

Support actions during this period amounted to, aside from the military aspect, diplomatic efforts and negotiations, economic sanctions and informational efforts to propel the people into forcing Noriega from power.

Unilateral negotiations were unsuccessful; Noriega used them to ease pressure on his regime by alternately promising and then backing away from any real agreement. Multilateral negotiations were no more successful. The Organization of American States (OAS) made several attempts to make a deal that would allow Noriega to give up power, to no avail. For the most part, the OAS, while generally agreeing that

Noriega should go, disagreed in many cases with U.S. policies to make that happen. In one meeting in May,

Many OAS representatives were so eager to denounce U.S. intervention that they argued against any resolution that mentioned Noriega's name, let alone his resignation. Some representatives believed that any resolution directly calling for Noriega's departure constituted, in itself, an act of intervention.<sup>32</sup>

During meetings in August, the OAS voiced concern over the increased U.S. military posturing in the country, and saw them as counterproductive to ongoing diplomatic negotiations. For his part, President Bush "never believed the OAS mission could oust Noriega and concluded that multilateral diplomatic efforts were a failure."<sup>33</sup> This belief effectively neutralized any positive impact the OAS might have been able to wield on the situation, and left things in the hands of the Intervening Power.

The most visible aspect of support actions by the United States during this period were economic sanctions, which by the late summer had brought Panama to the brink of bankruptcy. Sanctions did not affect Noriega's control over the country.

They did, to some degree, increase the hostility of the opposition toward the regime, but more to the point, they caused great inconvenience and hurt more the lower and middle classes, but did not achieve "decisive political results."<sup>34</sup> By early 1989, the U.S. GAO reported,

1. \$44 million was escrowed in the United States under the control of President Duvalle.
2. The regime experienced a loss of 26% in revenues in 1988, which indirectly affected 40% of the drop in GNP.

3. In 1988 the GNP dropped 20%, construction 78%, electrical consumption 21%, tourism 35%, imports 44%, exports 17%, industrial production 23%, capital flight amounted to \$1.5 billion from June 1987 to September 1988 and unemployment was 23%.<sup>35</sup>

Marcella and Woerner argued the failure of sanctions to work to our advantage was the result of conflicting goals of the U.S., the loopholes in the policy that allowed dollars to continue to enter the country, the incremental imposition of the sanctions, allowing the government to react, and an underestimation of the support for Noriega in the PDF and the "extent to which the tyranny of the armed minority could subdue the unarmed majority."<sup>36</sup>

Marcella and Woerner quote the former Director of Latin American Affairs on the National Security Council:

Economic sanctions have become a weapon of choice because no one in the decision-making group is directly affected. The Pentagon doesn't need to risk its soldiers or use its facilities. The State Department can say it is taking action, and the White House can say to a domestic audience that it is tough with a drug dealer. Its people outside the room--Panamanians, American businessmen, and bankers--who get hurt. Economic sanctions are generally the result of not knowing what else to do or not being able to do something else. It isn't an effective way to bring down governments.<sup>37</sup>

The Bush administration, in public statements and through various informational channels, continued throughout the crisis to try and reassure the Panamanian people of the U.S. commitment. The concentration appeared to be only on getting rid of Noriega; only later would the elimination of the PDF be added.

Early on, administration pronouncements not only did not call for the end of the PDF, they encouraged the PDF to be part of the solution instead of part of the problem. These statements were predicated on the assumption that the United States would still need to work with the PDF in a post-Noriega era. But they also betray a



fundamental flaw in the analysis of the structure of power within Panama, the PDF's receptivity to civilian control, and the levels of corruption in the institution.<sup>38</sup>

Further, the administration obviously wanted a solution, but did not appear willing to invest the effort to change the status quo.

Wishful thinking that Noriega and his corrupt ilk would leave because of democratic and professional sentiments characterized the U.S. strategy for many months. Public statements of the sort were at variance with the views of the opposition and even with the advice that was being provided to Washington by the U.S. Southern Command and elements of the U.S. Embassy.<sup>39</sup>

Failure to provide the assistance needed to make Major Girolodi's coup attempt on 3 October a success spoke volumes. U.S. policy became more convoluted and unclear--not only to Americans, but to Panamanians who believed (prior to the coup attempt) the United States would come to their aid if they took action. Inaction at this stage of the crisis undoubtedly discouraged others in Panama from mounting a coup attempt of their own.

#### Post-JUST CAUSE Analysis

Support Actions by the Intervening Power after the invasion were characterized by a lack of strategic vision and adequate planning, forcing participants on the ground into a reactive mode faced with explaining policy to expectant Panamanians. This had been a problem from the start of the crisis. Marcella and Woerner write,

at no point during the 30 months of the crisis did Washington apply a coherent and attainable strategic vision founded on a clear understanding of the national interest, or the institutional capacity within the structure of government--the decisive authority composed of political will, and consensus and resources--to carry it through . . . It became a strategy of unlimited objectives with limited means.<sup>40</sup>

Essentially concerned with immediate objectives, no one, neither in the military nor at the national level, defined the end state.

If the military planners were not ordered to develop their plans directly to achieve the strategic objective of democracy and the civilian government planners did not formulate full blown strategies (ends, ways, and means), then no one developed a strategy to achieve democracy in Panama . . . planning was focused on achieving operational objectives, not strategic ones.<sup>41</sup>

Another problem facing post-conflict actions was the issue of whether or not the coalition of Endara, Arias and Ford constituted a government. While there were efforts prior to the war to organize the cabinet, those efforts were made to put a face of legitimacy on our intervention.<sup>42</sup>

Michael Polt, former Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy, Panama points out,

The problem with occupation versus liberation was that we had to become an occupying power. A benevolent one by the consent of the people and the government, but nevertheless an occupying power that had to perform basic civil government functions either alongside Panamanian authorities or totally on our own such as the law enforcement function which we faced for a long time by ourselves . . . (It) would have been easier, to take Panama and then put it back together "the right way" and then turn it over to the Panamanians. . . That would have been the right way, but that was not the political reality.<sup>43</sup>

Essentially, by whatever name, whether liberation or occupation, U.S. forces were forced into the position of an occupying power. The ramifications of that position were not fully realized, either at the time of the invasion, or as the year progressed.

The level of commitment from the United States wavered in the months following the invasion, but expectations remained high--by Panamanians and Americans alike. For the United States, it was

imperative that the United States maintain enough support to ensure success of the Endara government. Buckley asserts,

The government survived because it was a U.S. domestic political imperative that it survive. If it failed, what was JUST CAUSE all about? The new civilian government had no protector other than the United States.<sup>44</sup>

For the Panamanians, expectations were bound to exceed reality. In developing part of a potential strategy for how to address post-conflict Panama, Booz Allen & Hamilton established that:

There have been inordinate expectations generated regarding economic revitalization in Panama. There are myths in Panama regarding the bounty to be expected from the Canal and the amount of aid to be provided by the United States in restoring the economy. Economic setbacks likely will be blamed on the insufficient U.S. aid. Displaced economic and political elements can be expected to appeal to nationalism and attempt to undermine the efforts at reform.<sup>45</sup>

An unfortunate reinforcement of Panamanian expectations came in the form of President Bush's promise of one billion dollars in aid to restore the country's economy to pre-sanction levels and to repair the damage the invasion had caused. Over time, this amount dwindled first to 500 million, then finally to 420 million.

By September 1990, only 120 billion had actually been received. In Buckley's words, "the sum shrank as Panama receded from the headlines."<sup>46</sup> This caused an understandable loss of faith on the part of the new Host Government that was trying to hold Panama together in light of insurmountable economic and political difficulties.

By the end of the first year after the invasion,

Of the \$420 million congress appropriated to "jump start" the Panamanian economy, \$377 million had been obligated by AID as of 28 February 1991. . . . Although agreements have been signed with the government of Panama and other recipients to obligate nearly 90 percent of the dire Emergency Act funds, AID has dispersed only about \$77.9 million (about 19 percent of the amount appropriated).

Even less, about \$41.8 million, has actually been spent by the Panamanian government or AID.<sup>47</sup>

Fishel notes the frustration experienced by the Panamanians as a result of the slow pace with which recovery funds were allotted and distributed:

The effect of this delay was not lost on the Panamanian business community . . . Panamanians of all political stripes believe that the conditions imposed by the United States for release of aid dollars are onerous and unacceptable . . . (that) the United States has forgotten that it was responsible for the destruction of Panama's economy through both sanctions and invasion.<sup>48</sup>

Additionally, the lack of foresight on the part of the senior combat commanders and political administrators to plan for assistance to post-war Panama contributed to the real and perceived notion that the United States' support (after the war) vacillated. Because the military was charged with providing so much of the post-war assistance, and because it remained a highly visible symbol of U.S. intentions, it can be said that the lack of adequate planning delayed our response to problems that required immediate action.

This is not to say planning was not done at all. Initially, General Woerner understood the need for the military to plan post-conflict support to Panama, but the planning done under his command was overcome by events as the crisis deepened. Despite JTF-South's detailed planning for OPLAN 90-2, plans to support operations in a post-conflict environment--the longest phase that would ultimately have the greatest impact on U.S. ability to realize the strategic objective of promoting stability--were insufficient. When it came time to implement, the U.S. failed to resource the effort adequately and ultimately paid the price.

U.S. efforts at rebuilding a police force illustrate this inconsistency in commitment.

By taking down the PDF, the U.S. military destroyed a military institution through awesome force, and we . . . inserted ourselves in the reconstruction of the polity.<sup>49</sup>

Accepting this mission would cause untold problems over the course of the first year.

Although the effort to rebuild the police force was critical in reestablishing the public security and political stability so necessary for Panamanian viability, the manner in which the U.S. supported this effort indicated some lack of U.S. commitment to honor its responsibility toward rectifying many of the systematic problems which economic sanctions and the U.S. invasion had caused Panama. The U.S. provided a level of assistance sufficient to allow the Panamanians to start to build the police, but a level which forced continued reliance and dependence on U.S. support.<sup>50</sup>

Over and above the emotional challenges associated with standing up a credible police force from the remnants of the PDF, more practical considerations arose daily. Obtaining police cars, radios, and office equipment was extremely difficult. The major resource shortfall, according to Colonel Norman Higgenbotham, USARSO DCSLOG, was money.

We simply did not have the dollars to support the operation that needed to be done. Once Operation JUST CAUSE was over, any emergency funding associated with JUST CAUSE came to an end. And that left us with basically no money to do anything, unless it was a security assistance case or something like that . . . . The State Department had not come forth with any money . . . money and funding authority to do it was not there. That created a tremendous shortfall for a long period of time.<sup>51</sup>

The U.S. government's contribution of the Inter-national Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) in support

of the development of Panama's new force also raises the question of the depth of commitment to making the new Public Force work.

Massing, who blames ICITAP for not doing anything to curb abuses among the security forces it trained, acknowledges that the material they start with leaves a lot to be desired. In Panama, "as long as the old PDF remains largely intact, no amount of training is likely to turn it into a Costa Rican-style police force."<sup>52</sup> Not only was there the problem of trying to retrain the former members of the old PDF, but there were inherent problems in ICITAP's organization as well.

It was not only ICITAP's perceived incompetence, but their lack of resources (or ability to employ them), their inability to understand and appreciate the cultural issues of the situation, and their unwillingness to spend time with the Panamanians long enough for the former PDF members to internalize the values and principles ICITAP was tasked with imparting.<sup>53</sup>

The lack of strategic planning, the inability to focus operationally, and the growing number of insurmountable practical issues bred frustration on the part of individuals tasked with the nation assistance. It became clear by the summer of 1990 that between the high expectations of Panamanians and the reduced emphasis on crisis support from the United States, Panama's problems were not going to be solved in any semblance of what the U.S. military would understand as a "timely manner."

The lack of adequate and clearly understood planning that could be turned into executable operations on the ground further aggravated military efforts.<sup>54</sup> The U.S. military simply was not able, nor were

they clearly mandated to, rectify all of Panama's problems in the areas of economics, security or government administration.<sup>55</sup> Despite the tireless efforts of those involved, it became clear that the onus for substantial change in Panama would be on the Panamanians themselves.

Overall, the United States faced an inevitable dilemma. Administration officials feared that too deep and visible an American involvement in Panama's affairs would only bring accusations of U.S. imperialism.<sup>56</sup> It was a question of how to "teach independence to a (dependent)."<sup>57</sup> The country's real problems--political isolation of the ruling coalition, a failing economy and a multitude of social and security problems--had to be addressed by the government, but they were unable to do it without assistance from the U.S. government.

In light of the damage wrecked on the country by two years of economic sanctions and a military invasion, public calls for Panama to stand on its own without the United States (after almost 100 years of total dependence) indicates just where Panama really stood as a strategic issue in April 1990.<sup>58</sup> Perhaps the United States realized at this point that the invasion did not resolve many of the primary problems that existed in Panama before the war--a desire for independence, but an immaturity to realize it; an ineffectual government bureaucracy that no amount of support from the U.S. could fix; and a security apparatus that was not trusted by the people. Problems like this made a military take down look simple.

### Application to the Dimension

The U.S. did not provide (adequate) support to these complex problems, although it was to the U.S. that the Panamanians turned for just this assistance. The support provided was not enough to attack the vast myriad of problems Panama faced. The commitment not strong enough, and clearly wavered over time. The practical considerations associated with vacillating policy precluded effective application of the plans and programs that were established. With the world's eyes turned to the Gulf conflict in August of 1990, Panama took on less and less importance. Put best by Fishel and Downie (addressing support to the PNP, but applicable to all U.S. support after the war):

Thereafter, when the newsworthy drama of the intervention in Panama faded and U.S. policymakers reduced the priority on the reconstruction effort in Panama, the decisions and programs necessary to ensure follow through on the actions already taken to facilitate the initial arming, equipping, and training of the PNP did not draw sufficient attention and political support.<sup>59</sup>

The effects of unclear policy, manifested through varying degrees of commitment, resulted in an inability to even make a dent in the problems that plagued Panama after the war. While the perceived length of commitment by the United States remains strong--at least until 1999, and even then Panama will remain a strategic security concern--the effects of a visibly decreased resolve toward rebuilding Panama in the aftermath of JUST CAUSE rates Support Actions of the Intervening Power negative.



## Host Government Legitimacy

### Pre-JUST CAUSE Analysis

The legitimacy of the Noriega government, in hind-sight, is easy to dismiss. What may be more relevant is an understanding of its underlying foundations. A clearer picture of where Panama was before the crisis could lead to an appreciation of how events unfolded and why policies succeeded or failed.

Panama has no legacy of democracy; the strong-willed "benevolent" dictatorship of Omar Torrijos more likely fits a tolerable form of government in that country. While the history of democracy, or lack thereof, is outside the scope of this study, it suffices to say that Noriega went beyond the acceptable bounds of strong-willed leadership in his manipulation of the government and the people. Marcella and Woerner note how complete Noriega's control actually was:

The Commander-in-Chief (Noriega) controlled the executive branch, the cabinet, the National Assembly through the government coalition of two parties (PRD and PALA), the electoral tribunal, the supreme court, the police, the customs service, the national intelligence apparatus, and numerous lucrative enterprises. The concept of constitutional checks and balances, never strong in Panamanian history, did not function because it was inimical to the interests of the military.<sup>60</sup>

One result of this system of control was a bloated, inefficient bureaucracy, staffed to some degree with and headed by Noriega supporters. Probably the only good aspect of this system was that it employed a lot of workers. The remnants of Noriega's government would

later create havoc with post-conflict attempts to streamline government agencies and increase efficiency. Progress would take an inordinate amount of time; as Endara privatized certain agencies, did away with others, and cut the payroll by thousands in an effort to improve the system, he would be blamed for the increase in unemployment and the continued failure of government agencies to provide services.

Koster and Sanchez explain the Noriega government through its roots that date back to Torrijos:

What happened in Panama, beginning with Omar Torrijos, and reaching its most complete expression with Noriega, was that structural militarism, a form of elitism, was infused with an ethos (if it may be called that) of radical individualism common to corrupt police and other criminals. The result was the narco-military state, a new phenomenon, where a national entity is controlled by its military establishment, and this in turn is controlled by a criminal clique, gangsters in uniform dedicated to enriching themselves via crime, characteristically via the traffic in cocaine.<sup>61</sup>

While somewhat oversimplified, as the PDF and its political party, the PRD, were far more complex, this concept does help explain why our efforts to depose Noriega and the PDF did not completely reform the country. A military study of the personalities, organizations and corrupt infrastructure that existed prior to Operation JUST CAUSE indicated that, while the U.S. was able to destroy the surface problem, (i.e., Noriega and the PDF) the U.S. Government found that the country itself was not progressing in the manner expected.<sup>62</sup> Success at changing the deep-seated "criminal clique," which still had immense power in the country, would prove more illusive than winning the war or the hearts and minds of the Panamanian people.

On the eve of Operation JUST CAUSE, the coalition of Guillermo Endara, Richardo Arias Calderon, and Guillermo "Billy" Ford was "sworn

in(to office) at Fort Clayton late at night on December 19, 1989.<sup>63</sup>

Endara later recalled

(i)f he assented, he would assume the presidency "under occupation by American forces." He realized that history could condemn him as a "puppet." He knew that Latin American leaders would sneer, but he also knew that circumstances in Panama were unique. He saw no alternative.<sup>64</sup>

Endara's concerns were not without basis. Not only was he taking power and immediately consenting to an invasion, occupation or liberation, depending on your point of view, he was assuming power legitimized by election results that were more anti-Noriega than pro-Endara. Fishel cites Latin American expert Kalman Silvert,

it is not a rare phenomenon in Latin America to find a political group taking power after long and continued opposition only to find itself powerless to put a program into effect because of its own administrative inadequacies and inability to transfer protest politics to positive policy.

Fishel likens this situation to the Endara government,

three "guys" and an inauguration do not make a government. Neither do those same three "guys" and an abortive election make a democracy. Nor can that election alone confer long-term legitimacy to that government.<sup>65</sup>

Endara would begin his term from an extremely disadvantaged position. The government of which he took charge was bankrupt and the bureaucracy bloated. Much of the illegal infrastructure remained intact despite the invasion. His "inauguration" on a U.S. military installation, arranged by U.S. personnel, would haunt his administration's credibility. His election to power was a protest vote that did not necessarily signify a sound endorsement of him or his policies or his coalition. The road to legitimacy would be difficult at best to achieve.

### Post-JUST CAUSE Analysis

Once installed, the government's legitimacy was questioned from the start. Perceptions of continued U.S. dominance and years of corrupt military control dictated that the government desperately needed to gain control of the "chaotic domestic situation, restore order and stability and demonstrate its authority."<sup>66</sup>

The influence of the United States in guaranteeing Endara's power did not go unnoticed by the people. Major General Marc Cisneros, in a post-war interview, said,

If you really talked to the people in Panama, Endara was the leader, but I don't think he was recognized as the legitimate leader, in my view . . . . He was the most practical, but that did not make him the most legitimate, therefore, in retrospect, it was not wise for us to orient as the government that would be in power for the next five years . . . it would have been better if we had said and encouraged them to accept it as a transition government.<sup>67</sup>

The coalition definitely was fighting an uphill battle. In the words of one study, written in May 1990,

Already the May 1989 mandate is questioned in and out of Panama and perceived as a vote against Noriega rather than a vote for the ruling coalition. Further-more, as time wears on, the political effects of Operation JUST CAUSE will likely diminish as well as U.S. commitment and resources. . . . (N)o amount of U.S. aid will legitimize the Endara government to the point that its origin through a protest vote and its installation through the use of foreign force are forgotten.<sup>68</sup>

This assertion sadly proved to be true as 1990 progressed. Despite initial approval ratings as high as 90 percent, Endara's popularity, and that of the coalition, soon began to wane. Dissension among the coalition itself resulted in an inability to make and implement decisions. Major General Cisneros observed that once the coalition was installed,

(e)verybody was passing the buck to one of the three partners, and nobody was responsible and therefore nothing got done. That's where a lot of frustrations came in, on our part to get things done, and Panamanian people were obviously very unhappy with the new government.<sup>69</sup>

By July, while Panamanians were generally happy to have basic freedoms again, they did not see any major improvement in the economy. Still more damaging to the government's legitimacy was that, despite Herculean efforts by the United States military forces, civil affairs personnel and the USMSG-PM, the government still had instilled little confidence in the new Public Force.<sup>70</sup>

Problems also existed in other areas of government. Many of the judges appointed during the years of military rule continued in their positions, hindering efforts to clean house. As of the end of June, eighty-five percent of the inmates in the country's jails still had not been sentenced; none of the 291 cases involving Noriega's supporters had been tried.<sup>71</sup> The civil service, based on patronage and inadequately trained, was woefully inadequate.<sup>72</sup>

The coalition government was accused of doing too little to broaden its base of support. Composed of mainly white, upper class businessmen, many Panamanians saw the coalition as a "members of the oligarchy who have never managed to establish a meaningful rapport with poor Panamanians."<sup>73</sup>

The government continued to be attacked through the end of the summer. With little in the way of U.S. aid arriving in country, it was not just the poor Panamanians who had lost faith in the U.S. and the U.S.-backed government. "Business leaders just rolled their eyes when U.S. aid (was) mentioned. . . ."<sup>74</sup>

The government was unable to halt the disruption caused by bomb threats, strikes and protests that filled the streets of downtown Panama City or Colon. Unemployment continued to plague the country, hovering at around 20 percent, with underemployment even higher.<sup>75</sup> None of these factors brought the government down, but the Endara coalition had little political credibility. Neither did they have "charismatic legitimacy," a quality beloved by Panamanians, which made Omar Torrijos, a swaggering Latino who had forced the U.S. to return the Canal to Panama, so popular.<sup>76</sup> In fact, it was often observed that Major General Marc Cisneros, Commander of JTF-Panama and who had often stood up to Noriega in the pre-war games of brinksmanship, had this "charismatic legitimacy" and would have been elected President of Panama by a landslide had he chosen to run.

Endara displayed none of these qualities, and when coupled with the emasculation of the entire military of a country with a long tradition of Latin machismo, it is little wonder that this obese, easy going gentleman was the object of much derision and the butt of political jokes. Whether or not he was actually an intelligent, shrewd individual is not as important as the perception that he was inept.

Another major hindrance to Endara's legitimacy was the chronic problems that plagued the new police force. The failure of the government throughout that first year to provide basic security for its people would further erode support to the government. This issue is addressed in more detail under the dimension of Host Government Military Actions.

As the country moved toward the end of the year and the one year anniversary of JUST CAUSE, the situation did not appear to be any more optimistic. Demonstrations continued on an almost daily basis, varying in size and intensity, protesting everything from labor policy to demands for reparations from the United States.

At the time the USMSG-PM was inactivated, in January 1991, the polls provided a good idea of the status of the government's legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Illustrated clearly by Buckley,

President Endara's approval rating slipped (from 90 percent after the invasion) into the teens--a number that was perhaps half the unemployment rate, which was estimated at somewhere between 20-30 percent. . . . At least 40 percent of the population lived in poverty; 75 percent believe that the new Public Force (PF) . . . could not guarantee public safety . . . . Violent crime had tripled. Strikes and demonstrations were common and schools were shut down when Endara failed to pay the teachers. One poll found that only 37 percent thought the invasion brought more benefits than problems.<sup>77</sup>

#### Application to the Dimension

Overall, post-JUST CAUSE legitimacy of the Host Government is rated negative. Problems with legitimacy were born before the invasion. An inefficient, bloated bureaucracy, a bankrupt economy, and a toehold on power based on a protest vote all made the new government's task arduous and seemingly insurmountable. The swearing-in at a U.S. installation compounded credibility problems. Despite the early high confidence levels resulting from the success of the invasion itself, when the U.S. still controlled every action that occurred in the country, there was no time during the entire first year when the government could clearly say they had the confidence of the majority of the people.

By the end of that year, political infighting showed disunity within the coalition itself, government leaders themselves were questioning the viability of the Public Force and the economy, although making some improvements, had mainly benefitted the same people who profited before the invasion. The people of Panama had basic freedoms, but it was not enough to legitimize the Endara government.

It is interesting to note that, presently, the inability of the Endara coalition to establish sufficient legitimacy has resulted in a resurgence of "the old military populist coalition (the PRD) as a potentially important political force."<sup>78</sup> This illustrates that democracy--certainly the American form, or possibly any form such that we can understand--may not be well-suited to Panama. One article notes,

While Noriega's dictatorial excesses temporarily resulted in a dramatic decrease in the military government's popular appeal, this coalition has endured and continues to be represented by the PRD.. When splits began to appear in the (Endara) coalition and the government's economic privatization measures began to dramatically affect government employees and some business people, the opposition gradually gained ground . . . . Through tacit deals struck with Endara in 1991 . . . the PRD was able to gain renewed access to the media. By late 1992, it had negotiated a legislative alliance with the PA (Arnulfista Party) that allowed it to gain a leadership role in certain key committees . . . with Noriega in jail for 40 years, it now (becomes) easier for the PRD to portray itself as a civilian-oriented party of popular reform.<sup>79</sup>

#### Degree of Support to the Destabilizing Forces

##### Pre-JUST CAUSE Analysis

From May until December 1989, Noriega was generally isolated from outside support, both on a political as well as a military front. The PDF and Dignity Battalions were Noriega's strength. Although there is little evidence they received any significant support during the time



frame of this study, both elements were trained, armed and/or equipped by other nations (including Cuba, Libya, Nicaragua and even the United States--politics make strange bed-fellows) prior to the crisis.

Support in the form of political asylum was offered to Noriega by Spain and several countries in South America during the failed OAS negotiations. During the invasion, Noriega was provided asylum for a period at the Papal Nunciature, and several of his henchmen fled to third countries during or following the war. None of this support, however, was significant enough to have an impact on events before, during or after Operation JUST CAUSE.

The PDF grew out of the Guardia Nacional after completion of the Canal Treaty. The Panamanian military was built up so Panama could defend the Canal and the country once U.S. forces departed in 1999. These forces, many of whom had been trained by the United States and supplied with U.S. equipment, also had been influenced by other Central American armies and the Cubans.<sup>80</sup> Influential members of Noriega's inner circle received intelligence training in Cuba or tactical training in Libya or Nicaragua.<sup>81</sup>

There is no evidence of support to Dignity Battalion members, either in the way of sanctuary or in the way of training or equipment provided, except for weapons.<sup>82</sup> It is interesting to note that one of the top leaders of the Dignity Battalions, Balbina de Perinan, who remained throughout the conflict on the Top 50 Most Wanted List, was elected to the Legislature after the conflict and could not be apprehended. Only in Panama.

On the political front, the strongest evidence of support to Noriega was in the work done through the OAS. Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela suggested the OAS tell Noriega to "disappear," and offered Noriega asylum. While earlier efforts by Perez had been rejected by Reagan, the Bush administration initially accepted his support to "take some of the heat off his administration and even present the image that something was being done."<sup>83</sup>

Felipe Gonzalez, the Spanish Prime Minister made similar offers throughout the pre-war period to no avail. In early December, Noriega requested Gonzalez's support to re-open talks he felt would stem the tide moving toward intervention by the United States. It was one more step Noriega took to "shore up his defenses against a kidnap attempt," the course of action he saw as the most likely the U.S. would implement.<sup>84</sup> In mid-December, Gonzalez warned Noriega that negotiations were not expected to yield results and that "there is very little time left . . . ."<sup>85</sup>

#### Post-JUST CAUSE Analysis

The PDF and Dignity Battalions were effectively destroyed during the invasion. Noriega was extradited to the United States. For the 17,000 former PDF members, most found refuge in the ranks of the new Public Force. The ramifications of this action are discussed elsewhere in this study. Many of the Dignity Battalion members melted back into Panamanian society. What did begin to emerge were organizations--if they can be called that--that were disaffected former members of the

PDF, criminals or Communists, or former Noriega supporters who felt compelled to carry on in his absence.

The Communists were more popular in the western province of Chiriqui and at universities. The former Noriega supporters generally controlled the poorer suburbs in the San Miguelito area of Panama City and remained represented in the government through the former military regime's party, the PRD. The criminal element--the vast underground Mafia network that had grown and prospered during the Noriega years--were the ones whose names continued to surface associated with shadowy elements like the M-20, which was never proven to really exist. None of these elements, studied extensively during the post-JUST CAUSE period, received any support of any significance from outside channels.

#### Application of the Dimension

The SWORD model stresses the amount of support available to destabilizing forces, when that support was available, and whether the government was capable of isolating those forces from their sources of support. The seeds of destabilization in the post-conflict environment arose from the pre-conflict environment; i.e., the losers of JUST CAUSE. For the time period analyzed here, outside support to destabilizing forces is rated neutral because of the insignificant impact of those forces on the situation in Panama. While they succeeded in causing concern, and several incidents (noted under Actions Against Subversion) occurred, at no time was there a threat to U.S. national interests equivalent to that perceived during Noriega's regime.

Support to these elements was defacto; weapons were still available in country, but not through an organized system of support. Sanctuary was available, but the size of destabilizing elements was too small to require major sources of support. The Endara government could not successfully isolate what support these forces could generate, because it is difficult to monitor every facsimile machine, telephone or individual with a can of spray paint. The dimension is rated neutral.

#### Actions Against Subversion

##### Pre-JUST CAUSE Analysis

Noriega's repression was severe. Subversion during the pre-invasion period was essentially impossible, with the notable exception of uprisings within the military itself. When these attempts failed, the result was even greater repression by Noriega. He was able to control the majority of the population and influence Americans and Panamanians through an extremely effective PSYOP campaign. He manipulated the media, and his military and paramilitary forces kept the country in check through violent intimidation practices.

The Dignity Battalions, Noriega's PSYOP invention, were used to varying degrees of success to present the illusion of support to the dictator. Often these individuals were threatened if they failed to show up for "spontaneous" demonstrations of support. While they were armed with some small caliber weapons, and were--at least on paper--nominally organized and structured, their greatest success was the psychological effect they had on U.S. planners. Lieutenant General Stiner (Commander, JTF-South) increased the force package for Operation

JUST CAUSE due to fears that the Dignity Battalions would fight en masse in some sort of organized units.<sup>86</sup>

Other PSYOP actions included the issuance of arrest warrants in December for General Thurman and Major General Cisneros, charging them with "constant harassment of Panamanian citizens with the relentless motion and noise of trucks, planes, and helicopters."<sup>87</sup> His "declaration of war" with the United States on 15 December may have influenced his forces to the extent that they felt justified in firing at an American car, killing the Marine lieutenant, an event that precipitated the invasion. Marcella and Woerner point out,

Noriega . . . made perhaps the most critical strategic miscalculation of his career on December 15, 1989, when he orchestrated the newly-formed legislature to declare that Panama was in a state of war as a result of the actions of the U.S. . . . This expression was used to emphasize and give reasons for the emergency laws and dictates. It was never put into a military context. Nonetheless, the hyperbole may have contribute to the indiscipline of his troops that caused the killing of Marine Lieutenant Robert Paz on Saturday night, 16 December 1989.<sup>88</sup>

Throughout the crisis period, Noriega held the media under tight control. Newspapers printed pro-government articles or paid the price through the destruction of their offices and harassment of employees. Whatever else one can say about Noriega, he was a master at manipulation.

Repression of the people came in many forms, including economic hardship, extortion, a massive intelligence network aimed at intimidating the people, and physical abuse. U.S. personnel found it increasingly difficult to conduct any routine business in the Noriega environment; license plates alone required days of work. One need only remember the May elections and the aftermath of Noriega's authorized

attacks on the opposition to understand his success in controlling the population.

Manipulation of information, both in content and presentation proved advantageous to Noriega, noted in the comment,

(t)he absence of sophisticated analysis was an important asset for the PDF-PRD in its manipulation of historical myth and national symbols for the purpose of solidifying its power base.<sup>89</sup>

But his successful use of information had ramifications on the U.S. and the opposition as well.

Access to information and alternative analyses not only leads to sound decisions, it is also a form of democratic empowerment. Democratic community and participatory resolution of conflict are nurtured by access to information. Ignorance and its handmaiden--disinformation--create competing realities that drive policy choices. This was as true for Panamanians in the opposition as it was for the fence straddlers, the policymakers in Washington and the defenders of democracy in Latin America.<sup>90</sup>

Regardless of how successful Noriega's information control, his intelligence failed him in the end. He failed to recognize the indications and warning that negotiations were no longer an option for him; he refused to accept the idea that the invasion was imminent. Had he acted on the indications, the chances are he would have been able to escape the fate that awaited him in Miami.

For its part, prior to Operation JUST CAUSE, the U.S. was slow to conduct the intelligence operations that would be critical in assessing the post-conflict environment. Because Panama, and Noriega had been "friendly" to the United States for decades, the data base on the Panama environment was incomplete. There was not, as a rule, adequate current information on Panamanian organizations, personalities,

or potential threats. As a consequence, the learning curve during the post-conflict period would be steep.<sup>91</sup>

#### Post-JUST CAUSE Analysis

The first proclaimed terrorist act against U.S. forces occurred in mid-March, when a grenade exploded at a downtown bar frequented by American service personnel. One American soldier was killed, sixteen others were injured. The incident was never resolved and no one was ever prosecuted. Numerous reports that the M-20 was responsible proved inconclusive. There were other reports that it could have resulted from a domestic dispute between an American serviceman and his Panamanian girlfriend, or between two Panamanians, or a disgruntled patron who resented being thrown out of the bar. Needless to say, it is unlikely the incident was a bona fide terrorist attack.

Nonetheless, the beginning of a new LIC environment was born. Over the next nine months, bomb threats grew into the hundreds. Reports warning of new and violent groups bent on revenge against the Americans and the Endara government sprouted on a weekly basis. This caused an increasing level of concern by American military officials who were charged with the security of the Canal and the American citizens in country, as well as promoting stability. Most leads led nowhere; the command became desensitized to intelligence reporting because there was no way to evaluate the sources of information. Every rumor was briefed with the same level of credibility as another.

Efforts in the area of PSYOP, which had worked to "foster a positive police self-image," support law and order and promote a

positive image of U.S. forces were curtailed when the U.S. Ambassador ordered those operations to cease.<sup>92</sup>

Trying to meld the efforts against this new subversion between American and Panamanian agencies was difficult at best. Often, information could not be shared with the Panamanian government, or it appeared they were not sharing information with us. This led to duplicative investigations, false reporting, operations compromised, and increased suspicions on both sides. Intrigue, rumor and innuendo, all great Panamanian pastimes, made the job of countering subversion--even for Americans protecting Americans--extremely difficult. The Panamanians were equally frustrated.

In May, the infamous "David Letter,"<sup>93</sup> threatening mayhem against Americans at the David Fair proved totally false. In October, there were several "never fully explained bomb explosions in Chiriqui."<sup>94</sup> Reports continued to surface of conspiracies, plots, coup attempts, or assassinations which had to be addressed by the U.S. Command and the Panamanian government. Thankfully, none ever proved to be credible; they showed only that there were an unknown number of disgruntled Panamanians who were anti-U.S./anti-Endara.

In early December, Colonel Eduardo Herrera Hassan, former police chief who had been under arrest at Naos Island for anti-government activities since October, escaped and led an attempt to bring what he saw as the plight of the new PNP to the government. He succeeded in taking over PNP headquarters for a short period. Because there were two senior American officers at the headquarters at the time of the takeover, the U.S. had "justification" to respond. There was



another reason U.S. forces responded though, that illustrated the inability of the government to counter subversion, even a year after taking power.

The Endara government was,

unwilling to risk trying to arrest Herrera Hassan. Endara had no confidence that the PF would obey orders to make the arrest. No one wanted bloodshed.<sup>95</sup>

The answer was to call in 500 American troops of the 193D Infantry Brigade, who were given the mission of cordoning off the headquarters, and prevent entry or exit of any personnel. They were, however, not authorized to use force to accomplish that mission. The result was many of Herrera Hassan's supporters were able to break through an American roadblock and flee into the nearby Corundu neighborhood.

No PNP elements reacted; the only officer in a position to react was the chief of the Balboa Police Station and he could not get the rank and file to support operations against Herrera.<sup>96</sup> Once reinforced, the Americans were able to round up most of the armed supporters of Herrera Hassan and he was "taken into custody by the Panamanian authorities with U.S. assistance."<sup>97</sup>

The overall impact of the incident was to demonstrate the difficulty associated with the transition period, the questionable loyalty of the PNP to the government, and the continued total reliance of the Endara government on the U.S. for security. The incident also did little to instill public confidence in either the government or the PNP,

American and Panamanian officials had insisted that they were making steady progress toward turning Noriega's soldiers into freedom-loving cops. But since the Dec. 5 coup attempt (sic), joined

by more than 100 uniformed police, few believe it.<sup>98</sup> . . . By turning to the same American troops who put him in office a year ago, Panamanian President Guillermo Endara has further weakened his already shaky government and created new troubles for his American backers.<sup>99</sup>

While public opinion polls indicated Panamanians supported the U.S. assistance in general, there were also signs many resented the "big brother" aspects of the relationship between Panama and the U.S.<sup>100</sup> This resentment was not new; it simply was manifested in public incidents such as the U.S. support in arresting Herrera.

Although a new LIC environment appeared to be emerging, it was extremely low intensity. Does this mean the U.S. was successful at Actions Against Subversion or that subversive acts simply did not materialize for any number of reasons? Certainly Panama does not have the cultural capacity for violence one sees in Nicaragua or El Salvador. Nonetheless, there were enough incidents, or threats of incidents, to keep U.S. intelligence agencies off balance and operators busy. U.S. psychological operations which could have continued the positive effects they started were cut short.<sup>101</sup>

The Panamanian government was relatively impotent in dealing with potential threats, especially since many came from within the PNP. The uprising led by Herrera Hassan was an embarrassing blow to Endara's struggling government. It reinforced the people's belief that the government was unable to provide security and was still overly dependent on the U.S.

#### Application to the Dimension

Overall this dimension is rated as negative. Although there was never any credible subversive threat to the country or the

government, several factors contribute to this rating. The first factor included the inability to use intelligence successfully. Intelligence support is only as good as the source of information; in Panama, there was no way to judge many of the sources. As a result, hundreds of man hours were spent chasing down baseless rumors. The Panamanian intelligence experts generally were ousted during the invasion; key post-invasion PNP leaders with intelligence backgrounds, Lieutenant Colonels Valdonado and Quezada, were ousted as part of the political game within the ADOC coalition. The newly formed investigative bodies within the government were less than effective during the first year they operated.<sup>102</sup>

Also, the inability of the government to take proactive measures to convince the public they were in control, evidenced by the Herrera debacle, contributed to a less than successful attempt to curtail potential threats as they arose. The dubious loyalty of elements within the PNP and their questionable ability or willingness to counter internal threats, along with the continued overt reliance on the U.S. military further hampered Actions Against Subversion.

#### Host Country Military Actions

##### Pre-JUST CAUSE Analysis

The viability of the PDF and the Dignity Battalions will not be further discussed for purposes of this dimension. Suffice it to say that the military/paramilitary forces under the Noriega regime were, as Koster and Sanchez stated earlier, a military establishment run by a criminal clique who served only themselves and Noriega, who legitimized

their power. Despite early on proclamations that President Bush had no quarrel with the PDF per se, the actions of the Dignity Battalions against the opposition in May and PDF actions against the American Marine lieutenant in December clearly demonstrated, in terms of this dimension, the forces were undisciplined and, most importantly, the senior level leadership was almost universally corrupt.<sup>103</sup>

#### Post-JUST CAUSE Analysis

The situation after the war, which dictated that the PDF be transferred en masse into the new Public Force, presented its own unique challenges. The objective,

was to establish a first rate, professional police force capable of implementing an effective system of law enforcement as rapidly as possible. Without the stability represented by such a police force, the viability of the new government would remain in question, the domestic economy would not recover, investment opportunities would wither, and tourism, a major potential industry for Panama, would not develop.<sup>104</sup>

Unfortunately, U.S. efforts were hampered by the material with which it had to work; the U.S. started from a losing position. Booz Allen notes,

(t)o change values and the attitudes of (the former PDF) is nearly impossible. To rely upon internal accountability as the sole means of control of this force is foolhardy.<sup>105</sup>

Also,

the PDF, while largely being made up of policemen and carrying out police functions, had developed a military ethos. Real policemen were definitely 'second class' citizens. Secondly, the PDF police had been wholly reactive, mainly repressive, mostly brutal, corrupt, and generally undisciplined. In short, the new police were not safe to walk the streets much less police them.<sup>106</sup>

The government was faced with a dilemma. In the wake of the massive looting and anarchy that followed the invasion, Arias believed disbanding the PDF "would have been the most dangerous and irresponsible of all decisions."<sup>107</sup> If they refused to allow former PDF members into the new Public Force, the potential for "a possible nucleus for urban guerrilla warfare" to develop, significantly increased.<sup>108</sup>

The government took a different approach, offering former PDF members an opportunity to become part of the new PNP by swearing allegiance to the new government. While this precluded the guerrilla warfare scenario Arias envisioned, it created months of turmoil while new PNP leaders were purged, reorganizations were effected to keep the system from appearing military, and it allowed a group of military-minded individuals to continue to direct the primary security forces in the country.

The further away from Panama City one got, and depending on the province, the more military-minded the cuartels remained. It was only through the intercession by U.S. officials and national Panamanian government leaders that halted this practice, and then it was never fully successful--at least during the first year after the invasion. Despite the presence of U.S. special forces and reserve component police advisors in the provinces, there was, at some locations I visited, a chronic animosity--in some places to the point of belligerency --on the part of these soldiers turned policemen.<sup>109</sup>

By the end of that first year, the new force had made progress. But perceptions die hard and the realities were hard to deny:

The new public force . . . is the subject of widespread complaints, and it lacks even rudimentary equipment to police the streets effectively . . . . One precinct chief noted he had only 775 policemen to patrol one of Panama City's worst areas with a population of 210,000; they have only seven vehicles, of which four were open bed pickup trucks, hardly conducive to transporting suspects. Maintenance of the vehicles was a problem; getting gas was an even bigger one.<sup>110</sup>

Probably the most telling evidence of the post-conflict military actions of the Host Country lies in the increased crime and the resultant public perceptions. In April 1990,

(t)he police in this country of 2.3 million people have recorded an average of thirty murders per month--six times the pre-invasion rate. Armed robbers have been breaking into houses by day and holding up expensive restaurants at night. . . . Panama continues to serve as a transshipment point for U.S.-bound cocaine.<sup>111</sup>

The public was not only not impressed by the performance of the new police force, one poll showed "50 percent of all respondents think police pose a threat to democratic government."<sup>112</sup> They saw new uniforms, but would not dismiss the legacy of the PDF.<sup>113</sup>

There were perceptions (based in part on reality) that the government was tying the hands of the PF, limiting funds and equipment. The government was also accused of imposing restrictions on the use of force, afraid of being accused of supporting a repressive police force, reminiscent of the PDF. They were slow in providing adequate weapons to the force, and shortage of vehicles, gas and even office supplies were real. The only asset that was in abundance was personnel -the uneven distribution, however, resulted in the force overstaffed in the interior, and understaffed in the worst areas of Panama City and Colon.<sup>114</sup>

Herrera's uprising in December 1990 further degraded perceptions of the PNP as a viable security force. Fishel notes,

When the new force after 8 months still had no new (non-PDF) recruits, had not been able to provide a perceived satisfactory level of security, and evidence of old style petty corruption appeared, the government was blamed. When this was followed by the abortive December 4-5 police coup attempt/cum mutiny/cum protest demonstration that had to be put down by U.S. forces at the request of the government, public confidence fell.<sup>115</sup>

These factors all contributed to the overall ineffectiveness of the PNP after one year and resulted in reduced credibility for the force and the Endara government, as well as continued reliance on the U.S. military. As a result of low public confidence, thousands of private security guards hit the streets, presenting a potential threat of their own.

#### Application to the Dimension

The variables associated with this dimension include the level of discipline and training of the force, a willingness to take casualties and the level of aggressive patrolling to counter threats and provide security.

Some members of the new police force, mostly those who served in police functions in the former PDF, were trained to some degree, although they maintained, as Fishel noted, "a military mindset." Others maintained the legacy of the PDF and attempted to instill a sense of the military into the new force, holding formations, wearing military insignia and combat boots. While this did not last, it indicates the unwillingness of many former PDF members to transition to a peace enforcing body. The U.S. government, as noted in the section on Support Actions by the Intervening Power, was less than successful the first year in providing adequate training to reinforce positive attitudes,

eliminate the recalcitrant personnel, and promote a positive image for the PNP. The inability of PNP leaders to instill a sense of loyalty to the new government was demonstrated during the aborted Herrera uprising.

The dramatic rise in crime during the first year, even compensating for faulty reporting prior to the invasion, indicates a lack of aggressiveness on the part of the PNP to do its job. Not all of the problems can be attributed directly to the PNP itself; the lack of basic arms, equipment, and supplies hampered their efforts to be effective. Nonetheless, the increase in crime, both in reality and perceptually, probably was the driving factor behind the low confidence in the organization by the Panamanian public.

Finally, the continued reliance on the U.S., demonstrated by the events of 5 December, seal the rating for this dimension in the negative. That the Panamanian government remained dependent on the U.S. for national as well as internal security, a primary responsibility of a government to its people, is proof of strategic failure. The ramifications of that incident reverberated both in Panama and in the U.S. military as a measure of the lack of success of an entire year's endeavors.

#### Unity of Effort

#### Pre-JUST CAUSE Analysis

Prior to JUST CAUSE, the U.S. political objectives ran counter to those of the government in power. U.S. actions before the invasion alternated between public statements of support and failure to commit on the ground. During the coup attempt in October, for example,



In his statement, Bush seemed to suggest that there were some coups he would support and some he would not. Until then, Bush, in his frequent and fervent appeals for a coup, had proclaimed only one U.S. demand--the removal of Noriega. He had not specified one type of a coup as favorable over another. He did not define his new criteria, yet whatever his new standards were, they seemed operative retroactively: The Giroldi coup, Bush implied, had not measured up.<sup>116</sup>

U.S. policy was one of conflicting signals that could not help but confuse the opposition, either civilian or military. Incredibly, the administration continued to indicate their support when the President told Billy Ford "Just because we didn't help out this time, doesn't mean we can't help next time."<sup>117</sup>

Further, the far-reaching goals of nationbuilding and promoting democracy appear not to have been uppermost in the minds of planners, at least as the invasion grew nearer. Civil affairs planners arduously constructed a series of plans to address post-conflict issues, but the reality of the situation was that there appeared to be little command emphasis on this planning from the strategic or even operational level. Certainly once the XVIII Airborne Corps took over planning for the operation, considerations for what we would do in country after the invasion was deemphasized. Colonel James Kelly, the former Deputy Commander, U.S. Security Assistance Agency for Latin America, put it this way:

Operation JUST CAUSE was meant to eliminate the embarrassment of the U.S. presidential administration. It wasn't designed to make a better more democratic Panama. The primary mission was to get Noriega out of the picture . . . that's where all the energy was. There was no real thought or concern of doing anything else. . . . There was no real strategic vision or strategic objectives except to get Noriega out of the picture. Certainly there was concern that Panama was democratic and all that, but there were no resources dedicated or thought given to how are we going to make this thing work, and where is our responsibility versus Panamanian

responsibility. There was no real strategic concept for the rebuilding of Panama afterwards.<sup>118</sup>

The post-conflict plans became valuable only after the fact, when political realities necessitated their implementation.

So, while the opposition may have understood that the U.S. was committed to restoring stability and promoting democracy from the beginning, in actuality, the primary concern lay with ousting Noriega. The generally accepted failure of economic sanctions, the damage caused by the invasion itself, and the "self-inflicted" responsibilities the U.S. assumed when it inaugurated the coalition prior to the invasion resulted in Operation Promote Liberty. Put eloquently by Stanley Hoffman, "one is bound by one's commitments; one is committed by one's mistakes."<sup>119</sup>

It was an operation that the U.S. military would pursue enthusiastically, making every effort to make it work. While the other agencies of the government would be slower to react, they too, would eventually make significant contributions to the effort.

#### Post-JUST CAUSE Analysis

Immediately after the cessation of hostilities, the U.S. and Panamanian governments were united in victory and looked forward to the future with optimism. Political rhetoric spoke with one voice for a new democracy in Panama, a rebuilding effort to heal the nation, and promises were made by the United States to fully support assistance efforts.

The U.S. military took the lead in post-conflict operations if for no other reason than the U.S. Embassy, which would normally be in

charge of nation assistance, was not in a position to do so (having been reduced to a 15-member staff prior to the war). The government of Panama followed the U.S. lead because it was not in a position to stand on its own. Under these circumstances, the onus remained on U.S. military forces in country to launch rebuilding efforts, stand up the new police force, and take on the myriad of tasks inherent in promoting stability and supporting the fledgling democracy.

Despite the rosy outlook, problems arose early. A lack of adequate planning, the contradiction of having military forces take the lead in promoting democracy, dissension within Panamanian and American agencies, increasing divergent opinions on how to implement programs and policies, and disagreements between the national interests of the two nations surfaced throughout 1990.

As has been noted earlier, post-conflict planning took a back seat to combat operations. As one study noted,

Few leaders look forward to the third day of war, the day after the fighting stops. It is just as important to win the peace as it is to militarily defeat the enemy . . . . Conflict termination is an essential link between national security strategy, national military strategy, and post-conflict aims--the political effects desired.<sup>120</sup>

The lack of a coordinated plan which integrated interagency instruments of national power and a clear strategy to support long term stability and development clearly presented challenges for the U.S. military tasked to perform the mission.<sup>121</sup> In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, "we had guys out there with a street broom in one hand and a gun in the other trying to figure out which one to use from day to day."<sup>122</sup> In a larger context,

If the senior U.S. civilian and military leaders in Panama perceived that unity of effort had been achieved at the top, then that was hardly the view of the people in the organizations that had to execute the policies. Rather there were conflicting interpretations of U.S. policy objectives . . . . Issues involving the proper U.S. role in establishing, influencing, advising, and training Panama's security forces never were resolved.<sup>123</sup>

This statement leads to the second issue associated with the unity of effort dimension, the use of military forces as the lead element in building a democratic government and nation assistance. That the Embassy was not able to take the reins of the effort early on, and the acknowledged dependence on the military to "do something" is evidenced in this statement,

we knew there were vast numbers of U.S. military in the various organizations because we were told. . . . We sort of smirked at (the military's) efficiency at having set up that plan. We looked at it as being maybe not totally proper, while at the same time realizing . . . the U.S. military . . . had a set up, a civic action plan that they could put in place in this kind of a situation where we didn't have any. While we thought some of this closeness to the Panamanian civil government or at least reawakening Panamanian civil government was not appropriate we also realized an incredible number of things needed to be done in the government weren't going to get done any other way. No one else was going to do them.<sup>124</sup>

While initially an expedient solution to immediate problems, the visible lead taken by the military would begin to chafe. The military saw the State Department as slow to react, the State Department, through the Embassy, saw the military overstepping its bounds. The U.S. Ambassador believed it was a contradiction to have the U.S. military "in the forefront of supporting democratization, the creation of civil government and nation-building."<sup>125</sup> Military leaders, on the other hand, complained of the inherent problems that arise from different mindsets between the military and State Department, as well as the resentment bred over the military's taking charge.<sup>126</sup>

Dissension within and between the Panamanian government and the U.S. caused further problems. While total agreement on all policies could not reasonably be expected, the number of disagreements "became an impediment to achieving effective combined unity of effort on issues where both governments were in agreement on the objectives."<sup>127</sup>

The cuts in the aid package and the agonizing process of obtaining the equipment, funds, and manpower needed to execute Operation Promote Liberty had a detrimental impact, both in a real sense and psychologically. Politically, the U.S. remained staunchly supportive of Endara throughout the post-conflict period, but the inability to realize common goals and objectives relatively neutralized the synergistic aspects that unity of effort gains.

One clear example where over the course of 1990 disunity was evident was the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, a pact "designed to provide information sharing . . . involving financial transactions involving drug running and the laundering of narcotics money."<sup>128</sup> Fishel explains the dilemma,

The MLAT, as originally proposed by the United States, struck at the very core of Panama's offshore banking industry, based as it is on confidentiality. More importantly, U.S. assistance was held hostage for the signing of the MLAT. In the end a workable agreement was negotiated but not without leaving many Panamanians believing the United States was prepared to impose on Panama, in its hour of need, conditions it did not even ask of the U.S. banking system.<sup>129</sup>

Another example of disunity involved the diverging views on the stand up of the police. Within the Panamanian government itself, suspicions that surrounded a PDF-turned-PNP organization prompted discord between those who believed the new force should be forced to live with extreme restrictions and those who sincerely wanted to make

the force effective. The result was an ill-equipped, poorly-led force that lacked credibility that precluded the realization of the Panamanian goal of a new, professional security force.

On the U.S. side, the dissension between civilian and military agencies also contributed to a disunited front.

the U.S. effort to establish the PNP was extremely disjointed. . . . Civilian agencies took a long term view on the resolution of problems in Panama; the military, on the other hand, faced real world problems requiring immediate solutions. The Embassy and ICITAP were willing to take several years to establish an effective police force. In contrast, the military needed to get the police operating to reestablish order on the streets and end the role of U.S. soldiers acting as policemen in Panama. In truth, the civilian's "long-term view" was often an excuse for not having a strategy to deal with immediate problems in the framework of a permanent solution."<sup>130</sup>

Further hampering a united effort was the complicated system of legal considerations with regard to policies and programs in a post-conflict environment. According to Colonel Kelly,

This is peacetime, not war, we are just going to make this as if it never really happened. Everything was back to business as usual. All the restrictions, all the limitations were reimplemented almost immediately. We couldn't do all these. We couldn't have the military train the police. We have to use security assistance to buy these new uniforms. Nobody wanted to do anything.<sup>131</sup>

Considering the amount of dissension over the issue of police, along with the immense problems in standing up the force that had nothing to do with unity of effort, it is easy to understand why, at the end of the first year, the official USSOUTHCOM assessment concluded there were still major problems. The PNP still was not adequately trained, manned or equipped; the peripheral fallout of low public confidence, high crime and Herrera's insurrection exacerbated an issue that would be a long time in resolving.

Overall, the inability to develop a cohesive post-conflict strategy created different interpretations of how to tackle the immense efforts that would be required to get Panama back on its feet; agencies involved often worked in many different directions. Having a military force in the lead was perceived as diametrically opposed to the democratic way of doing business, and it created friction among U.S. agencies. The military's take charge attitude further exacerbated relations with other government agencies. The Endara government's gratitude for U.S. assistance began to wane under issues like the stringent requirements of MLAT and the frustration over the inadequate measures taken to form, train and use the PNP. By year's end, the U.S.-Panamanian political and moral support remained, but the level of U.S. commitment, the degree of practical cooperation between agencies, and a clear understanding of the end state remained in question.

#### Application to the Dimension

The perceptions of the interests of the United States in Panama went from positive to, at a minimum, neutral over the course of 1990 despite the enthusiastic actions by the U.S. military. Decreased aid dollars, slow delivery of economic assistance, and the imposition of strict prerequisite measures as a condition to providing aid understandably changed perceptions of the U.S. interests over time. Panamanian expectations of a total U.S. solution became more realistic as the year progressed, but dashed hopes understandably lead to frustration and resentment.

While overarching political and moral polarity remained, in reality the lack of a unity of effort on the part of the individual players proved counterproductive to operations in country. Even the initial support promised by the U.S. government and its military forces to attain post-conflict objectives waned as the year progressed and in some cases, never advanced beyond the rhetorical or symbolic stage.

Adapting the model to fit Panama's specific situation, the problems that arose from disunity within the Panamanian government, and within various agencies of the American government, must be considered under this dimension. Although progress certainly was made in many areas, U.S. ability to achieve strategic and operational objectives was hampered by interagency rivalry, the lack of cohesive planning, and disagreements on implementation of policy. The hindering effects of this infighting inevitably slowed the pace of recovery and the year would end with many of Panama's problems no closer to solution than in January. This dimension is rated negative.

#### CONCLUSION

What is most remarkable in the application of the model to the case of Panama is that, although generally accepted as an overall success by the U.S. government and military alike, the overwhelming number of negatively evaluated dimensions do not support this impression. A failure across the board in pre-JUST CAUSE policies prompted the necessity of the invasion. Post-conflict operations were not well-planned or executed, and the support from the Intervening Power



decreased substantially, both in real terms and perceptually. The one success story in Panama was the invasion itself.

The military forces of the United States proved overwhelmingly that they were capable of conducting combat operations in support of national policy. They accomplished their objectives in relatively short order. It was only after the conflict, when the goals became more ambiguous, the strength of the commitment declined and dissension among agencies, both Panamanian and U.S., that U.S. efforts became disjointed and less than successful. This loss of success must be considered as the most important aspect of the overall evaluation, for two reasons. First, it is the actions that fall outside the realm of the military invasion itself that have the most lasting impact on the country, and on U.S. interests as a whole. Second, because the U.S. military was the most visible representative of U.S. intentions and was responsible to carry out the lion's share of post-conflict support to Panama, U.S. successes or failures reflect on the military itself, in this case, negatively.

It is this lasting impact with which the U.S. military will have to deal eventually, each time it becomes involved in operations other than war around the globe. In Panama, the military did not set the stage for prolonged stability. It was not able, in that first year, to foster an environment that could conceivably ensure security for the nation in the future. If military forces increase their role in carrying out political missions in a post-Cold War world, Panama serves as a clear example of how they need to refocus their efforts to address the unique challenges of a post-conflict, or non-conflict environment.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>Kevin Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 207.

<sup>2</sup>Author's personal observation of actions in country, coupled with various reports received at USARSO headquarters from Washington, plus author's monitoring of U.S. public opinion polls and media reports following the operation.

<sup>3</sup>Dr. John T. Fishel and Major Richard Downie, "Taking Responsibility for Our Actions? Establishing Order and Stability in Panama." Military Review 72: 4 (April 92) 66.

<sup>4</sup>On or about 7 February, the USARSO staff was briefed that forces in country were to be down to 13,600 by 15 February. A widespread offer was issued to USARSO headquarters staff (at least in my section; it is reasonable to assume this happened in other staffs as well) for individuals who wanted to "go home." Needless to say, there were many volunteers, many of whom received new assignments, orders and clearance papers within 48 hours. My J2 operations section alone lost three active duty personnel and three reservists (out of a section of about 15).

<sup>5</sup>The new police force formed after Operation Just Cause underwent numerous name changes over the course of the year which followed Operation Just Cause. While it began as the PPF (or simply PF), it later changed to PN (Policia Nacional), and finally to the PNP, (Policia Nacional de Panama). References used in this study equate to the time frame during which the reference is used.

<sup>6</sup>Gabriela Marcella and General (Ret) Fred Woerner, "The Road to War: The U.S.-Panamanian Crisis, 1987-89," 6 May 1991, unpublished, 21.

<sup>7</sup>The increase in operating tempo and show of force operations is documented in numerous sources that discuss the direction of planning by military forces after the elections. The dramatic increase in the exercises and tit for tat operations was due, at least in part, to the assumption of command at USARSO by Major General Marc Cisneros, a no-nonsense commander who had lengthy experience dealing with the situation (he was previously the SOUTHCOM J3) and who believed in aggressively standing up to Noriega's program of harassment and intimidation. This information is additionally based on comments made by Colonel Michael G. Snell, commander, 193d Infantry Brigade, interviews with author, December 1993.

<sup>8</sup>Major General John Hartzog, Commander, JTF-Panama, interview with Dr. John T. Fishel, Transcript April 1991, 3.

<sup>9</sup>Kevin Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story 189.

<sup>10</sup>This justification for this statement lies in my own observations of over 25 USARSO level staff calls, during which Major General Cisneros encouraged (although perhaps that is a strong word) an attitude of get-evenness; planners understood they should anticipate opportunities for exploitation. By that I mean, staff members were definitely under the impression that he believed in developing "tit-for-tat" responses to PDF actions--they planned activities that way. During exercises that elicited PDF responses or incidents where U.S. forces were stopped by the PDF, Major General Cisneros would occupy a seat in the Emergency Operations Center (where I worked) and provide instructions to elements on the ground. Inevitably these actions were intended as provocative. I never once saw him back down and order a withdrawal to ease tensions.

<sup>11</sup>Kevin Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story, 222.

<sup>12</sup>Marcella and Woerner, "The Road to War," 45-46. While the authors acknowledge that Major Giroldi's coup attempt was poorly organized and executed, they stressed the inaction by Washington as having a serious impact on perceptions in Panama. They believed that "it would have been a relatively simple operation for U.S. troops to block the two airports and roads through which reinforcements moved to the Commandancia." This concept is supported by statements by Major General Cisneros (interview between LTC Fishel and Major General Cisneros, 6-7) that indicate he believed in-place forces could execute the plan "any length of the spectrum."

<sup>13</sup>Further, in arguing that the turmoil caused by the assumption of command by General Thurman as the root cause for inaction, Marcella and Woerner believed Thurman fell victim to Noriega's psyop reputation; that he "reportedly feared a trap was being set by Noriega to ensnare the United States into a humiliating intervention." While this may, in fact, have been the case, one could just as easily argue that there was enough expertise in country to keep General Thurman straight immediately; one wonders what the intelligence community in Panama was doing at the time.

<sup>14</sup>R.M. Koster and Guillermo Sanchez, In the Time of the Tyrants, Panama: 1968-1990 (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1990), 375.

<sup>15</sup>John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War Colonel, 15 August 1992), 12-13.

<sup>16</sup>It appears, from numerous interviews conducted that the senior planners, including Major General Cisneros (then SOUTHCOM J3),

General Woerner, and the initial planners of follow-on operations had believed there would be widespread looting and provided in the plan for the use of elements of 7th ID to respond to such a contingency. However, once General Thurman was in command, and XVIII Airborne Corps took the lead in planning, this contingency took second place to warfighting operations. Even if a response to looting had been anticipated by the senior level leadership, it appears--from the interviews--that below the General officer level, there was no real appreciation for the possibility--nor any move by the actual planners to push the issue strongly enough to change the plan. For example--General Thurman, Colonel Stone and Colonel Higgenbotham, both of whom were involved in post-conflict operations, all voiced the belief that looting was not anticipated. Major General Hartzog, SOUTHCOM J3 under Thurman, believed looting would occur, but not as quickly as it did. Colonel Pryor, Deputy Commander of the USMSG-PM, did not anticipate the magnitude of the destruction.

<sup>17</sup>Colonel Higgenbotham, USARSO DCSLOG and later involved with USFLG and USMSG-PM, interview with Lieutenant Colonel John T. Fishel, Written Transcript 4 April 1991, 8-9.

<sup>18</sup>Colonel (Ret) Michael G. Snell, interview with author, December 1993. Colonel Snell stated that up to three full infantry companies were required to provide security to the housing areas during the first nine days of the war because of the refugees. Further, a company was tied up at Balboa High School to control the refugee camp that had to be established after Chorillo burned to the ground. These forces were unavailable for commitment in the areas where rampant looting occurred.

<sup>19</sup>Higgenbotham interview, 9.

<sup>20</sup>Interview with Colonel Bill Stone, former Commander, Civil Affairs Task Force, Written Transcript, 16 April 1991, 17.

<sup>21</sup>Michael Massing, "New Trouble in Panama," New York Review, 19 April 1990, 45.

<sup>22</sup>The Washington Post, "U.S. Army Guarantees Endara Stays in Power, 17 December 1990, republished in The Early Bird, 17 December 1990, 14.

<sup>23</sup>Richard Schultz, In the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, August 1993), 63.

<sup>24</sup>Michael Polt, former Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy, Panama, interview with Dr. John T. Fishel, Written Transcript April 1991, 21-22.

<sup>25</sup>Personal observations of author while assigned to JTF-PM J2 Operations and as Assistant J2, USMSG-PM.

<sup>26</sup>John T. Fishel, Fog of Peace, 52-53.

<sup>27</sup>Marcella and Woerner, "The Road to War," 22.

<sup>28</sup>Massing, "New Trouble in Panama," 49.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., 46. Also, Colonel James Kelly, former Deputy Commander, U.S. Security Assistance Agency for Latin America, interview with Dr. John Fishel, Written Transcript, 22 March 1991, 25, who stated, "We could not count on the RC cops speaking Spanish."

<sup>30</sup>Massing, "New Trouble in Panama," 46.

<sup>31</sup>Kevin Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story, 192.

<sup>32</sup>Marcella and Woerner, "The Road to War," 32.

<sup>33</sup>Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story, 186.

<sup>34</sup>Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause, The Storming of Panama (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 64.

<sup>35</sup>Marcella and Woerner, "The Road to War," 35.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., 35-36.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., 37.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., 28.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., 28.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., 5.

<sup>42</sup>Fishel, The Fog of Peace, 5.

<sup>43</sup>General Maxwell Thurman, interview with Dr. John T. Fishel, Written Transcript, 3 April 1991, 5. Thurman notes, "The reason for arranging the cabinet prior to the operation was so that as soon as possible after the operation commenced, . . . the government would stand

up and be counted via radio and television broadcasts. Panamanians are now in control of the government. There is a government. It is no longer the United States dickering with the government." While the necessity of the actions taken to legitimize Endara's government may have played well with the general public, the reality of the situation was not as Thurman would suggest. As Fishel notes, three guys do not constitute a government. (See Host Government Legitimacy).

<sup>44</sup>Michael Polt interview, 2-3, 14.

<sup>45</sup>Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story, 259.

<sup>46</sup>Booz, Allen & Hamilton, "Draft Panama Strategy," Prepared for the Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, U.S. Military Support Group-Panama, 14 May 1990, 5.

<sup>47</sup>Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story, 255.

<sup>48</sup>United States General Accounting Office, "Panama: Issues Relating to the U.S. Invasion," (Washington, D.C.: National Security and International Affairs Division, 24 April 1991), 1.

<sup>49</sup>John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace, 62.

<sup>50</sup>Marcella and Woerner, "The Road to War," 57.

<sup>51</sup>Dr. John T. Fishel and Major Richard Downie, "Taking Responsibilities for Our Actions? 68.

<sup>52</sup>Colonel Higgenbotham, interview, 22.

<sup>53</sup>Massing, "New Problems in Panama," 49.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid.

<sup>55</sup>As a member of USMSG-PM J2, I can attest to the fact that there was no cohesive long range--or even short range--plan. It was routine for the staff of USMSG-PM to remain at the office until 2200 or 2300, waiting for directions on what to do the next day. This remained SOP throughout my tour with the organization.

<sup>56</sup>These observations are based on my experience while assigned to USMSG-PM J2. Over the course of the first year after Just Cause, resources decreased as demands increased. There appeared to be no end to the requests by the Panamanians for assistance, many of which U.S. forces simply were not in a position to respond to, from the mundane request for a well to be built to the monumental task of restructuring the judicial system. Other government agencies, which had been slow to

organize for the massive effort that post-conflict operations require, initially were not perceived as a source of support for those of us who worked the day-to-day issues. The conflicting demands of providing support and getting out of the way at the same time were confusing at best.

<sup>57</sup>"Life After Manuel Noriega, Panama's New Regime is Off to a Rough Start," U.S. News and World Report, Vol, No. (30 July 1990), 30.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton, in "Life After Manuel Noriega," U.S. News and World Report, 30. Hinton suggested a need to get away from the historical perception that the U.S. always knows best, that perhaps it was time to break "these mental habits," in his push to get Panama to accept more responsibility for its actions.

<sup>60</sup>Dr. John T. Fishel and Major Richard Downie, "Taking Responsibility for Our Actions?," 69.

<sup>61</sup>Marcella and Woerner, "The Road to War," 14.

<sup>62</sup>Koster and Sanchez, In the Time of the Tyrants, 283.

<sup>63</sup>This refers to the study done by the author (and others) in the months following Operation Just Cause, explained in Chapter One. If this situation was predicted by any element, either in the national military intelligence community or by other agencies within the federal government, those findings were not readily apparent or available to the people who were charged with trying to understand the post-conflict environment. It was only through this study that the infrastructure came to light. For military planners concerned about the potential for another low intensity conflict arising, this information, first put together by USMSG-PM, was valuable in providing a framework from which to assess the "activities" of the M-20, or other disgruntled entities.

<sup>64</sup>Marcella and Woerner, The Road to War. 49

<sup>65</sup>Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story, 234.

<sup>66</sup>John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace, 56.

<sup>67</sup>Fishel and Downie, "Taking Responsibility for Our Actions?" 67.

<sup>68</sup>Major General Marc Cisneros, Commander, JTF-Panama, interview with John T. Fishel, Written Transcript, 15 April 1991, 13-14.

<sup>69</sup>Booz, Allen & Hamilton, "Panama Strategy, Campaign Plan," 6.

<sup>70</sup>Major General Marc Cisneros interview, 14.

<sup>71</sup>U.S. News and World Report, "Life After Manuel Noriega," 29.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., 31.

<sup>73</sup>Booz, Allen & Hamilton, "Panama Strategy Campaign Plan," 7.

<sup>74</sup>U.S. News and World Report, "Life After Manuel Noriega," 30.

<sup>75</sup>Laura Brooks, "Panama Hits Its Stride in Recovery," The Christian Science Monitor, vol 84 No. 182, date unknown (article copy among Panama files at Carl), 2.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid.

<sup>77</sup>Ilse Dronberger, The Political Thought of Max Weber, (New York: Appleton, Century, CroForts, 1971), 177. Charismatic legitimacy is, according to Weber, one of three types of legitimacy, and hence, authority. Charismatic legitimacy rests "on devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person . . . ." The other types of legitimacy include traditional, which is derived from "an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them; and rational-legal, which is based on "a belief in the legality patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issues commands." I make this statement based on my participation in post-conflict operations, my discussions with the leadership of USMSG-PM, who had almost daily contact with the coalition and the Panamanian public, and my own personal interaction with the Panamanian people.

<sup>78</sup>Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story, 258-59.

<sup>79</sup>Steven C. Ropp, "Things Fall Apart: Panama After Noriega," Current History, (March, 1993), 104.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid.

<sup>81</sup>Buckley (196) and Koster and Sanchez (359), along with a host of others all evidence support from these countries to training and/or equipping Noriega's PDF. Some of the most influential junior officers in the PDF--Gaitan, Gaitan, Castillo, to name three, were extensively trained in the countries mentioned in the study and in turn, trained their units correspondingly.



<sup>82</sup>Ibid.

<sup>83</sup>Information gained by author while assigned to Panama. Again, weapons came into Panama primarily through Cuba and Nicaragua; during the war, U.S. forces recovered over 50,000. This number far exceeded expectations of how many weapons Noriega actually had in the inventory. The large number of weapons also caused concern in the aftermath of Just Cause because, since original estimates had been so far off, there was no way to judge whether we were anywhere close to recovering all the weapons. Inevitably, many were not recovered and we continued to receive reports for months about weapons caches all over the country. These reports often were used as justification for the "show of force" operations conducted after the war by the combat elements remaining in country, notably the 193d Infantry Brigade, who continued these operations until August 1990.

<sup>84</sup>Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story, 185.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid., 225.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., 226.

<sup>87</sup>Colonel (Ret) Michael G. Snell oral interview, December 1993.

<sup>88</sup>Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story, 225.

<sup>89</sup>Marcella and Woerner, "The Road to War," 17.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., 13.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid.

<sup>92</sup>Personal observation by the author. The J2, JTF-PM office had numerous files on the military members of the PDF, compiled over the course of the crisis period beginning in 1987. However, there was precious little information on the myriad of groups that operated in Panama, corrupt civilian operations and the like. If that information existed, it never appeared in the hands of the intelligence personnel who needed it, despite requests to numerous agencies. Additionally, once the war was over, the tendency to hold information, an intelligence shortcoming known as the "green door syndrome" precluded optimal effectiveness of intelligence support to the combat operators in country.

<sup>93</sup>John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace, 46, 49.

<sup>94</sup>I was unable to locate a copy of this letter, but was assigned to the USMSG-PM J2 when it arrived. The letter talked of

killing Americans, warned of the general uprising to oust Endara and the Americans from Panama, as well as other nefarious acts. To investigate, I went to the David Fair and found a peaceful spring celebration, nothing more. The only injury incurred were the numerous hangovers that resulted from partaking too much Panamanian rum. Dr. Fishel, a noted author on Panama, recalled the incident as well.

<sup>95</sup>Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story, 261

<sup>96</sup>Ibid., 263.

<sup>97</sup>Colonel Michael G. Snell, oral interview, December 1993, and comments by Dr. John Fishel.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid.

<sup>99</sup>Washington Post, "U.S. Army Guarantees Endara Stays in Power," 18.

<sup>100</sup>U.S. News and World Report, "Winter of Their Discontent," Vol x, No. x, (17 December 1990), 55.

<sup>101</sup>Steven C. Ropp, "Things Fall Apart: Panama After Noriega," 105.

<sup>102</sup>John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace, 46,49.

<sup>103</sup>Personal observation by the author. The Panamanians appeared grateful for the assistance provided to them by U.S. intelligence. They were not, however, very successful at reciprocal efforts. During 1990, while many of the former PDF or military regime members remained in positions of authority, there were deliberate actions taken to prevent information from being passed to U.S. offices. This was true not only regarding information about potential threats, it also included information on the new structure of Panamanian government agencies. We were continually put off, or rebuffed in our efforts to understand or monitor the actions of the Public Force. This was not true for all agencies; primarily just those with whom we were involved who could provide needed intelligence. To a great extent, this was our own fault. The USFLGIPFLD had an excellent relationship with the PPF and PNP but as we left and the PFLD became the PLE.

<sup>104</sup>Numerous examples of this widespread corruption exists. The most extensive documentation is provided in the Joint Document Center's Reports, a series of (at that time and for the most part still) classified interrogation debriefs conducted by Colonel (FNU) Stuart, who was in charge of the center. Colonel Stuart's organization worked for months not only deciphering thousands of documents, but also conducting hundreds of interviews with former members of the PDF and Noriega

supporters who were arrested after the invasion. The documents provide a keen insight on how corruption which started at the top of the PDF began to seep lower and lower until the behavior of the whole organization reflected the self-promotion and self-centered nature of the leadership. Some of these documents have been transferred to the CARL Library at Fort Leavenworth; others remain in the possession of the 470th Military Intelligence Battalion.

105Fishel and Downie, "Taking Responsibility for Our Actions?," 3.

106Booz, Allen & Hamilton, "Panama Strategy, Campaign Strategy," 6.

107John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace, 45.

108Massing, 45.

109Ibid.

110Personal observation by the author. While the attitude of the new police force varied from area to area, enough hostility toward us existed to cause concern. In particular, during visits to San Miguelito, Penonome, David, and La Chorrera convinced me that not all of the members of the PNP were happy with the new arrangements. Officers would turn their back, or walk out of the room if U.S. personnel entered. In other cases, they would immediately stop talking when we walked into a room. They would go through periods where they insisted on coming to work in military uniforms with rank and insignia. While I might be able to put this admittedly perceived attitude down to the fact that I was a female, the Special Forces NCOs I normally had with me voiced similar opinions.

111"Life After Noriega, Panama's Regime is Off to a Rough Start," U.S. News and World Report x:x (30 July 1990): 29.

112Michael Massing, "New Trouble in Panama," 43.

113Laura Brooks, "Crime Wave, Corruption Tie Up Panama's Police," The Christian Science Monitor, x:x (28 August 1990), p. unk.

114Personal observation by the author based on numerous interviews with Panamanian citizens over the course of 1990. Again, these attitudes varied from area to area, but Generally, there was an understandable hesitancy on the part of Panamanians to trust many of the same people in their small towns and villages who had been the repressive PDF soldiers prior to Just Cause.

<sup>115</sup>Personal knowledge of the author. During that first year, it was clear from statements made by mid-level management within the PNP that the leadership of the government did not want the new PNP to gain any real power. To preclude this understandable concern, the government overreacted. Police cars were limited to five gallons of gas per week by the government; there was little if any money for repairs to vehicles or equipment. The government refused to establish any significant police presence in the eastern portion of the country, including even a naval presence, for months, even though narcotrafficking was increasing in that area. As to staffing, visits to various cuartels and discussions with PNP leaders we considered reliable repeatedly noted the imbalance in force allocations if they were short personnel.

<sup>116</sup>John T. Fishel, *The Fog of Peace*, 56.

<sup>117</sup>Buckley, *Panama: The Whole Story*, 216-217.

<sup>118</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>119</sup>Colonel James Kelly interview, 22 March 1991, 32.

<sup>120</sup>Stanley Hoffman, *Daedalus* (Fall, 1962); reprinted in *The State of War* (New York: 1965), in Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *The American Political Science Review*, 63:3, (September 1969), 692.

<sup>121</sup>Schultz, *In the Aftermath of War*, 3.

<sup>122</sup>*Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>123</sup>Major General William Hartzog interview, 11.

<sup>124</sup>John T. Fishel, *The Fog of Peace*, 59.

<sup>125</sup>Michael Polt interview, 16.

<sup>126</sup>Richard Schultz, *In the Aftermath of War*, 40.

<sup>127</sup>Major General Marc Cisneros interview, 22-24. Major General Cisneros pointed out, "(The State Department) is just not organized like we are, saying here's the objective, the organization and then execute . . . our way of thinking in the military is to be pragmatic, get things done quickly, and it doesn't matter who's doing it as long as it gets done. Thinking on the State Department side is political maturity building up for a long time and that's good also. But there's a time for certain of those two things." Also, Colonel Jack Pryor, Deputy Commander, USMSG-PM, interview with Dr. John Fishel, 7, who states, "(The Embassy) wanted to do it all, but didn't have the wherewithal to

do it, and they resented asking the military to do it for them. Up through the summer of '90, with parochial interests, (they) wanted to be the big guy on the block, there was a lot of tugging and pulling internally to USARSO, internally to State Department, internal to the (Panamanian) government." Also, Michael Polt, former Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy, interview with Dr. John Fishel, 9, In the aftermath of Just Cause we (the Political office) were bypassed; Jack Pryor and Jim Steele (of USMSG-PM) dealt directly with the Ambassador and DCM and by-passed the political section entirely."

<sup>128</sup>John T. Fishel, *The Fog of Peace*, 59-60.

<sup>129</sup>*Ibid.*, 60.

<sup>130</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>131</sup>Fishel and Downie, "Taking Responsibility for Our Actions," 75.

<sup>132</sup>Colonel James Kelly interview, 32.

## CHAPTER 5

### ASSESSMENT OF FEASIBILITY, ACCEPTABILITY, AND SUITABILITY OF MILITARY INTERVENTION AND CONCLUSIONS

#### Feasibility, Acceptability, and Suitability

Feasibility, acceptability and suitability are criteria used to assess the utility of a given strategy. Each of these criteria can provide a general idea as to whether the use of military force in the case studies of intervention in Somalia and Panama achieved the objective, was the appropriate instrument of national power to use, and at what cost, or impact, on the mission, and on the military.

The SWORD model applied in Chapters 3 and 4 does not address the impact of intervention in operations other than war on the military itself, and only indirectly on the ability to use the military effectively as an instrument of national power to achieve strategic objectives. This chapter is devoted to an analysis of these criteria applied to the case studies conducted in Chapters 3 and 4, Somalia and Panama. It will specifically address the use of military forces in promoting stability and/or providing nation assistance in these two countries, and generally examine how the other instruments of national power supported or detracted from the operation. The chapter then addresses the overall conclusions of the thesis and provides recommendations for further study.

While the national security strategy addresses enduring interests, in order to remain applicable over time it is, by definition, abstract and all encompassing. Even the more specific national security objectives, from which military objectives in cases of intervention are derived, are usually nebulous and difficult to define clearly, especially in a post-Cold War environment.

Although difficult, this is not to say producing correlative military objectives is impossible, at least in theory. "Translating political objectives into military objectives is the art half of strategy . . . an intuitive translation based on the experience, education, and wisdom of senior military leaders."<sup>1</sup>

In a conventional scenario, the education and experience of senior leaders is easier to apply. To today's senior leaders, a generation trained to face the conventional threat of the Soviet Union and who witnessed or experienced the political and military failures associated with the Vietnam conflict, planning for conventional war comes naturally. Doctrine, training, mission focus and mindset are geared to that end.

Once the policy formulation process enters the realm of operations other than war, this application becomes more ambiguous. In a post-Cold War environment, conventional doctrine writers are beginning to analyze involvement in other than conventional scenarios, and in the future planning for operations other than war may become as institutionally integrated as conventional planning is today. The transition period will be difficult, though, and U.S. strategic doctrine

and policy interface, exemplified by our involvement in Panama and Somalia, still require work.

### Feasibility

Feasibility answers the question, "Can the action be accomplished by the means available?"<sup>2</sup> It is "an assessment of the strategic concept (ways) given the resources available (means)" toward achieving the objective (ends).<sup>3</sup> The test of feasibility also requires "examining the underlying assumptions of the strategic concept," both in terms of the specific mission(s) to be performed as well as the force structure, or type resources, recommended to for use.<sup>4</sup>

As one reviews each of the seven dimensions of the Manwaring Paradigm, or SWORD Model, it becomes evident that consistent application of adequate resources contributes to success, while the opposite is also true--as resources decrease, so do the chances of long term success. The case studies bear this out to a large degree.

Initially, in the cases of both Somalia and Panama, one could argue that the resources applied to achieve the national objectives were more than adequate, a result of General Colin Powell's "overwhelming force" concept. This concept, born in part of his experiences with incremental intervention in Vietnam, resulted in almost immediate achievement of operational objectives in the Panama invasion, and surprisingly quick victory in the Persian Gulf. In Somalia, it served to stabilize the situation in a rapid enough manner to allow delivery of relief and an end to the immediate starvation problem.



Over time, resources to achieve long term goals were reduced, with the corresponding decrease in chances for success. Not only were troops and logistic support withdrawn, but political attentions turned elsewhere to other more pressing requirements, economic aid either was slow to materialize or pared down and national emphasis on the issues receded to the background; i.e., a decrease in informational resources dedicated to the problem. Each case study will be examined separately to see if the resources that remained were sufficient to achieve the national objectives.

A primary assumption made in cases of military intervention is simply that military forces are capable of doing the job. A subordinate, or internal to the military, assumption is that U.S. forces trained for combat, are already prepared for and capable of conducting, operations other than war. Each case study will reflect if the underlying assumptions made in each case were valid during the execution of the respective missions.

#### Somalia

In Somalia, the strategic focus primarily was on the results of the problem (i.e., starving people). Initially, the U.S. tried to ignore the symptoms (the violence), as though the benevolence of the mission and the goodness of U.S. intentions would inevitably lead to peace, stability and progress. There is no doubt that the operation saved thousands of Somalis from starving.

The potential for future failure was born with that initial intervention. As noted in Chapter 3, the U.S. entered the country as an

invading military force; a benevolent mission did not dissuade those who perceived our actions as a violation of their sovereignty. The U.S. did not fully appreciate the pride of the Somali people, how it could turn against an intervening force, or how visible military operations would become a hindrance instead of a help.

The U.S. was unable or unwilling at any time, to commit the resources that would be required to address the root causes (historical clan rivalry) of the problems in Somalia. It would have taken years and billions of dollars. That is the reality. Military forces provided a band-aid that, while costly enough, stopped the initial bleeding in the country and kept people from starving. Taking the analogy somewhat further, the U.S. failed to create the conditions which would allow the wounds to heal properly; the end result is that Somalia remains mired in chaos and instability and solution to the civil strife is no closer today than prior to the intervention.

The "overwhelming force" used during the UNITAF stage was feasible. There is no other agency within the U.S. government that has the physical capability to move vast amounts of relief aid, personnel, command and control, and security forces than the military. Over 26,000 U.S. soldiers deployed for five months to operations in Somalia to support national goals. That Operation RESTORE HOPE was executed successfully is a testimony to the feasibility of the "overwhelming force" concept.

The drawdown of U.S. forces in May 1993 and the stand up of UNOSOM II, however, did not end U.S. involvement in Somalia. Although the number of troops remained approximately the same, the number of U.S.

troops declined drastically. As noted earlier, the majority of UN-sponsored forces from Third World countries relied totally on the U.S. for logistics and/or transportation.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, many of the Third World military forces did not project the same deterrent factor U.S. troops presented. With less than 2,000 U.S. troops in country to support UN operations, the missions expanded to include support to all aspects of nation assistance envisioned by UNOSOM II, as well as security, with no commensurate expansion of resources. This inevitably undermined their chances of success.

There were not competent or fully committed troops, not enough resources, and there was not enough political or national will to accomplish those goals, despite Congressional sanction of such support in the spring of 1993.

After the killing of the Pakistanis in June, resources provided to the U.S. military increased. These assets, however, were not to be used for nation assistance objectives, but for the purpose of increasing the security for remaining troops and to assist in the hunt for Aidid. At this point, feasibility becomes debatable. Clearly, if seizing Aidid was the national objective (as it was for at least a period of time) the U.S. (or for that matter the UN) did not commit the proper resources to accomplish that mission. Rather, additional combat elements were piecemealed in, antagonizing the already hostile elements in country. The result was a disjointed and counterproductive operation which only served to aggravate the situation, decrease the chances of success for UNOSOM II, and hamper efforts toward the overarching goals of a stable, functioning, self-governed Somalia.

Apart from the affects of the amount of resources available, in making the assumption that the U.S. military was capable of doing the job--that it was a "feasible" resource --a dilemma arises when the ramifications of introducing a military force into a target country are not fully considered.

Connaughton notes that military intervention has "a tendency to harden and polarize resistance within the target country."<sup>6</sup> It was U.S. military visibility and the way operations were conducted in Somalia along traditional military lines that fostered, in part, anti-U.S./UN sentiment in the first place; this in turn led to actions against the U.S./UN military, a corresponding increase in coalition military operations, and increasingly violent anti-U.S./UN actions, all of which spiraled out of control.

At that point, it became a matter of U.S. forces being part of the problem, not part of the solution--hardly feasible. The limitations on conventional operations in environments like Somalia tend to increase as the situation deteriorates--hence the U.S. military is less likely as time goes on to be able to rectify a crisis because the military instrument of power is geared toward a conventional approach to crisis response.

Overall, the use of military forces during Operation RESTORE HOPE was feasible. Military objectives were achieved through the use of adequate resources and overwhelming force. However, once resources, in terms of military manpower and equipment, were withdrawn, hostile clan factions were able to increase their operations; continued U.S. presence, at the levels maintained, were not feasible to accomplish the

long-term goals of the UN and aggravated the situation in applying a conventional response to clan actions.

#### Panama

In Panama, the situation was not as dire as that found in Somalia. There is a similarity in that the U.S. military acted as a superficial means to address superficial problems. The root causes of Panama's problems--primarily political, economic and social--fall outside the realm of the military's main purview, but there was no one from elsewhere in the government prepared to address even the surface issues immediately after the cessation of hostilities.

Operation JUST CAUSE provides a clear example of a feasible course of action. Once again, the U.S. applied overwhelming military force to achieve the military objectives that would create the desired strategic endstate. Resources clearly were adequate to accomplish the mission. The conventional use of military forces as an instrument of policy clearly produced success in achieving military objectives in support of clearly stated political aims.

In the aftermath of Operation JUST CAUSE, the military had enormous credibility, 26,000 forces on the ground and the feasibility of using military forces for stability operations made perfect sense. The "overwhelming force" that had been dedicated to ousting Manuel Noriega and taking down the PDF in and of itself became a stabilizing element, creating calm in the storm of all the looting and crime that took place in the days immediately following the cessation of hostilities.

As normalcy returned, however, President Bush ordered a return to pre-conflict force levels--to 13,600--as early as 15 February. Little support was available from the State Department early on; the military visibly involved at all levels of the Panamanian government and virtually in complete control of security. While capable of continuing conventional activities, it did not have the resources to accomplish more than token nation assistance, nationbuilding or military civic action, the primary focus of post-conflict operations.

Probably the most glaring shortcoming in resources was reflected in the debacle that surrounded U.S. attempts to stand up the security force. With hands tied due to legal restrictions and Ambassadorial edicts, it was virtually certain that the U.S. military would not be able to accomplish the mission. With no one else on hand to effectively coordinate the effort, and scant resources available, the mission was less than wholly successful. Politically, the resources that would have been required to ensure the Endara government not only survived, but prospered, were not made available. The U.S. provided support, but not to the degree that would ensure true democratic reform within Panama--a long term proposition that would have required an immense investment in time, manpower and dollars. The U.S., more than providing the diplomatic resources to ensure success, simply did what was necessary to preclude failure.

Economically, the resources allotted to the U.S. military and to Panama were rife with restrictions, were slow to materialize and were piecemealed out in such a way as to preclude optimal integration of military efforts into achieving national goals. The backtrack policy

that reduced the promised aid package of one billion dollars to only 420 million was further evidence that the U.S. was unwilling to make the commitment necessary to achieve the stated objectives of promoting stability and nationbuilding.

With the U.S. interests turned toward the Persian Gulf by the end of the year, Panama receded to the backwater of national interest. No one seemed willing to commit the resources (if indeed, they ever had been, and even that is questionable) that would be required to really effect change in Panama. Despite the best efforts of the military, the amount of real progress achieved toward strategic ends was minimal. The chronic problems that faced Panama at the beginning of 1990, like Somalia at the end of 1993, were far from solved.

Overall, it is clear that, while more than adequate resources were committed during the invasion phase, which allowed the U.S. military to achieve its objectives in support of national aims, the feasibility of U.S. actions after the conflict is on less solid ground. The available evidence would suggest that at no time in the post-conflict phase did U.S. rhetoric match reality through commitment of adequate resources. While it would be political nonsense to say the objective was "to promote a little stability, a little democracy, and build a little of the nation for as long as this money holds out," in effect, this would have been more realistic given the resources that were made available.

Internally to the military itself, it was assumed that the forces introduced needed little training or adjustment to perform the operations other than war that came after the cessation of hostilities.

As has been pointed out, the 193d Infantry Brigade, organic to USARSO and permanently stationed in Panama, had spent an enormous amount of time and training resources to prepare its soldiers to handle the complex nature of the situation in Panama. Other forces were less prepared;

infantrymen expecting to attack remote towns in a second wave of assaults (weeks after the last of Noriega's military had been suppressed) instead discovered Noriega's troops had surrendered, leaving them in charge of the town. . . . platoon leaders and company commanders of combat arms units were thrust into the roles of mayors and town managers with little preparation for the job.<sup>7</sup>

The above article notes that "perhaps the most enduring lesson of Operation JUST CAUSE was the need to prepare soldiers to run a country, at least briefly . . .," suggesting that military forces were not a feasible means to accomplish the post-conflict missions incurred.

#### Acceptability

Military intervention becomes "acceptable" if the "consequences of cost (justify) the importance of the effect desired."<sup>8</sup> Costs can be measured in the willingness to expend resources, number of casualties that the country is willing to bear, and how long America is willing to be committed; in other words, "comparing the resources required (means) and the benefits to be achieved (ends)."<sup>9</sup>

The Manwaring Paradigm again provides clear direction as to what will constitute likely success or failure. A strong level of consistent commitment, where the Intervening Power is willing to bear the burdens that such a commitment entails, over time, is more likely to produce success. If the commitment vacillates, and political or public



support is withdrawn if benefits are not realized quickly, the chances for failure increase.

The acceptability assessment can also gauge the costs of protracted intervention on the military itself, in terms of readiness, morale, and adaptability. It becomes a question of acceptable to whom, and exactly what the cost really is, over and above the visible cost in lost lives, or money spent. At what point does the cost of "adapting" units to operations other than war-type missions become prohibitive in terms of readiness? How does the transition from "steely-eyed killer" to benevolent peacekeeper or humanitarian relief worker affect the soldiers themselves? How long does it take to return a conventional unit to its warfighting capable status? Each case study will address these issues to the extent that information is available.

#### Somalia

The groundswell of public support to the humanitarian mission in Somalia made the cost of deployment acceptable during the UNITAF stage. Isolated loss of life was seen as a necessary element of deployment to a difficult environment and in terms of the thousands of lives that were saved, acceptable. After the redeployment of the vast majority of U.S. forces, the costs of involvement, from a manpower and resources standpoint, decreased significantly, and was deemed acceptable enough so that Congress was willing to support continued operations in that country "for years, if necessary."<sup>10</sup>

The cost of involvement escalated significantly, however, after the standup of UNOSOM II, after the UN vacated its neutrality and

involved the U.S. in support of its call to arrest Mohammed Farah Aidid and the ensuing violence that occurred in October.

The intervention was never a long-term proposition. When the decision to deploy forces to Somalia was made, optimistic policymakers estimated U.S. forces would be out of country as early as March 1993 (some even went so far as to say the U.S. would be gone before the presidential inauguration in January, although military planners saw this as totally unrealistic).<sup>11</sup> The short-term proposition helped make the costs of the intervention more palatable to the American public.

In May, with most U.S. forces home, and Somalia out of the limelight, most Americans perceived the mission as a success and felt good about the action. The loss of 15 Americans to that point had been deemed acceptable.<sup>12</sup> The situation had stabilized, at least on the surface, and maintaining a small element to help coordinate logistics and transportation in support of UN forces, along with a Quick Reaction Force for security, was equally acceptable.

When violence against the UN elements increased in June, and Mohammed Farah Aidid was targeted for arrest, the U.S. began to reassess the costs involved in what was becoming a protracted intervention. The costs of this operation became prohibitive in October--primarily because of the deaths of the 18 servicemen, and even more to the point, the visibility of the Somali desecration of those servicemen on national television.

It is clear, from a review of the feasibility assessment, that the U.S. did not enter the country for any other publicly stated purpose than to provide security for the relief agencies. The humanitarian

aspects of the mission justified the cost. When one clan faction turned this humanitarian element into a hostile response, it was confusing to Americans. They were not prepared psychologically for that eventuality, although government officials had been warned of the "tarbaby" of Somalia.<sup>13</sup>

Overall, the U.S. accomplished what it initially set out to do. The problem arose when the U.S. agreed to remain in support of the UN effort--a noble goal, but not clearly in the U.S. interests, largely unnoticed by the American public, and undermanned and underresourced. In the end, a stop-gap policy was acceptable only as long as the U.S. was "winning" and the costs remained relatively low.

From a military viewpoint, the costs can be seen as high. For a period of six months, elements of two divisions (the 10th and the 24th), a corps headquarters, and elements of an operational headquarters (USCENTCOM) and numerous support and special operating forces units were turned from their "train for war" mission to a humanitarian effort.

Current doctrine, as it is emerging, suggests that preparation for operations other than war requires "adjusting the mindset" of U.S. soldiers away from warfighting toward the more benevolent or administrative tasks required by such operations. At the same time, reports have implicitly discussed the need for much more.

In Somalia, units at times were responsible for direct coordination with not only other military units, but also non-governmental agencies and various UN elements, all with their own agenda and interests. Knowledge of the clan and sub-clan cultural climate was limited, but extremely important to understanding and instituting

effective methods of operations. In any crisis situation requiring rapid deployment of troops, especially into an area where there has been little historical U.S. interest, intervention can be difficult if the troops are not oriented to the peculiarities of the environment.

The "mind-adjustment" doctrine assumes there will be time to indoctrinate deploying forces not only in the unique characteristics of the target country, but also the intricacies of various economic, cultural, and social aspects. This is a lot of information to internalize when soldiers are also tasked to train in more traditional skills as well as prepare for and conduct a deployment. In a time critical situation like Somalia, even had all the information been available, it is doubtful the units would have had the time to avail themselves of it.

U.S. Ambassador Robert Oakley notes

Peacekeeping operations often involve more than simply keeping the peace or promoting political settlements; they also involve extensive humanitarian relief and rehabilitation; repatriating refugees and displaced persons; developing infrastructure; building institutions (such as elections and political structures); demobilizing, disarming, and reintegrating local armed forces and militias; and creating effective, impartial police and indigenous security forces. Each of these elements is vitally important for the success or failure of the overall mission.<sup>14</sup>

Having been involved in some of the operations Oakley lists, and observed military forces involved in others, I would argue that "adjusting the mindset" of forces is simply not adequate to prepare or conduct operations other than war.

In sum, the U.S. military intervention in Somalia was acceptable only to a point. The U.S. was not willing to conduct a humanitarian mission in a country not of vital interest to the national

security under hostile conditions, where humanitarian efforts were not perceived as appreciated. The reduced commitment and transition of support to a non-neutral United Nations set the stage for escalation of violence. Loss of acceptability of U.S. involvement at that point became a matter of time. The costs were too high for the benefit gained, and the Bush Administration deemed the costs of solving the underlying causes for the crisis too high at the outset.

Further, the costs of involvement in operations other than war such as Somalia can be high and indirect, but they may apply only within a military context, not against the policy as a whole. The military cost must be accepted if the policy of intervention is determined suitable at the national level. Thus, military leaders must be aware of the hidden costs of these operations, and this should be reflected in our doctrine.

#### Panama

U.S. actions in Panama were, for all intents and purposes, unilateral. The costs incurred, both before, during and after the conflict were all born by America and were considered generally acceptable. Acceptability, in this case, becomes a measurement of how much the U.S. was willing to bear to achieve the strategic goal (before and during the invasion), and then how acceptable the consequences of our investment in the country were after hostilities ceased.

Acceptability must be seen in terms of not only how much "cost" the U.S. is willing to bear, but also, in some cases, how much "cost" is imposed on the target country by U.S. action before it becomes

counterproductive to America's objective. This is true in the case of Panama. The U.S. might be willing to incur higher costs, which would in turn accomplish its own objectives, but at the same time that increased investment could cost the target country in terms of legitimacy; i.e., perceptions that it is a "puppet" of America.

Politically, U.S. diplomatic actions failed to negotiate the removal of Noriega. They encouraged anti-Noriega elements which led to a coup attempt that also failed, ending the lives of the coup leaders. The U.S. created a perception of weakness or lack of resolve, both in America and in Panama, possibly discouraging others from taking similar action (refer to Support Actions of the Intervening Power, Chapter 4). The cost to the U.S. was one of credibility; it would lead eventually to the much more costly invasion. One could argue that the U.S., unwilling to accept the cost of prestige and credibility of its failed political policies, led, in part, to the acceptability of the costs incurred during Operation JUST CAUSE.

Economically, the costs to the U.S. were somewhat indirect. Sanctions did not cost America significantly during the time they were imposed, but the costs to Panama were great, as seen in Chapter 4. The costs to the U.S. came in the form of the inherent responsibility it incurred to help rebuild the country ravaged by two years of those sanctions. The acceptability of post-conflict actions was one of degree; the U.S. was willing to pay a price to help rebuild the country; we were not willing to pay *the whole price*.<sup>15</sup>

The cost of military action in Panama prior to and during the invasion was considered acceptable. The loss of 27 servicemen was

acceptable in terms of the objective achieved; the loss of hundreds of Panamanian lives remains a bone of contention in the eyes of some.

In the post-conflict phase, acceptability again becomes one of degree. Although during the first year after the operation strategic goals were not met, or only partially achieved, the U.S. was not willing to accept any higher cost than that expended.

Politically, the cost of rhetoric was cheap until it became clear the U.S. was not the answer to all Panama's problems. Economically, the U.S. was not willing to invest the necessary money and assistance required to recreate Panama to even pre-Noriega conditions. As seen in Chapter 4, this eroded Panamanian faith in America, and hampered efforts by in-country forces to accomplish more than relatively token nation assistance.

The responsibility of most post-conflict operations was placed squarely on the military. The cost in terms of lives was relatively low (eleven killed during show of force operations in February 1990) and the costs in terms of using soldiers to "advise" the new police force, provide security, and conduct nation assistance was considered acceptable.<sup>16</sup>

Nonetheless, there were significant "hidden" costs that should be examined. From the point of view of the State Department, there is the cost of maintaining a visible military presence in the streets, which eventually worked against U.S. intentions by undermining the legitimacy of the government and the new police force. From the point of view of the Panamanian people, the cost incurred was one of over-reliance on the U.S. military to provide answers to all their problems.

Expectations on the part of the Panamanians far exceeded the limited capability of the military to respond.

This dependency on the U.S. in general and the U.S. military specifically, also worked to undermine Panamanian faith in the fledgling government of Endara, local leaders and put the U.S. in a position from which it would be difficult to extract itself from. Assistance breeds dependence; dependence breeds new requirements for assistance, which breeds not only further dependence but potential resentment in the long term.

What about the costs to the military itself? Much of the U.S. force used during the post-conflict phase consisted of specialized elements trained to conduct nation assistance operations--engineers, medical and legal experts, as well as special forces ideally suited to conduct liaison and provide advice. Their contributions were invaluable; other than the conditions noted above, their employment was acceptable. Conventional ground forces, however, who were also used during this phase, paid a higher price in terms of training and readiness.

Steven Collins, in an article for Parameters, points to some of the issues faced by one company commander in the 7th Infantry Division, whose unit was involved in Operation JUST CAUSE. The commander discussed the schizophrenic nature of training for combat, then becoming a benevolent peace enforcer:

these actions (constabulary requirements) forced the leadership in C Company to think in different terms than it was used to. Force was supposed to be used only as a last resort in order to protect lives or government property. Soldiers trained to act as warriors with



extreme violence were now constables and were to perform the unaccustomed functions of maintaining order.<sup>17</sup>

Another article notes that the missions incurred by ground force elements following the conflict were "exciting to some, a nuisance to others."<sup>18</sup> The article pointed out that most of the soldiers agreed they needed more training to deal with the non-combat related tasks that were required in a post-conflict operation.

The debate which rages today over whether to train forces for combat or operations other than war, or a little of both cannot be answered in this thesis. But in Panama, the lack of training in non-combat missions, unfamiliarity with the mundane details and tasks that inherently arise in such an environment, can take its toll on units who are prepared for conventional war.

The 193d Infantry Brigade, stationed in Panama, was prepared, but also at a cost, as described in Chapter One. While elements of the 7th Infantry Division were prepared for conventional war, and had to adjust their soldiers conduct and mindset once in country for operations other than war, the 193d was not prepared to conduct conventional combat other than invasion tasks; they had focused all training toward specific operations in Panama and were ill-trained for conventional, brigade-level employment elsewhere.

For example, while one could argue that "providing security" is a "warfighting task," applicable to both combat and operations other than war, the security missions tasked to the 193d Infantry Brigade, some of which continued nine months after the cessation of hostilities, did little to contribute to the unit's readiness--in fact, it worked against it. The conventional infantry battalions of the 193d Infantry

Brigade, after months of routine guard duties and administrative support to nationbuilding efforts, were not prepared to participate in external evaluations until a full 15 months after the conflict.<sup>19</sup>

The point of the matter is that there is a cost to units and to soldiers and to Army readiness that has not, to date, been explored to the degree that any agreement exists as to how we will prepare for both types of operations.

Training for combat will prepare soldiers to some degree for operations other than war; it will not make them capable of immediate assimilation, as was required in Operation Just Cause. If the long-term impact on the target country is reflected more by actions in a post-conflict or non-conflict environment, then conventional training and mentality may not be the best approach. Units trained for conventional combat may find themselves involved in a steep learning curve when faced with operations other than war; this certainly was true for the 7th Infantry Division.<sup>20</sup> Units who train for operations other than war need time to train for combat.

In either case, "adjusting the mindset" of soldiers may be within the realm of the "doable"; the question is the cost of the realignment of that mindset to its previous state. Virtually nothing has been published addressing this specific issue which would allow for scientific analysis; U.S. military forces seem to concentrate on the mission at hand while committed, then concentrate on how well the mission was accomplished. There is precious little analysis of the impact of that mission on the force itself as it turns back to more conventional training and operations.

Overall, Operation JUST CAUSE was an acceptable policy; the introduction of U.S. forces into Panama was deemed necessary, resourced properly, publicly supported, and the costs incurred were bearable considering the benefits gained. U.S. willingness to accept a finite cost in the aftermath of Operation JUST CAUSE was reflected throughout the course of implementation of post-conflict policies and operations.

The impact of limited acceptability once the invasion was over resonated in terms of failure to apply the political leverage needed to ensure the legitimacy of the new government, commit the funds and people needed to repair the damaged economy and provide the resources to establish an adequate security force.

Acceptability in terms of the military itself can be measured in a degradation of readiness or a lack of preparedness on the part of various units involved; it is difficult to assess the lasting impact of using forces in the manner described in operations other than war, but it must be considered as a cost incurred in intervention.

#### Suitability

To evaluate this criteria, one asks the question, "Will attainment of the objective accomplish the desired effect?" In other words, "a military objective is suitable if, when achieved, it leads to a desired political or national security objective."<sup>21</sup> Obviously, this criteria assumes that there is a rational process in the development of national security objectives in the first place. This may be, if not a faulty assumption, then one which must be measured in light of the political situation at any given time in the United States.

If some of the national objectives of intervention are based on what Sutter refers to as "the universalizing of the democratic form of government,"<sup>22</sup> then it holds that military objectives of promoting stability and democracy are consistent with the national goals. But the possibility exists, certainly in the cases of Somalia and Panama, who have little or no historical claim to democracy, that the national objectives may be based on the faulty assumption that democracy in one form or another is good for everyone. If that is true, then regardless of how well military operations are executed, the military intervention may fail, either in the short term or at some point in time.

When applied against the Manwaring Paradigm, military intervention, using overwhelming force, or forces, to achieve short term objectives proved successful. Both in Somalia and Panama, however, military intervention to achieve long-term objectives of promoting stability or democracy, or contributing to nationbuilding or nation assistance, was not suitable in that the objectives were not achieved, at least during the time period of the study. If that assessment is true, and it would appear to be from the results produced by the model, then the arguments for or against feasibility and acceptability almost become moot.

Suitability rests on the assumptions that 1) the U.S. government understands what it wants to accomplish or help to accomplish; and 2) that the military instrument of power will, in fact, accomplish that objective. Military strategy, along with the comprehensive system used to create it, is fundamentally tied to these assumptions. In other words, if the national military strategy is based on the national

security strategy, and that in turn is based on national interests, then the political variables which enter into the cohesive, organized-- indeed, almost scientific--approach to war planning must be rational. When they are not, any military strategy can be abrogated by the nebulous quality of the policy on which it is based. It is not within the scope of this study to determine the validity or invalidity of the policy established by any given administration; rather it is to bring attention to the difficulty in translating that policy into an acceptable, feasible use of military force.

In a post-Cold War environment, where the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war compress and in situations where combat and non-combat missions overlap in the arena of operations other than war and across the continuum of military operations, clear strategic objectives at the national level become more critical than ever before. When tactical units are placed in situations where they can have a strategic impact by their operations, or when the political, economic and informational instruments of national power are projected into or onto a target country through military means, then two things must happen. National objectives must be clear, and the military must be given the necessary resources, support, and the leeway to operate in such a way that it can accomplish its mission.

Further, the national level must understand that the military is not necessarily a substitute for diplomatic power, economic assistance or informational efforts. While there is a degree in all of these into which the military can assimilate and contribute, it must be remembered that, under current policy, doctrine and training, the

military is best-suited to carry out conventional operations--whether in support of unlimited war, limited war, or operations other than war.

In the case studies used for this thesis, the results of the application of the Manwaring Paradigm indicate that using military force to achieve stated national objectives became unsuitable under four conditions. Those conditions included:

1. When national objectives address only the superficial symptoms or results of a crisis, not the root problem that created the crisis.

2. When short-term national objectives became long-term ambiguous goals.

3. When military force, or forces, were substituted as the lead agency better suited to other instruments of national power (i.e., the military was the supported instrument, instead of the supporting instrument)

4. When sufficient resources, both tangible and intangible, were not provided to accomplish the mission.

Each case study will be examined to show how these conditions contributed to varying degrees of failure and at what point they caused the military instrument of power to be unsuitable to achieve the national objective.

#### Somalia

When President Bush sent troops into Somalia in December 1992, the military objective of providing security to relief operations dovetailed with the political objectives of saving the Somali people

from starvation. Under these conditions, the use of military forces was suitable, and U.S. forces performed commendably in achieving the military and political objectives.

While the U.S. succeeded in achieving those objectives, it did not focus clearly on what the overall end state would be, or an exit strategy. Policymakers did not realize that continued U.S. military presence in country, albeit at a lower level, still constituted the requirement to provide national objectives more specific than continued support to UN operations under UNOSOM II.

Also, because the political aim did not attempt to address the root causes of the crisis in Somalia--instability, civil war and clan rivalry--continued U.S. support to resolution of surface problems was bound to become unsuitable. A short-sighted policy which left forces in country to support the UN began the U.S. military slide down the "slippery slope" of a winless intervention. One article illustrated how this short-sighted policy was instituted, arguing that Americans tend to construct policy based on emotion.

The danger is that such international idealism may be shallow and short-lived, a sort of sentimentality of the privileged. These feelings-behind-policy, the Great Power subjectivism, often arise spontaneously from pictures . . . that are mainlined directly into the democracy's emotional bloodstream without the mediation of conscious thought. America got into Somalia because it felt a sane and generous outrage at the spectacle of thousands of children and other innocent people starving while gangs of thugs stole the food from their bowls. Now the majority of Americans want to withdraw from Somalia because they have felt a converse outrage at pictures of an American soldier's body gruesomely dragged through the dust, and of grinning Somalis dancing on the corpse of a helicopter. In both instances, the feelings aroused . . . have their passion and validity--as feelings. But not as solid thoughts on which to form American policy when that policy may put American lives, and many others, at risk.<sup>23</sup>

During UNOSOM II, while the United Nations envisioned an end state for Somalia, and its objectives called for establishing a secure environment, rebuilding the infrastructure, providing for elections and ending the civil war, and while the U.S. supported those aims in principle, the nation was not prepared to make the commitment necessary to achieve those goals. By leaving its troops in country, the U.S. agreed that their mission coincided with the policy goals of the United Nations. During UNOSOM II operations, as seen in chapter 3, the UN violated its own policy of neutrality, and the situation became more complex. This is the point where the use of military forces became unsuitable.

Even if one assumes that the overarching goals of security, stability and humanitarian relief remained constant, once the UN violated its policy of neutrality, the U.S. military still could not be seen as suitable. As hostility toward the UN increased, the U.S. military presence, by association, became a clan target. The resulting increase in the level of violence and tension in the capital hampered efforts to coordinate relief. The use of military force at this point is hardly conducive to promoting stability. U.S. forces not only did not promote stability, their own security was threatened; the situation would only be exacerbated by the increasing deployments of combat elements through the summer.

Further hampering the military were constraints in resources. If the U.S. military was, indeed, supporting UN policy, then it stands to reason that success, at least according to the conditions laid out in the Manwaring Paradigm, hinged on consistent commitment of adequate



resources. It is important to remember that the suitability problem arose after the drawdown of U.S. forces in country. The use of U.S. military force was introduced in the first place *because* the UN had been unable to stabilize the situation, let alone address the basic problems in the country. While the military was a suitable instrument for meeting the objectives to counter the crisis, it seems incredible that the U.S. would assume a small supporting force was also suitable, that the follow-on UNOSOM II force could solve the root problem brought on by clan warfare. The military, as a visible indicator of U.S. support, was caught between the rock of absent U.S. policy and resources and the hard place of UN requirements and increasing anti-U.S./UN sentiment among the fighting clans.

Under these conditions, the situation was bound to deteriorate. The end result was the uproar in October, when the attempt to capture Aidid ended with 18 Americans killed and 77 wounded, and the administration trying to explain what it was trying to achieve in Somalia, an explanation understandably difficult to make because there was, at that point, no established, clear, national objective.

It can be seen from this case study that U.S. policy was flawed from the beginning because it was policy based on feelings; Americans wanted to "do something," but it was not willing to make the necessary commitment to resolve the real crisis. The use of military forces became unsuitable when U.S. troops remained in country with no clearly stated national objective. At that point, despite continued tactical successes on the ground, the "war" was lost. U.S. concession of that

defeat was the complete troop withdrawal in March 1994, and an insoluble situation still existent in Somalia.

#### Panama

In Panama, again we see the success that stems from a clear connection between the national aim and the military strategy. Once the combined diplomatic, economic and informational efforts failed to produce the desired results--i.e., the ouster of Noriega--the use of military force became a suitable option to accomplish that objective, as well as the other stated goals of the operation. Deduced from the Manwaring Paradigm, the quick introduction of massive military force, supported with adequate resources and national will to achieve a clearly defined purpose was likely to produce success.

During the post-conflict phase, however, the U.S. again ran into problems of ambiguous long-term objectives, an unwillingness to address the root causes producing instability, and, in this case, a situation where the military was placed in a position of being the "supported" instrument of national power, as opposed to a "supporting" instrument.

Following Operation JUST CAUSE, the U.S. Military Support Group-Panama (USMSG-PM), tasked with conducting the majority of post-conflict operations, had, as its mission, to

conduct nation building operations to ensure democracy, internationally recognized standards of justice, and professional public services are established and institutionalized in Panama.<sup>24</sup>

Fishel notes that two of the critical terms in this mission statement are undefined: nation building and democracy. While he

argues that the ambiguity of the term "nation building" allowed the organization to "subsume" a myriad of activities to help the nation get back on its feet, in the long term, this would become counterproductive as expectations increased and resources dwindled.<sup>25</sup> He points out that the "lack of definition of democracy worked to the advantage of no one."<sup>26</sup> While these lofty goals played well in the realm of public policy, they created immense difficulty during the translation phase to military strategy and subsequently, into execution on the ground. How could success be measured? The quantitative measures used to evaluate the success of the Endara regime at the end of the first year, provided in Chapter 4, would indicate a clear lack of a winning strategy. On the other hand, the national goal of democracy, may, in fact, have been faulty to begin with. As Fishel correctly points out, the argument that

The Endara government was elected by the people of Panama. Therefore it is a democracy. Its actions are democratic. The Endara government must be made successful . . .<sup>27</sup>

was faulty on logical grounds.

In Panama, even if the vague nature of the terms could have been rectified, current doctrine indicates the military in operations such as this should play a supporting role. That the military was on the forward edge of the democracy and nation building battle is almost a contradiction, as pointed out in Chapter 4 by comments from the U.S. Ambassador. Clearly, the U.S. military was not suitable to these missions in the long term. It created a continued reliance on the U.S. military for actions and hampered efforts to legitimize the Endara government.

Panama's political and economic woes, the root causes for instability and the reason so much "nation building" was necessary in the first place, were not adequately addressed during the post-conflict phase. Not only were military forces unsuited to rebuilding the fractured economy, but their presence and "can-do" attitude probably slowed the response time of the other instruments of national power which should have been in the lead.

In Panama, the situation dictated that the military remain in the forefront of post-conflict nation building efforts. In spite of varying degrees of frustration on the part of the military as it spread into unfamiliar territory, it performed admirably under the conditions that existed. But it was not able to accomplish the objective, thereby, under the terms of the category, the military was an unsuitable instrument.

The continued visibility and involvement of U.S. military forces at all levels of the Panamanian government and virtually complete control over security throughout the first year undermined the people's faith in their government and reinforced Panama's dependence on the U.S. military, rather than instill confidence in Panamanians' ability to take care of themselves. Their presence in the undeveloped interior served to increase expectations, also indirectly undermining confidence in the government's ability to provide services. Over the long-term, using the military to provide economic assistance and conduct nation building efforts to promote democracy was the equivalent of trying to fit a square peg in a round hole. That the State Department or other government agencies were not prepared to step in early on hardly excuses

the overuse and/or misuse of military forces in post-conflict operations in Panama.

Finally, the military's efforts were sorely constrained by a lack of resources. This brings the question of suitability back to the base assumptions that the U.S. understood what its aim was and that the military was capable of accomplishing that objective. While the U.S. professed support to rebuilding Panama, the lack of commitment, seen through decreased levels of aid dollars and assistance in the form of equipment and manpower, contradicted political rhetoric on the ground. It is likely that no agency of the government would have been able to resolve the immense political, economic and social problems that existed in Panama without massive aid from the U.S. If true, then even expecting the military to "do more with less," a relative hallmark of military ingenuity, was a no-win situation from the beginning.

So, while the military was clearly a suitable instrument of national power to execute Operation JUST CAUSE, it was less suited to post-conflict operations with which it was tasked to conduct. The military did have a role to play; certainly there are unique capabilities and economical uses for military elements to contribute. To the extent it was capable, its accomplishments were admirable. From the viewpoint of the national objectives, however, the military was not suitable; the nebulous goals were almost by definition, impossible to translate into military objectives in the short term. With military forces in the lead of nation building efforts, misperceptions on the part of Panamanians were bound to result. As resources dwindled, the

prospects for success at national objectives became even more remote. The results spoke for themselves; much work remains.

In sum, both case studies represent examples of successful operations followed by failure. The feasibility study offered a clear picture of the importance of resourcing to success or failure, while acceptability assessments provide insight into the costs of intervention not only from a public policy point of view, but also on the military force itself. Studying the suitability factor proved that military forces can accomplish missions only if the national objectives are sound. Conversely, faulty national objectives, when translated into ambiguous, but generous-sounding goals, likely ensure they could not be achieved through application of military power.

#### Thesis Conclusions

In the final analysis, the study just concluded raises more questions than it answers. The problems of intervention remain unresolved, and the literature that exists currently sheds no light on a clear avenue to a sound strategy or doctrine. The case studies indicated tactical and operational success, but strategic failure. The suitability of military forces to accomplish long-range goals is totally dependent on situationally vacillating politics and policy. The feasibility and acceptability provide only peripheral considerations unless the strategy is suitable and sound.

Does a strategic point of diminishing returns exist? I believe it can, under some circumstances. The study makes a clear connection, evidenced through application of the Manwaring Paradigm, that failures

in Panama and Somalia (and ostensibly in other cases of intervention) can be traced to a lack of clear objectives, a negative change or inconsistency in the level of commitment, inadequate resourcing, and/or allowing (or forcing) the military into a lead role under conditions where it should be in a support role.

On the other hand, when a clear policy is delineated, a strong, consistent commitment is maintained, adequate resources are provided and the military is assigned a suitable role, the mission is usually successful. There are numerous other factors which can play into any given situation that will determine success or failure; as Fishel notes, there is as much, if not more, "fog" of peace as Clausewitz would argue than there is in the "fog" of war. Those foggy elements listed here simply played a major role in the case studies, and presumably would apply in similar situations.

In attempting to determine the strategic point of diminishing returns, while the thesis has produced enough evidence to indicate that at some point in both case studies efforts either failed or become counterproductive or both, the study cannot delineate where, when or exactly why that point is reached, only that it is.

It also appears that this point is hidden among a myriad of variables acted upon by people. The actions and decisions that lead to national security strategy in response to world situations is key. From the national objective, all else is determined. Harry Summers, in a recent editorial, noted Creighton Abrams belief that the national military strategy is "a great logical edifice built on a foundation of gas,"<sup>28</sup> the gas being the national security strategy.

The ramifications of a faulty national security strategy are enormous, the ramifications of which can be seen threaded throughout the tapestry of the national military strategy, military operations in support of intervention, and down to the dimensions of the Manwaring Paradigm. If the national security objective is faulty, as evidence would indicate in both the UNOSOM II phase in Somalia and the PROMOTE LIBERTY phase in Panama, then it follows that success is unlikely at some point in time or space. Whereas if the national security objective is not faulty, as in the cases of RESTORE HOPE in Somalia and JUST CAUSE in Panama, then the prognosis for success is much better, as proven by the achievements of those two missions.

It seems that the appearance or existence of some combination of the contributing factors listed above (strategic goals, consistency of commitment, proper role alignment and resourcing) are those which will indicate that a point of strategic diminishing returns is likely. Precluding selective failure in one or more areas rests at the highest levels of decision-making. The capabilities of the military can stave that point off for some time, and in isolated cases may be successful despite their presence, but in the end, the costs will be high, both in terms of mission accomplishment and to the force itself.

That the contributing factors must be decided and acted on, or prevented from occurring, by human beings affected by bureaucratic, political and situational realities, will likely result in U.S. interventions of the future continually plagued by problems largely of our own making. The military has little leeway in its response, other than to ensure the policymakers clearly understand not only capabilities



and limitations of the force, but the costs incurred in diverting combat forces to long-term missions that are not combat-oriented.

Additionally, the military must do its part to ensure that, in the vast majority of operations other than war where tactical decisions can have political as well as military ramifications, that military leaders are trained to transcend the entire continuum of military operations at all levels of war. As Colonel Horace Hunter noted,

Political, psychological or informational issues will continue to weigh as heavily as tactical or operational ones . . . The change in focus, the dwindling military assets and the changing concepts of threat all lead to the conclusion that old ways of doing business are not necessarily the best. For that matter, they may be neither appropriate nor possible.<sup>29</sup>

If operations other than war involving protracted intervention are to remain a viable mission for U.S. military forces, and every indication at this point would lead to that conclusion, then it is the responsibility of the military to do its part to work with civilian counterparts, policymakers and decisionmakers to ensure that the strategic point of diminishing returns does not occur; or, if it looms on the horizon, to take active measures to refocus strategy and operations to prevent mission failure.

Also, if the military instrument, more integrated with the other instruments of national power in operations other than war than under conventional conditions, is to be maximized, then synergy along military lines is not enough. We must look beyond the concepts of joint and combined operations, and work more closely with those who formulate policy initially, expanding our efforts to achieve interagency

interoperability and synergy. From a position of policy strength and cohesion, our chances for success are limitless.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, "Strategic Concepts," in Joint and Combined Environments, C510, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USACGSC, 2 August 1993), 27.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 28.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>See Chapter 3, endnote 27.

<sup>6</sup>Richard Connaughton, Military Intervention in the 1990s. A New Logic of War (New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hill, 1992), 40.

<sup>7</sup>Article, Army Times, December 1990, page unknown, Operation JUST CAUSE files, Fort Leavenworth Combined Arms Research Library.

<sup>8</sup>U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, "Strategic Concepts," 28.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>"Anatomy of a Disaster," Time, 142:16, 18 October 1993, 45-46.

<sup>11</sup>Personal knowledge of author, based on conversations that took place while assigned to U.S. Army Operations Center, Pentagon.

<sup>12</sup>"Anatomy of a Disaster," 42-43.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 45.

<sup>14</sup>Robert B. Oakley, "An Envoy's Perspective," in Joint Forces Quarterly, 2 (Autumn, 1993), 55.

<sup>15</sup>See Chapter 4, endnotes 37, 45, and 47.

<sup>16</sup>"Show of force" type operations, or "visibility" operations, were continued in Panama long after the cessation of hostilities. During one of these operations in February 1990, to the sparsely populated area west of Colon, weather and pilot error contributed to a catastrophic accident which left four aviators and seven infantrymen dead, and two helicopters destroyed. The mission was aborted; nor was a subsequent

mission launched, leaving one to question the criticality of the mission in the first place.

<sup>17</sup>Steven N. Collins, "Just Cause Up Close: An Infantryman's View of LIC," in Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, 22:2, Summer 1992, 56.

<sup>18</sup>Army Times article, page unknown, December 1990, Operation JUST CAUSE Files, CARL.

<sup>19</sup>Michael G. Snell, Colonel, USA (Ret), interview with author, December 1993.

<sup>20</sup>See note 31, Chapter One. The "warfighter" mentality was also exemplified by the 7th ID's refusal to order its soldiers out of combat battle dress for at least two months after the cessation of hostilities. Their aggressive nature in operations in the interior, while counterproductive enough, would have been even more damaging had they entered the capital that way. Training and "tradition" were the reasons the 7th ID (Light) remained in combat field dress and maintained the emphasis on warfighting as long as they were deployed. The author was assigned to 7th ID during its transition to a light division and can attest to that mentality.

<sup>21</sup>U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, "Strategic Concepts," 28.

<sup>22</sup>Richard L. Sutter, "The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action," in John W. De Pauw and George A. Luz, Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990), 140.

<sup>23</sup>"The Trouble with Good Intentions," Time 142:16 (18 October 1993) 37-38.

<sup>24</sup>John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 15 April 1992), 43.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>Creighton Abrams, quoted in Harry Summers, "Clinton Security Policy is Fuzzy and Flawed," Army Times, 54:34 (21 March 1994), 62.

<sup>29</sup>Colonel Horace L. Hunter, Jr. (USA, Ret), "Ethnic Conflict and Operations Other Than War," in Military Review, 73:11 (November 1993), 20.

TABLE 1

## MOST IMPORTANT VARIABLES BY LONG TERM DIMENSIONS

| MILITARY ACTIONS<br>BY THE<br>INTERVENING POWER | SUPPORT ACTIONS<br>BY THE<br>INTERVENING POWER | HOST GOVERNMENT<br>LEGITIMACY                | DEGREE OF SUPPORT<br>TO DESTABILIZING<br>FORCES  |
|---|--|--|--|
| NUMBER OF TROOPS<br>(FEWER IS BETTER)           | CONSISTENT<br>MILITARY SUPPORT                 | DEGREE OF<br>DOMESTIC SUPPORT                | SANCTUARY<br>AVAILABLE?                          |
| TYPES OF ACTION                                 | PERCEIVED<br>STRENGTH OF<br>COMMITMENT         | GOVERNMENT<br>ABILITY TO<br>PROVIDE SERVICES | DESTABILIZING<br>FORCES ISOLATED<br>FROM SUPPORT |
| UNCONVENTIONAL<br>OPERATIONS                    | PERCEIVED LENGTH<br>OF COMMITMENT              | POLITICAL<br>VIOLENCE<br>CONSIDERED COMMON   | STAGE OF WAR WHEN<br>SANCTUARY<br>AVAILABLE      |
|   |  | HOST GOVERNMENT<br>SEEN AS CORRUPT           |  |

TABLE 2

## MOST IMPORTANT VARIABLES BY SHORT-TERM DIMENSIONS

| ACTIONS VERSUS<br>SUBVERSION | HOST GOVERNMENT<br>MILITARY ACTIONS            | UNITY OF EFFORT  |
|------------------------------|--|--|
| POPULATION CONTROLS          | DISCIPLINE/ TRAINING<br>OF REGULAR TROOPS      | PERCEPTIONS OF<br>INTERVENING POWER'S<br>INTERESTS         |
| PSYOP                        | DISCIPLINE/ TRAINING<br>OF PARAMILITARY FORCES | CLARITY OF TERMS FOR<br>SETTLEMENT                         |
| INTELLIGENCE<br>OPERATIONS   | WILLINGNESS TO TAKE<br>OFFICER CASUALTIES      | INTERVENING POWER/HOST<br>GOVERNMENT POLITICAL<br>POLARITY |
|                              | AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING                          |  |

TABLE 3

## MOST IMPORTANT VARIABLES BY LONG TERM DIMENSION - SOMALIA

| MILITARY ACTIONS<br>BY THE<br>INTERVENING<br>POWER (-)     | SUPPORT ACTIONS<br>OF THE<br>INTERVENING<br>POWER (-)        | HOST GOVERNMENT<br>LEGITIMACY (-)                                   | DEGREE OF<br>SUPPORT TO<br>INSURGENCY OR<br>OPPOSITION (-)            |
|--|--|---|---|
| NUMBER OF TROOPS<br>(FEWER IS BETTER<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE | CONSISTENT<br>MILITARY SUPPORT<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE         | DEGREE OF<br>DOMESTIC SUPPORT<br><br>RATED NEUTRAL                  | SANCTUARY<br>AVAILABLE (?)<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE                      |
| TYPES OF ACTION<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE                      | PERCEIVED<br>STRENGTH OF<br>COMMITMENT<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE | GOVERNMENT<br>ABILITY TO<br>MOTIVATE PEOPLE<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE   | CLAN FACTIONS<br>ISOLATED FROM<br>SUPPORT<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE       |
| UNCONVEN-TIONAL<br>OPERATIONS<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE        | PERCEIVED LENGTH<br>OF COMMITMENT<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE      | POLITICAL<br>VIOLENCE<br>CONSIDERED<br>COMMON<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE | STAGE OF WAR<br>WHEN SANCTUARY<br>WAS AVAILABLE<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE |
|  |  | HOST GOVERNMENT<br>SEEN AS CORRUPT<br><br>RATED NEUTRAL             |   |



TABLE 4

## MOST IMPORTANT VARIABLES BY SHORT TERM DIMENSIONS - SOMALIA

| ACTIONS VERSUS<br>SUBVERSION<br>(-)              | HOST GOVERNMENT<br>MILITARY ACTIONS (-)                             | UNITY OF EFFORT<br>(-)   |
|--|---|--|
| POPULATION CONTROL<br><br>RATED NEUTRAL          | DISCIPLINE/ TRAINING<br>OF REGULAR TROOPS<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE     | PERCEPTIONS OF<br>INTERVENING POWERS<br>INTERESTS<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE          |
| PSYOP<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE                      | DISCIPLINE/ TRAINING<br>OF PARAMILITARY FORCES<br><br>RATED NEUTRAL | CLARITY OF TERMS FOR<br>SETTLEMENT<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE                         |
| INTELLIGENCE<br>OPERATIONS<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE | WILLINGNESS TO TAKE<br>OFFICER CASUALTIES<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE     | INTERVENING POWER/<br>HOST GOVERNMENT<br>POLITICAL POLARITY<br><br>RATED NEUTRAL |
|  | AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE                         | USE OF PUBLIC<br>DIPLOMACY<br><br>RATED POSITIVE                                 |

TABLE 5

## MOST IMPORTANT VARIABLES BY LONG TERM DIMENSIONS - PANAMA

| MILITARY ACTIONS<br>BY THE<br>INTERVENING<br>POWER (-)         | SUPPORT ACTIONS<br>BY THE<br>INTERVENING<br>POWER<br>(-)     | HOST GOVERNMENT<br>LEGITIMACY<br>(-)                                | DEGREE OF<br>SUPPORT TO<br>DESTABILIZING<br>FORCES (-)                 |
|--|--|---|--|
| NUMBER OF TROOPS<br>(FEWER IS<br>BETTER)<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE | CONSISTENT<br>MILITARY SUPPORT<br><br>RATED NEUTRAL          | DEGREE OF<br>DOMESTIC SUPPORT<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE                 | SANCTUARY<br>AVAILABLE?<br><br>RATED NEUTRAL                           |
| TYPES OF ACTION<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE                          | PERCEIVED<br>STRENGTH OF<br>COMMITMENT<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE | GOVERNMENT<br>ABILITY TO<br>PROVIDE SERVICES<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE  | DESTABILIZING<br>FORCES ISOLATED<br>FROM SUPPORT<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE |
| UNCONVEN-TIONAL<br>OPERATIONS<br><br>RATED NEUTRAL             | PERCEIVED LENGTH<br>OF COMMITMENT<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE      | POLITICAL<br>VIOLENCE<br>CONSIDERED<br>COMMON<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE | STAGE OF WAR<br>WHEN SANCTUARY<br>AVAILABLE<br><br>RATED NEUTRAL       |
|  |  | HOST GOVERNMENT<br>SEEN AS CORRUPT<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE            |  |

TABLE 6

MOST IMPORTANT VARIABLES BY SHORT TERM DIMENSIONS - PANAMA

| ACTIONS VERSUS<br>SUBVERSION (-)                 | HOST GOVERNMENT<br>MILITARY ACTIONS (-)                              | UNITY OF EFFORT<br>(-)   |
|--|--|--|
| POPULATION CONTROL<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE         | DISCIPLINE/ TRAINING<br>OF REGULAR TROOPS<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE      | PERCEPTIONS OF<br>INTERVENING POWERS<br>INTERESTS<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE          |
| PSYOP<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE                      | DISCIPLINE/ TRAINING<br>OF PARAMILITARY FORCES<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE | CLARITY OF TERMS FOR<br>SETTLEMENT<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE                         |
| INTELLIGENCE<br>OPERATIONS<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE | WILLINGNESS TO TAKE<br>OFFICER CASUALTIES<br><br>RATED NEUTRAL       | INTERVENING POWER/<br>HOST GOVERNMENT<br>POLITICAL POLARITY<br><br>RATED NEUTRAL |
|  | AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING<br><br>RATED NEGATIVE                          | USE OF PUBLIC<br>DIPLOMACY<br><br>RATED NEUTRAL                                  |

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